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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Politics of Collective Belonging: Loyalties in  
the European Union. (December 2005) 
Sibel McGee, B.S., Middle East Technical University; 
M.S., Middle East Technical University; 
M.A., Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universität-Bonn 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John D. Robertson 
 
 
 
 Why do some citizens of the European Union feel indeed European and 
others do not? Although the officials of the European Union introduced many 
symbols and discourses of unity, empirical studies show that the development of a 
sense of belonging at the popular level is slow. This dissertation, by drawing upon 
the established social identity theories, takes the investigation back to basics. It 
develops a model consisting of the basic premises of the identity theories as well as 
factors deriving from national and individual contexts that condition individual 
experiences relating to the aforementioned premises. Rather than developing new 
theories, this work’s contribution to the study of European identity is that the study 
presents as complete a model as possible based on the existing theoretical 
frameworks as a cross-sectional analysis. Doing so, it unifies the disconnected 
literature on the issue within a consistent theoretical logic and cross-validates the 
patterns found in 15 countries through a large N multivariate analysis based on the 
Eurobarometer 2000. Results yield that social identity theories are confirmed in the 
case of European identity except for external demarcation principle. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 We are not forming coalitions among states but union among peoples. 
 -Jean Monnet 
 
 Students of political science have long been preoccupied with questions of 
identity and political loyalty. In fact, the authority- identity- legitimacy triangle 
presents one of the oldest puzzles for political science. At issue is how to legitimize 
the governing power over the governed in order to ensure genuine popular support 
for the political system and compliance with the requirements of the authority 
without coercion through the use of force. Identity, indeed, holds the key for this task 
as it is the ultimate symbol of solidarity with a collectivity and loyalty to the 
authority that is exercised over that group. 
Ethnic and racial identities as well as national identities are studied in their 
own right and are also seen as independent variables that significantly affect political 
outcomes across different political systems (e.g., Weber 1983; Katzenstein 1996). 
Social boundary formation that accompanies collective identities conditions how we 
perceive ourselves and form images of others. Identity frames our views of who we 
are and why and how we are different from ‘others’. The definition of interest, 
perceptions of security, norms of proper treatment towards in-group and out-group 
members are all filtered through our understanding of where we stand and where we 
belong (Risse et al 1999; Katzenstein 1996; Keohane 1993; Mahant 1995; Jervis 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Political Science. 
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1999). Based on these conceptions of self and ‘other’, the lenses through which 
everyday events as well as the historical episodes and future prospects are evaluated 
will change. This is because calculation of costs and benefits do not take place in a 
vacuum. In fact, individual and collective action “presupposes a normative context 
informed by multiple and collective identities” (Mayer and Palmowski 2004, 578). 
As such, the concept of identity offers compelling explanations for a range of diverse 
political phenomena. 
 For example, the link between foreign policy and national identity is 
confirmed in many studies. Public approval of use of force against culturally 
dissimilar nations is higher compared to culturally similar nations (Geva and Hanson 
1999).1  A similar case of in-group bias presents itself as European governments 
show favoritism towards refugees from culturally similar countries by granting them 
formal refugee status (Welsh 1993, 14). Threat perceptions are closely related to 
identity constructs. The same action realized by two different nations—one perceived 
as an ally and one perceived as an enemy—will lead to different perceptions of threat 
and yield different courses of national foreign policies (e.g., see Campbell 1992).2 
Even the regime type of a country can be affected by the social identities of its 
citizens. Those societies that harbor cross-cutting identities are more conducive to 
democratic processes (Lipset 1960; Lijphart 1977). Similarly, the British resistance 
to delegating a full-fledged control to the European Union has a lot to do with the 
historical British identity. Unlike Britain, German embrace of the EU has been 
                                                 
1 The discourse of the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11 on ‘axis of evil’ is a recent 
illustration of identity informed foreign policy. Thus the nature of identities could be the very variable 
that determines whether one course of action prevails over the other. 
2 We often see foreign policy controversies between nations with an uneasy history where whether a 
military move is offensive or defensive is debated.  
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caused by deep identity concerns. The reluctance of the European Union states to 
admit Turkey into full membership, besides many alternative explanations, can be 
reasoned from an identity perspective. Can the experiment of the regional integration 
achieved within the EU be replicated in any other parts of the world? A compelling 
answer to this question can hardly avoid touching upon the identity issue. 
Identity is also closely related to the possibility of social movements and 
collective action. As Cerulo puts it  
Identities emerge and movements ensue because collectives consciously 
 coordinate action; group members consciously develop offenses and defenses, 
 consciously insulate, differentiate, and mark, cooperate and compete, 
 persuade and coerce…[c]ollective agency includes a conscious sense of group 
 as agent. Further, collective agency is enacted in a moral space. A collective 
 pursues the freedom to be because that which frames the collective’s identity 
 defines their existence as right and good (1997, 393-394).   
 In some cases, identity, rather than an alternative angle, is one of the 
indispensable components of an explanation. For instance, Risse et al. (1999) argue 
that national decisions regarding the adoption of Euro cannot be reasoned alone by 
economic or geostrategic concerns. Identity politics, accordingly, played an 
important role in determining whether the adoption of Euro was a legitimate decision 
in light of national identity constructs and its relationship to a European self. Hooghe 
and Marks (2004) show that national identity rather than economic interests explain a 
greater part of the variance in support for European integration. Frognier (2002) 
argues that European elections are wrongfully categorized as ‘second order 
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elections’, for an identity perspective is able to explain electoral participation free of 
national elections.  
 There are more ordinary and ‘close to home’ type of situations where we 
encounter identity questions as well. Every time an individual applies for a job that 
requires a particular citizenship, his/her identity is at issue. The controversial 
question of why some countries’ military force includes females and other countries’ 
military force does not is related to the local (gender) identity discourses. What can 
be more about classifying individuals according to their identities than the visa 
requirements for different nationalities? In sum, the concept of identity serves as a 
powerful tool to make sense of things that happen around us, for it is no less than 
what forms the cognitive roots of nonrandom social and political behavior. Jenkins, 
referring to the significance of understanding identities, posits that identity is “the 
best device that I know for bringing together ‘public issues’ and ‘private troubles’ 
and encouraging us to use one to make sense of the other” (1996, 3).3 
Perhaps owing to this strategic potential to color perceptions, claim loyalties, 
and mobilize masses, identities—despite the common misconception—are not 
formed on objective bases. Quite the reverse, collective identity formation is a 
historical process of social and political construction.4 Problematizing identities 
                                                 
3 Both the understanding of world politics and comparative politics may benefit from the identity 
studies. Neumann argues that the study of collective identity formation “offers a way of studying what 
the English school of international relations calls international society as an intersubjectively 
constituted structure of identities and interests which is endogamous and constitutive to the 
international system” (1996, 168). Furthermore, there is a link between international relations and 
comparative politics, one that benefits from understanding the interplay of local and national 
identities. For example, civil unrest in a country is often a result of unsettled ethnic identities. 
International wars are frequent ways to settle irreconcilable perceptions of capabilities and self-
definitions. The question of wars among multi-ethnic nations can only be settled by studying the 
interplay of various identities. 
4 This study largely agrees with the constructivist school of thought on identity politics. Accordingly, 
collective ideas as to belonging are socially constructed, and can and will change as a result of social 
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instead of treating them as givens of social/political life is necessary not only because 
identities are largely politicized, but also because no identity is inevitable. If we 
accept that it is reductionist to treat each cultural context as inevitably leading to a 
single and one identity construct, it becomes necessary to argue that there is more 
than one possible way of creating an identity discourse in every collectivity. Social 
and political actors develop discourses where they manipulate the salience and appeal 
of some dimensions over others suggesting different and often alternative definitions 
of who a collective is. By the same token, the target group has some say in the 
definition of the group, for ultimately an identity option is not internalized and 
assumed if the target group does not feel that such a definition is a genuine 
representation of their self-understanding. Identity is, then, a way of defining 
ourselves, a way of being defined as well as the interaction of the two. During this 
process of mutual bargaining, identities are not mute in the face of cost-benefit 
analyses. Both material and nonmaterial incentives deriving from alternative 
identities infiltrate into the evaluation of which identity one is likely to assume.  
For example, the Native American consciousness in the US grew parallel to 
the “changing federal Indian policies, increased American ethnic politics and 
growing American Indian political activism” (Nagel 1995 as cited in Cerulo 1997, 
390). Changing content of Scottish identity is another good example of this. As Ichijo 
(2002, 13-15) explains, close historical ties with Europe are recently re-discovered in 
Scottish discourse to differentiate Scotts from the British with the rise of the Scottish 
national movement. Strong argues that the link between self and order evolved from 
the “human understanding that there is a choice to be made as to with whom and how 
                                                                                                                                          
bargaining, political and historical negotiations, institutional  and power structures and public policy-
making. 
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one will live—that humans and human lives are and can be shaped by humans 
themselves” (1992, 9 as cited in Neumann 1996, 140). Thus, identities are no less 
than individual choices assumed as a result of tactical thinking and should be treated 
as such. In other words, identities are not to be taken for granted, rather they need to 
be explained before they can explain anything else. 
Although it is national identities that have attracted the most attention from 
the students of political science, the recent trends of globalization and transnational 
social networking (in the form of social movements, multinational corporations, 
international organizations and the like) have expanded the process of social 
construction of identities below and beyond the nation-state level. It is well known 
that starting from the second half of the 20th century, nation-state as the leading unit 
of political organization has been experiencing challenges to its sovereignty from 
both below and above. Rosenau (1990) referring to the growing transnationalism 
argues that the nation-state is facing both a ‘micro’ and a ‘macro’ revolution in the 
way we organize politics. As subnational movements challenge the central states and 
dominant national identities, suprastate initiatives facilitate nation-states giving up 
their sovereignties to integrate their economies and societies. Both of these processes 
have clearly political as well as identity implications. These developments challenge 
the ability of the nation-state to be responsive directly and exclusively to its citizens. 
This, in turn, is bound to interrupt the bond between the citizens and the nation-
states, a bond that once was thought to be in the exclusive monopoly of the nation-
states. The decline of the nation-state is however not same as decline of nations 
Croucher (2003) argues that nations might imagine their self-understanding in ways 
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that are different from the past. But the imagining of nations per se does not change. 
In other words, contemplation of nations- although in different forms- is permanent.  
The most prominent example of the suprastate initiatives is the case of the 
European Union (EU)5 where the process of regional integration has achieved an 
unprecedented success in establishing an extensive range of economic and political 
governance structures and in unifying disparate nations into a unique polity, 
making—perhaps for the first time—collective transnational identities a compelling 
alternative to regional, ethnic and national identities. When the EU was established 
as a means of handling peace and the German question, the founding fathers of the 
Union expected that the integration process started in the economic field would soon 
gain a dynamic of its own and ‘spill over’ into other fields leading to a federalist 
United States of Europe.6 This dominant neofunctionalist logic and preoccupation 
with the supranational politics to create an integrated market structure resulted in an 
opaque and complex bureaucratic giant that impacts everyday lives of Europeans 
without their direct consent. For decades, building economic and political institutions 
of Europe has prevailed over social integration of Europeans into a transnational 
community since European elites and government officials took Europeans’ support 
for new Europe for granted. The passive stand of the EU on transforming peoples’ 
thinking on identity was due to the expectation that the establishment of new 
institutions, joint policies, concerted actions, common experiences and increasing 
contacts/communications among the European people would inevitably result in 
European identity. 
                                                 
5 In this dissertation, the term EU is meant to cover all the preceding phases of the European 
integration process. 
6 Haas (1958) is the most widely recognized source on the general link between neofunctionalism 
within the integration process and the transfer of loyalties. 
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Today the empirical evidence and public polls show that the European Union 
is slow in bringing about social/cultural integration at European level compared to its 
speed of integration in other realms. This is all the more alarming for the European 
Union as it proceeds through an ever closer unification of 25 member states. In 
addition to ‘widening’, the extent of ‘deepening’ requires coming to terms with the 
issue of a collective European identity.7 The initial predominance of the economic 
issues in the integration process has changed dramatically particularly after the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (otherwise known as the Treaty on the 
European Union). The Maastricht Treaty not only officially announced the initiation 
of a political union among the member states, but also extended the jurisdiction of 
the European governance into the strategic domains. As more and more strategic 
competences are transferred from the nation-state to the EU, the process of 
Europeanization is not confined only to the economic unification of the EU 
countries. What the EU sets out to do is a reconfiguration of the loyalties of 
European citizens between various levels of governance.  As such, the EU initiates an 
unprecedented process of transformation in mentalities and thinking of European 
people as to where they belong in relation to other Europeans as well as ‘non-
Europeans’.  
In fact, considering the extent of integration achieved, it would be a 
reductionist evaluation of the European Union to treat it as anything less than a social 
enterprise bringing previously disconnected individuals together to interact and form 
new images about each other. It is a force driving the evolution of a compelling and 
                                                 
7 In the literature of European studies, the ‘widening’ refers to the enlargement of the EU by accepting 
new member states. The ‘deepening’, on the other hand, is concerned with the strengthening of the 
institutional structures within the EU in a way to reinforce a more supranational (rather than 
intergovernmental) functioning. 
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uniquely ‘European’ way of life that is defined in opposition to non-European 
cultural constructs along with the associated values and norms. The complex effects 
of the EU policies on culture/identities can best be seen in the inevitable effect such 
policies are having on the definition of Europeans and non-Europeans. Within the EU 
such definitions lead to rise of hostility to non-European immigrants and electoral 
success of right-wing parties as well as regionalist movements. 8 Hedetoft argues that 
the state of European Integration has transformed politics to an extent that it  
impinge[s] in a serious way on traditional ‘givens’ of European politics, 
culture and identity: the nation state as the principle organizing unit of 
European modernity; territorial nationalism as the overriding and uncontested 
form of political allegiance and cultural belonging; the nature and number of 
boundaries; the character and implications of sovereignty; the dividing line 
between domestic and foreign policies and much more (1998, 1). 
All these trends are important to understand as they answer many questions 
that deeply affect the broader social science studies: is the nation-state becoming 
obsolete? Are there other ways to organize politics beyond the familiar framework of 
nation-state to legitimately handle public policy and represent masses? Can the EU 
successfully disentangle territories and identities and offer a viable new locus of 
superordinate social identification? Should the EU be considered as a field of study 
for International Relations or Comparative Politics? 
 Following these trends, students of European integration began their efforts to 
explain European integration’s identity forming consequences. Recently, there is a 
renewed sense of urgency to understand European identity as this new sense of 
                                                 
8The European unification process caused a revival of nationalism. The Heider government in Austria 
was a good example of the rise of extreme right-wing mentality in some of the member states.  
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Europeanness can be the very phenomenon that helps us understand the future 
process of institutionalization and integration. National decisions to adopt Euro or to 
join the Schengen zone, referenda results on joining the EU or on treaty ratifications 
are all affected by the formation of a collective sense of belonging at the European 
level. Particularly, the current constitutional crisis indicates the role of European 
identity in motivating or curtailing a new wave of deepening in the EU. In other 
words, evolving European identity is taking on a life of its own, acting as an 
independent variable explaining cognitive sources of new political developments and 
policies within the EU. The identity issue has become a mutually reinforcing two-
lane process with dynamics that challenge the comfortable sets of assumptions of 
European politics and national cultures. 
This study presents a theoretical framework that draws upon the existing 
theories of Social Identity and Multiple Identities with the goal of comparatively 
investigating the sources of collective identity within the European Union as it 
pertains to the individual variation in the member states of the level of European 
identity relative to national identities.9 It tests the empirical data from the 
Eurobarometer survey to see whether the patterns suggested by the established 
Identity Theories hold in the case of European Identity as a form of social identity. 
Thus, the following research question dominates this dissertation: what are the 
sources of the adherence to national and European identities in the European Union? 
There is a theoretical and a substantive reason for the choice of European 
identity to study as a particular instance of identity: Theoretically, collective 
                                                 
9 Although European identity—in addition to a popular sense of belonging to the EU— can be 
understood as the institutional identity of the EU as it relates to the other states as well as transnational 
institutions in an international system, it is the former that is what this study aims at understanding. 
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European identity suggests an interesting opportunity to unpack the concept of 
identity, not only because formation of a sense of belonging in the European Union is 
still an ongoing process, but also because European identity as a form of 
transnational social identity has not been systematically investigated. What causes 
the variation among Europeans to feel attached to the EU as a political entity remains 
as an inadequately studied question. In fact, there is a general scarcity of 
investigation on the issue of identity not only in cohesive conceptual terms, but also 
in the empirical sense in European studies. Many studies on European identity rely 
on haphazardly formed single hypotheses without the cohesive framework of a 
unifying theoretical logic. Some studies (e.g., Inglehart 1970) evaluate European 
identity at superficial levels, forgetting identity is a sociological concept and identity-
related processes are conditioned by social relations. Others only use partial theories 
to highlight particular aspects of European identity. Thus, by bringing the insights of 
a cohesive theoretical framework, I aim to improve our theoretical understanding of 
European identity and do so through as coherent and complete a model as possible.  
As mentioned earlier, study of European identity also suffers from inadequate 
empirical validation. The majority of the conclusions rely on single country studies 
or a comparative case study of few countries.10 Although in many single case studies, 
different identities below and above the respective nation-state are evaluated, the 
patterns within a single nation are not likely to hold across the EU. Furthermore, 
many studies rely on descriptive and correlative relationships that cannot claim to 
                                                 
10 I do not intend to challenge the logic of single or comparative case study here. However, it is well 
established in the literature that there is a widespread variation within the EU countries in terms of 
willingness to identify with the EU, possibly pointing to the diverse national contexts affecting 
perceptions of the EU. As such, research on the European identity needs the cross-validation of 
analysis across all the EU member states. 
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test robustly significance of various factors for European identity. Thus, although I 
do not design new theories of identity, I intend to make a contribution to the study of 
the European identity by uniting existing theories and testing their logic in a complex 
and sophisticated model across the EU. 
Substantively, understanding the peculiarities of this identity, along with the 
conditions that trigger its development, is significant for two reasons: firstly, 
applicability of integration models to other parts of the world where we see regional 
trading blocks (such as Mercosur- the common market of South America’s southern 
cone) may promise [re]construction of social identities and broader cultures in ways 
that can unite and harmonize people who previously could not transcend historical 
prejudices, ethnic stereotypes and nationalistic conflicts. The European integration 
process is concerned with the role of the EU institutions and social interactions as a 
means of reorienting images and weltanschauung11 in a peaceful way to form and 
sustain new forms of solidarity among war-torn people. Without the experience of 
the European integration, the current state of German-French cooperation and 
understanding would be beyond any imagination. In fact, some scholars argue that 
the European Union provides the biggest evidence for one of the most compelling 
research programs in political science known as ‘democratic peace’. 
Secondly, understanding this new identity is significant for Europe and its 
future itself. The issue of a collective European identity goes to the heart of the 
legitimacy of the European Union revealing the limits of integration. There is an 
extensive literature about the problem of “democratic deficit” in the EU. In this 
literature, it is well established that the genuine attachment of Europeans to the EU is 
                                                 
11 Weltanschauung: world-view, my translation. 
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a prerequisite for the success of increasingly supranational policies that often have 
nation-state transcending implications. Without such durable allegiance from 
European citizens, the legitimacy and the democraticness of the EU will remain in 
question. As Bellier and Wilson argue “the building of the EU is not only a process 
of harmonization and integration, but one of legitimization, in which the structures 
and aims of the EU must find approval and meaning among its people” (2000, 15). 
Thus, understanding the sources of a sense of belonging at the European level will 
have policy implications for advancing this identity by rendering the EU more 
relevant and useful to the everyday social experiences of its citizens. 
With these reasons in mind, in chapter II, I introduce a detailed introduction 
to the issue of European identity by discussing the reasons behind the recent 
popularity of European identity studies.  As a form of an individual sense of 
belonging, European identity gained its current significance because of several 
factors ranging from the controversial Maastricht Treaty, extending jurisdiction of 
the EU, legitimacy problems of the EU and the end of Cold War. I also present a 
brief case for possible different meanings of European identity to clarify the issue 
that different discourses evoke these different identity understandings. I focus on a 
more modern understanding of the concept of European identity that is a result of the 
unification process within the EU rather than one imagined on historical/ethnic 
terms. After reviewing the EU’s own efforts to create a European consciousness and 
the obstacles in the way of such a collective sense of belonging to a European 
collective, I also revisit selected works from previous literature highlighting main 
findings, showing that empirical and systematic analyses of the topic have been 
inadequate. The main purpose of the chapter II is to appreciate the significance of the 
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issue of European identity for the broader project of building a genuine Union in 
Europe and to prepare a context to situate the discussions of substantive qualities and 
conditions of identity formation within the EU.  
In chapter III, I present my case with regard to the prospects of a European 
identity in the framework of social psychological theories. Even though the symbols 
and other strategies used by the European policy makers can serve to increase the 
recognition of the EU among ordinary citizens, they, alone, cannot guarantee the 
emergence of a compelling and genuine popular attachment to the political system of 
Europe. If European identity is to be a compelling self-conceptualization, it should 
not be seen as a case of Fremdzuschreibung imposed on the EU citizens by the elites, 
but as a subjective sense of self internalized by the EU citizens; hence as a case of 
Selbstzuschreibung (Lessar 2000, 2 as cited by Edwards 2003, 9)12. With this 
conviction, I introduce main principles of the established Social Identity and Nested 
Identity theories and apply them to the case of European identity. Drawing on these 
theories, I expect that individuals identify with only those groups that they hold a 
positive image of and are empowered by and have affect for. I also discuss the social 
demarcation process inherent in every social identity formation within the context of 
the EU. The constraints on one’s ability to socially relate to and experience the EU 
are conceptualized both at national and individual levels.  Accordingly, national and 
individual contexts both condition an EU citizen’s perception of the EU as the 
opportunity structures and meaning of the EU changes depending on the 
configurations of individual and national characteristics.  
                                                 
12 Fremdzuschreibung: imposed on by others; Selbstzuschreibung: self-imposed/ self-adopted, my 
translation. 
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 In chapter IV, I present the specific model of European identity derived from 
social identity theories discussed in chapter III and explain the respective 
propositions. I test some of these propositions through a Multinomial Regression 
based on data majority of which are compiled from Eurobarometer 53 (2000), 
deferring those components of the theory that the data availability prevents me from 
testing at the time being to future research. 
 Finally, in chapter V, I offer some conclusions based on the most important 
findings of the empirical analysis and discuss the implications of these results for the 
future prospects of European integration process. I pay some attention to the current 
constitutional crisis the EU is facing and the inherent link between an EU 
Constitution and the collective that such constitution is expected to represent. I also 
present some suggestions for future research in consciousness of the issues that are 
not covered in this study and could enhance our understanding of the evolving 
European identity.  
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CHAPTER II 
EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
 Europe is a useful and vague expression, designating an amalgam of countries 
 and groupings that are essentially diverse, encircled by the shifting 
 framework of a peninsula with neither geographical nor historical boundaries. 
 -J. Bardoux, ‘Diversite de l’Europe’, L’Europe’en, 29 April 1931, pp.1-2, as 
 cited by Deschamps (2002, 93). 
 
Remained as a dormant issue for decades, European identity has recently 
become a popular topic both in the governing and academic circles. European elites 
focus their explicit efforts to connect with their citizens while scholars try to 
understand this newly evolving identity and its peculiarities. Since this newly 
evolving identity does not develop in a vacuum, in this chapter, I present a detailed 
introduction to the issue by firstly discussing the reasons behind the recent popularity 
of the topic.  I also present a brief case for different meanings of European identity 
siding with a more modern (civic and universalist) understanding of the concept 
rather than one that is based on a discourse of common historical and 
cultural/religious traditions of European nations. After reviewing the EU’s own 
efforts to create a European consciousness and the related obstacles, I also revisit 
selected works from previous literature highlighting main findings, and contend that 
empirical and systematic analyses of the topic have been inadequate. These 
discussions will help me situate the issue at hand in its proper context and explore the 
genesis and development of a new collective identity at the European level. 
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Before, however, proceeding with the phenomenon of European identity, a 
logical place to begin the discussion is to clarify what I mean by identity and why it 
is important to understand the implications of identity for political/social life. Identity 
is a way of categorizing ourselves as to where we fit in the social environment that 
surrounds us. Accordingly, one deems oneself as part of a group because one is 
similar (perhaps identical) to others comprising that group and precisely because one 
is different from those who are considered unfit in that particular group. Jenkins 
posits that “social identity is a characteristic or property of humans as social beings” 
(1996, 3). Identity is that through which our existence gains meaning in relation to 
others. Precisely because of its meaning constructing implication, Jenkins argues that 
identities cannot be anything but social for meaning is not just out there. It is “always 
the outcome of agreement or disagreement, always a matter of convention and 
innovation, always to some extent shared, always to some extent negotiable” (1996, 
4), hence “social identity, is, therefore, no more essential than meaning; it too is the 
product of agreement and disagreement, it too is negotiable” (1996, 5).  
Identity as a concept is both dependent on and prior to many things that we 
are involved in our everyday lives and social relations. It is dependent on the outside 
stimuli such as social relations, interactions with others, communicative processes, 
negotiations and power relations. Identity is not inevitable, automatic or given but a 
consequence of the combination of the influences of these processes. It is through 
aforementioned social processes that identities are formed and subsequently changed, 
revised and transformed. Identities are also prior to many things in the sense that our 
evaluation of our environment, others, others’ actions and intentions, our own actions 
and the way we justify our actions to ourselves are deeply embedded in our 
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identityconstructs. As such, identities are both to be explained and to explain. 
Identities, however, need to be explained before they explain.  
It is with these justifications in mind that I indulge into the task of 
understanding European identity. I believe that identity perceptions of the member 
states explain many things about the inner functioning of the European Union while 
giving many hints of the possible limits and prospects of the Europe of the EU. 
Before making use of this potential that European identity has in terms of shedding 
light on the social and political imagining of Europe and the particular shape its 
institutional and practical functioning attains, one needs to explicate the process by 
which this identity comes into being and evolves. For precisely what makes this 
identity an appealing means of self-and collective definition holds the key to 
understanding what determines its persistence or disappearance. Once we know the 
latter, we will gain a renewed insight into the current shape of the EU and attain a 
greater predictive power as to what the future holds for the EU. 
Why Did European Identity Become a Priority in European Debates?  
European identity, officially suggested first by the “Copenhagen Declaration 
on European identity” (passed by the Council of Ministers) of 1973, has long been 
perceived in terms of the external political identity of the EU. The international crises 
of failure of Bretton-Woods system and rising oil prices brought the political identity 
of the EU into the fore (Strath 2002, 388-389). Extended debates on the matter 
focused only on the relationship of the EU to other international organizations and 
how this configuration affected the broader international relations under the 
hegemony of the US. This debate produced two camps known as the “Atlanticist” 
and the “Europeanist” camps. At issue was whether the EU should become an 
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independent actor in international relations that can suggest policies in pursuance of 
its own interests and back such policies with its own military capabilities without the 
dominant role of the US. The tendency to treat European identity as only the 
institutional image of EU in world affairs has also been reflected in the lack of 
primacy given to the issues of identity in the context of cultural integration in 
European studies. This was partly because of the visible predominance of the 
economic mentality driving the integration process until the 1990s.  
As a form of collective identity, European identity has come to the fore of 
agendas only in recent years particularly during the early 1990s where both the EU 
and the broader Europe went through some major transformations. A review of these 
developments will clarify the reasons for the current significance of identity issues in 
Europe’s future.  
Extending Jurisdiction of the EU and the Predicament of European Democracy 
The first and foremost cause for the urgency of identity issues in the EU 
emerged following the controversial ratification of the Treaty on the European Union 
(also known as the Maastricht Treaty of 1992). With the Maastricht Treaty, European 
venture targeted non-economic goals. As the original logic of the European 
integration—economic unification and prosperity—gave way to the achievement of 
political and social goals, the Union has begun to turn into a political structure of 
governance with jurisdiction in many more realms. The identity issue as an 
indispensable part of this metamorphosis emerged as a daunting challenge for 
European leaders and policy makers. Public objections (most pronounced in the cases 
of Denmark and France) to the Maastricht Treaty indicated a lack of public sentiment 
of Europeanness that had been taken for granted by optimistic European elites for 
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decades. Heated national debates on the direction and pace of the integration process 
indicated that delegation of national sovereignty in non-economic fields to the EU 
would not be easy. European leaders realized that they need to find a way to render 
the EU more appealing to the public in a sentimental sense. What is lacking was an 
emotional bond between the EU and its citizens. 
In fact, the extending jurisdiction of the Union exacerbated some of the 
deeper deficiencies in the nature of the EU.  As the Amsterdam Treaty of 1998 
further impinged upon the well-known legitimacy crisis of the EU (by claiming 
jurisdiction in more vital fields of governance) a surge in attention to the question of 
European identity became inevitable. 
This was, indeed, the beginning of an era where policy makers could not 
ignore the sensitive issue of collective identities in the process of Europeanization. At 
the end of this process, European publics clearly emerged as a significant “veto 
player” (Tsebelis 2002) in European governance that need to be taken into account if 
national policy makers desire to be reelected, if not for the sake of rendering the EU 
more democratic. It became evident that European governance cannot rely only on 
“permissive consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) anymore, and needs to also 
gain some ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of those affected by the EU.13 Lagroye (1985, as 
cited in Belot and Smith 1988, 83) who introduced the dichotomy between consensus 
and legitimacy differentiates these two concepts by arguing that while the former 
                                                 
13Expanding competence of the EU also points to the necessity of supranational decision-making. As 
more and more issues are decided at the Union level by majority voting, the EU becomes a polity with 
full rights of direct governance and effect. This has clear implications in terms of the necessity of a 
collective identity at the European level. In such a polity where national governments might have to 
implement policies that they couldn’t stop, the legitimacy of the policies made cannot be guaranteed 
unless there is a perception of other member states as part of the “we” group. As a result, any policy 
that results from the European governance that is not seen as “our government” is bound to be seen 
illegitimate. 
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relies on utilitarian calculation of the advantages of a political system, the latter 
requires a normative evaluation of the social value of institutions. If the EU is to be 
more than an integrated market, economic benefits alone can evidently not generate 
public support for the ambitious goal of a political union among Europe’s peoples 
(Habermas 2001, 8). As European integration moves into the realm of controversial 
matters and high politics only a genuine commitment of fellow Europeans to the 
EU’s political system and a common solidarity of a we-feeling can provide grounds 
to value long-term rewards rather than immediate self-interest. To put it differently, 
any kind of “specific support” (Easton 1963, 390-395) that Europeans have for the 
EU due to its effect on economic well-being is not sufficient to save the EU from a 
possible crisis if the EU policies fail to endure positive economic outputs (Obradovic 
1996, 193). 
The problem gets even more diversified when one notes the fact that even if 
the EU can sustain policy success in economic fields, the challenge of extending EU 
competence for national sovereignty is a reality. For many, this challenge raises 
deeper anxieties as to the loss of national identity and culture regardless of the state 
of economic advantages. Accepting and approving formation of a polity where 
previously distinct nationalities are considered fellow citizens raises issues deeper 
than pure economic advantages. 
A legitimate political system can, on the other hand, rely on the continuous 
support of its citizens even in the absence of policy satisfaction owing to its intrinsic 
nature as an expression of the respective society’s values, norms and its members’ 
commitment to each others’ and the broader group’s welfare (Obradovic 1996). A 
genuine ‘legitimacy’ would, thus, grant immunity to the EU from such crises as 
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citizen’s logic of evaluation is not confined to the economic services of the EU. 
Rather what they see in the EU, in addition to its economic benefits, would be its 
value as a means of ensuring common norms, values and social definitions. As such 
Obradovic argues what is at stake is not always whether the EU’s policies are 
acceptable per se, but whether “the redefinition of political boundaries in Europe or, 
in the words of Anderson and Eliassen (1993), Europeification of decision-making, 
where the European, not the national, political system becomes the unit of policy 
process” (1996, 207-208) is justifiable. 
The legitimacy crisis of the EU is reflected upon differently by different 
scholars. A widely-held view is that the EU lacks legitimacy because of low levels of 
European identity. Many argue that this has to do with the lack of a perception of the 
EU as an “appropriate sphere for politics” (Banchoff and Smith 1999, 1)14.  Belot and 
Smith argue that the lack of popular identification with the EU is due to, “popular 
incapacity and/or resistance to identify with a set of norms, institutions and values 
presented as product of Brussels” (1988, 83). This is where the collective identity 
comes into the picture. According to Obradovic “legitimacy is achieved when the 
government process displays a commitment to and actively guarantees values that are 
part of the particular national identity, i.e. of the general political culture of the 
people” (1996, 195). Thus, legitimacy is a product of the perception that the 
governing authority reflects and represents the people. In other words, the 
government is of the people and for the people. Lack of a collective identification 
                                                 
14 Banchoff argues that “to the extent that people identify with the political institutions or processes 
that affect their lives-that they recognize them as appropriate and consider them theirs- they endow 
them with legitimacy” (1999, 184).  
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among Europeans evidently compromises any chances of a popular perception of the 
EU as ‘our government’ and the European collectivity as ‘our polity’.  
The legitimacy question is also about whether the policy outputs that improve 
individuals’ lives alone are sufficient to generate a sense of legitimacy without the 
procedural legitimacy. ‘Democratic deficiency’ in the functioning of the EU is cited 
as a major problem in the way of a legitimate political Union at the European level. 
Increasing use of majority rule in decision-making requires a sense of community 
(Schild 2001, 335). In addition to majority rule, supremacy of Union law in many 
areas over member states’ domestic law requires public involvement on issues 
resolved at the European level if the EU governance is to be perceived as democratic. 
If the European law is perceived to be deriving from the cold hands of Eurocrats 
without any accountability to the citizens over which it will rule, the direct effect of 
these laws will be seen as illegitimate as they overrule the national laws that are 
made legitimately.  
In this context, a democratic public sphere (demokratische öffentlichkeit) and 
an open discussion of European issues with a ‘European’ point of view seems 
essential (Risse and Steeg 2003). Ensuring the democratic debate among the public 
renders the policy making at the EU level more accountable and legitimate. It 
reinforces and strengthens the emerging collective identity among Europeans. It is 
also a vote of confidence resulting from the rightness of the procedure that attributes 
legitimacy to the Union even at times when it cannot deliver expected benefits to the 
European citizens or secure an even distribution of such benefits along national lines. 
In other words, procedural legitimacy is also essential to ensure compliance to 
unpopular policies.  
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It is not possible, however, to deny that Europeans are still not an integral part 
of everyday functioning of the EU. The overwhelmingly bureaucratic nature of the 
EU hinders ordinary public’s ability to reach Europe and socially experience it. In 
addition to the complexity of the bureaucratic structures and Brussels’ treaty lingo 
whereby Europeans lose track of their rights and representatives, issues the EU is 
focusing on seem to diverge from what the majority of Europeans want the EU to 
resolve—that is, genuine challenges Europe is facing such as “war and peace, 
unemployment, and crime” (Edwards 2000, 67).   
This increasing gap between the governed and the government is also 
illustrated by a lack of public enthusiasm shown for more traditional ways of public 
participation in governance. Direct elections to the European Parliament consistently 
attract lower turnout rates than local and national elections. The situation led to the 
naming of European elections as “second order elections” in electoral studies, for 
party choices as well as campaign issues cannot be distinguished from national 
elections (Reif 1984). Such democratic deficiencies cannot be mediated by citizen 
initiatives (such as social movements), either. Rarity of social movements across the 
EU is a well-established fact. This is not surprising as the polity forming function of 
identity is best seen in increasing ability of collective action (Schneider 1993, 267). 
Although collective identification with the EU is the major part of European 
legitimacy that I am concerned with here, the democratic deficit is both partly 
responsible for the lack of public attachment to the EU and is caused by lack of such 
sentiment. In fact, these two elements of legitimacy are interrelated, as lack of 
accountability and representation would take away a major credential of any political 
system as an effective sphere of politics and discourage affective attachment. 
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Similarly, lack of Europe-wide debates and movements makes it easy for European 
governments to avoid accountability and get away with deficiencies in the 
representation.  
Kelman argues that “a modern nation-state’s legitimacy depends on the extent 
to which the population perceives the regime as (a) reflecting its ethnic and cultural 
identity, and (b) meeting its needs and interests” (as cited in Tajfel 1970, 131). If the 
same goes for any modern structure of governance, the EU’s legitimacy needs to rely 
on more than just the successful economic legacy that the EU policies have. Hence, 
today, collective identity formation in the EU context accompanied by successful 
cultural integration of distinct European societies is seen as a prerequisite to the 
construction of a genuine political union (Garcia 1993, 2) as well as attainment of a 
more durable public support (in the form of legitimacy) for such a Union. As Bellier 
and Wilson maintain “the building of the EU is not only a process of harmonization 
and integration, but one of legitimization in which the structures, and aims of the EU 
must find approval and meaning among its peoples” (2000, 15). Thus the legitimacy 
of the EU is going to be an enduring problem for the new European polity in the 
absence of a European identity and democracy (Hrbek 1995; Obradovic 1996).15  
 
                                                 
15 This point is not without its critiques. Banchoff and Smith (1999, 1-15), for instance, argue that 
popular attitudes and extent of democracy in the functioning of the EU alone does not suffice to 
evaluate whether there is indeed a legitimacy crisis in the EU. As a multilevel polity where both 
national and European level institutions interact, the EU, they argue, developed many novel forms of 
representation. Even though popular identification with the EU is low, Europeans have come to 
perceive the EU as an appropriate arena for politics supplementing their nation-states and regional 
institutions. Even though this line of argument unpacks the legitimacy issue and points to the 
neglected aspects of public-EU interaction along with their potential for a new kind of legitimacy, it 
does not-if the claim is that EU still serves as a valuable platform for politics by providing alternative 
channels of representation and participation- directly inquire about the relationship between 
legitimacy and the public identification, or more directly, it does not wonder why despite these 
compensating developments in the European politics, public identification is still low. 
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The End of the Cold War and the Need to Draw Social Boundaries of Europe 
 Another reason for the urgency of identity issues in European integration is 
the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the ‘iron curtain’ allowed many new forms 
of identities to emerge or resurface. This era also marked the end of a comfortable 
era for European identity. As a result of the increasing freedom of movement, the 
migration flows into the prosperous zone of the EU has increased since the 1990s.  
Immigrants and gastarbeiters16 from non-EU countries have come to challenge the 
preexisting- and relatively unified- image of Europe.  
 There was, however, a more challenging development in Europe that 
unraveled the clear boundaries of ‘we’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy. Freed from the two-
block politics, Central and Eastern European countries gained an opportunity for the 
first time to ‘return to Europe’. Many countries of formerly communist Europe 
expressed their intent to join the EU with the claims of common heritage despite the 
artificial dividing lines in place throughout the Cold War period. The unproblematic 
social boundaries of the Cold War were obsolete to demarcate European from 
nonEuropean both within and without the geographical Europe. Hence, the issue of 
who belonged in Europe and who did not became a question that needed to be 
readdressed.17 This is due to the fact that the answer is not so much in geographical 
                                                 
16 Gastarbeiters are guest-workers that were invited to Germany from other European and non-
European countries as labor force needed to rebuild Germany after the damages of WWII. Initially this 
labor force was assumed to be temporary, hence the name guest-worker. However, as these guest-
workers brought their families into Germany from their home countries, bought properties and land 
and raised their children in Germany, their presence proved to be a permanent (no matter how much 
resented) part of the German society. In light of current negative fertility rate in Germany, 
guestworkers seem to have even more reason to settle in Germany and consider it as their second 
homes. Parallel to these developments, there has been an increasingly active political discourse in 
Germany trying to integrate guestworkers into the German society and politically mobilize these 
marginalized groups for their votes. 
17 This adjustment, though, proved not very difficult. Most of the Central and Eastern European 
countries were deemed to fit the definition of ‘European’ more than the minorities who have been 
living in the EU zone for years as permanent residents. For example, Gastarbeiters’ children who 
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or historical realities per se, but more about what kind of a Europe Europeans 
contemplate. 
 The end of the Cold War also unraveled to a considerable extent the post-
World War II (WWII) security alliance between Western Europe and the USA, as the 
strategic interests of the EU and the ‘lone superpower’ seem to increasingly diverge. 
In addition to diverging interests, Europe and the US seem to follow different 
philosophies to justify their courses of action as a sign of different ways of life and 
identities (Keohane 2002).18  For an EU that aspires to be a true political union, the 
necessity of establishing an independent military capability that ensures political and 
military autonomy is self-evident. A viable European Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) requires a unified stand on issues of high politics and the ability for 
concerted action, conditions that cannot be met without a strong European identity. If 
national identities affect how nations see their interests, a collective European 
identity can shape in the same way member states’ perceptions of “legitimate and 
appropriate interests” (Risse et al. 1999)19 and prepare the ground for collective 
action.20 The kinds of threats Europe is currently facing -civil conflicts and terrorism- 
require willingness of Europeans to die for the Union (along with citizens of the 
Union who were previously citizens of other countries) and what it stands for.  Are 
                                                                                                                                          
were born and raised in Germany still have a harder time in becoming a German citizen than those 
ethnic Germans who have lived all their lives in ex-communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as Russia with no ability to speak German or no affinity to the German way of life. 
18 For a detailed account of this unraveling and the differences between the EU and United States in 
terms of conceptions of sovereignty as basis for such drifting see Keohane (2002). 
19 Risse et al. (1999) argue that the nation-state identities in Germany, Britain and France shaped 
different perceptions of interest with regard to euro in these countries. 
20 Loth (2000) posits that even “the ability to act within an international arena presupposes a 
corresponding consciousness of collective identity” (19). The pronounced low turnout in European 
elections can, Frognier (2002, 43-58) argues, be explained by a lack of collective consciousness and 
identification with the European level structures. Theoretical roots of this finding may go to lack of 
ability to collectively act on a level other than national system. 
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Europeans ready to feel that kind of trust for one another and act under a Union 
command?  Promoting and strengthening such an overarching European identity is an 
important prerequisite for further deepening initiatives in this or any other realm 
(Laffan 1996; Marks 1999).   
Even though there is no consensus as to how far geographical Europe goes, 
the ‘Europeanness’ of the EU countries is considered unproblematic.21 Yet, to 
suggest that European identity is essential or self-evident is an ethnocentric approach 
to a very fluid and political identity category. Furthermore, in light of the broader 
identity studies, it is misleading to allocate such unproblematic tags to any category 
of identity and treat it as “out there”. As anything else that cannot be taken as a 
‘given’ in social and political spheres, identity—in this case European identity—
deserves an explanation. Ignoring this task compromises the scientific nature of any 
research program that is concerned with European identity as well as its students’ 
ability to reach compelling and valid conclusions in their research with regard to the 
processes that are subsequent to the formation of a European social identity. 
Furthermore, as an intersection of international relations and comparative politics, 
the EU offers an invaluable laboratory for cross-validating the dynamics at work in 
many issues. Studies of European identity promise to be a significant contribution to 
the wider research in various fields of social sciences.  
 
                                                 
21 In fact, many often treat Europe as only comprising of the EU member states. When the broader 
geographical Europe is reductionistly boxed in the Europe of the EU, non-EU countries that are 
situated in Europe go unaccounted for. This point is also meant to highlight the common tendency to 
treat Europeanness as a category of identification that is unproblematic, even and free of internal 
contradictions. For a good account of how identity categories are challenged not only by out-group 
members but also from within groups, see Gregory and Sanjek (1994); Omi and Winant (1994). For a 
more specific source for such contestation in the context of the EU and the development of European 
identity as different historical discourses across time, see Strath (2002).  
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A Historical Conception of European Identity 
Before indulging in a theoretical reading of European identity, one has to 
place this collective identity in the broader context of cultural and historical identity 
shared by Europeans, for it conditions what it is to be a European today. The EU’s 
identity discourse is a combination of three elements: a broader cultural identity (the 
past of Europe) that involves European culture, heritage and history; a European 
Union (civic) identity that relies on the ideals of integration for which the Union 
stands; and the social boundary formation between the EU and the ‘other’ of the EU 
(Edwards 2003, 1). While the first component covers oft-referred narratives on joint 
experiences of Europeans ranging from the ancient Greece, the Enlightenment, 
Christianity, to the Renaissance, and French revolution, the second relates to the 
principles of democratic governance, freedoms, rule of law, human rights as well as 
those values that are uniquely European (such as multilateralism, respect for life, 
environmental protection, and the welfare state).22 The last component of identity 
formation has been a conceptualization of what it is to be European in opposition to 
its ‘others’—namely non-Europeans.23  
These three elements of European identity have largely been interlinked and 
to a varying extent draw on each other. For example, all three can be seen interacting 
in the discussions of Turkish membership in the EU. Is Turkey a part of the European 
historical experience with its own contributions? 24 Is Turkey a sufficiently 
democratic country? Is Turkey non-European?  
                                                 
22 On a discussion of values that are distinctly European see Su (2004). 
23 For a good discussion of the issue of boundary demarcation in the process of identity formation see 
Cederman (2001) and Neumann (1999).  
24 Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome restricts membership of the EU only to European countries. 
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One caveat is, nevertheless, in order here. Even though the historical and 
philosophical conceptualization of Europe is related to what it is to be European 
today in the context of the EU, the latter is different from the former (Garcia 1993, 3; 
Mayer and Palmowski 2004, 592). Certainly, European societies have many ancient 
discourses on identity depicting some form of unity among the countries of the 
continent depending on the historical juncture. Yet, the current understanding of 
European identity is more of a consequence of the European integration process 
within the EU and a response to the negative episodes in European history of 
Nazism, Fascism, religious intolerance and imperialism.25  
In addition to the specific historical context in which the modern conception 
of European identity has evolved, the current inner dynamics of European societies 
also require a more modern discourse on identity that fits the requirements of 
globalizing and heterogeneous polities. Thus, as a discourse, today’s European 
identity is based more on democratic and peaceful ideas and less on discourses with 
primordial and essentialist connotations.26 This is, however, not to deny the 
significance of such historical elements for the current constructions of ‘Europe’. In 
fact, all identities-be they national or European or any other category such as ethnic 
and racial identities- are determined by a socio-historical process of social 
construction (Omi and Winant 1994; Ignatiev 1995; Takaki 1993, 1998).  
                                                 
25 Kohli (2000, 128) goes so far as to say that there is, indeed, a battle between European and national 
identity, because the former is constructed against the internal enemy of “nationalistic past” instead of 
an external enemy.                                                                                                                                                                        
26 For example, in the case of the Turkish membership discussions, politically correct statements 
consistently deny the role of such primordialist definitions of Europe on the well-known hesitations of 
European countries to welcome Turkey into the Union. Leading politicians and EU elites draw 
attention to Turkey’s shortcomings in issues of democracy and human rights as well as to the 
economic costs of integrating such a large country into the integrated market. 
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It is often historical/cultural heritage that is utilized in manufacturing a new 
national identity. However, if Europe is to be merged into a polity its citizens can 
identify with and be proud of, such historical and cultural narratives in the case of 
Europe fall short of constituting a credible collective identity. The European Union 
occasionally employs an abstract discourse of common European history and culture 
to distinguish Europe from that which is considered non-European. In such 
discourses, it is a widely shared concern that only charming narratives are used 
(Shore 2000, 59). However, European continent at different historical junctures has 
been a theatre for internal wars, violent conflicts and genocides. Calling such biased 
depictions of European history “Sunday clothes of European culture”, Brands 
contends that nonappealing chapters in European history cannot be ignored for they 
are “the product of European developments” (1987, 77).  
National histories are certainly not free of such negative episodes and yet are 
able to generate compelling bases for national identities. However, what is different 
in the case of European history is that the collective history that is being interpreted 
has different and sometimes irreconcilable meanings in memories of separate 
nations—nations that are expected to embrace each other as fellow in-group 
members. As Edwards suggests, the use of old enmities and violent wars as part of a 
legitimizing myth is disabled by the fact that these conflicts’ memories are still too 
real and painful “to be treated in the way Benedict Anderson has suggested that other 
more ancient slaughters have been in a national context- as ‘reassuring fratricide’ that 
assists in the construct of national genealogies” (2000, 79). In other words, “there 
may be a common European heritage, but there is no European ‘nation’ to appeal to” 
(Edwards 2000, 79). Clearly, memories of such non-peaceful episodes of European 
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history present an obstacle to easy harmonization of images or acceptance by 
European nations of each other as in-group members. This fact placed universalistic 
values of democracy and rule of law in the center as the main material for a non-
essentialist discourse of a new identity. The prevalent tone of the overall official 
discourse of the EU is, therefore, civic rather than historical or cultural. 
Culture as a possible groundwork for a new European collective identity also 
falls short of meeting such a challenge, for European nations are not only quite 
different from one another but also host a multitude of different ethnic and cultural 
groups themselves to claim such homogeneity. The recent eastward expansion, many 
studies concluded, further challenges the EU’s odds of achieving homogeneity as 
Central and Eastern European countries increase the diversity in the EU (Fuchs and 
Klingemann 2000, 20).  
Some discourses also try to raise Christianity as the basis for collective 
European identity by revoking old fears of Islamic expansion.27 However, this 
discourse would present an inconsistency for aspirations of the EU for equality and 
non-discrimination as non-Christian minorities are present not only outside the 
Europe of the EU but in the very member states of the EU. In addition, any unifying 
myth of Christianity in Europe was lost during Thirty Years Wars. Delanty agreeing 
with the inappropriateness of an ethno-cultural basis for European identity argues 
that, 
the mistake is to conceive of European culture in the same way as the builders 
of the nation-state conceived the new pragmatic ideas for nation-state 
                                                 
27 For example, during heated debates on whether the EU should give a start date for negotiations with 
Turkey, a European Commissioner is known to have argued against such a prospect as it would mean 
that the defeat of Turks from Europe during the siege of Vienna was in vain. 
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building in the nineteenth century, namely transcendent myth of unity and 
origin. Culture must first of all be seen as something conflict-ridden: 
consensus is not something that can be invoked but created…what I am 
therefore suggesting is that in order to withstand the false universalism of an 
ethnic conception of culture European integration requires a kind of unity 
based on an abstract cultural identity (1998, 41-42). 
Thus, essentializing the bases of Europeanness would lead to a radically 
homogeneous image of Europe, one that is far from representing its diverse 
populations and dangerously excluding its immigrants as other. The fact that starting 
from the late 1970s, extreme right wing movements and activities increased in both 
Western Europe and the USA adds urgency to this issue. In the EU countries, such 
right wing radical movements among the less educated often blame deepening 
European integration and increased immigration for high percentage of 
unemployment (Kaplan and Bjorgo 1998).28 At a time, when conventional national 
identities are in flux, how European identity is defined will have a significant impact 
on Europe’s others. Claiming an objective basis for the definition of Europe would 
imply barring entrance options for others and create a fundamentalist identity for 
Europe. The first precondition of understanding the prospects of the future for 
Europe and how far it will extend is to realize the inevitable political nature of the 
task.29 Besides, the dynamics that define the historical understanding of Europe and 
the modern understanding of Europe under the framework of EU might be different.  
                                                 
28 The best example of this problem is seen in early 1990s when neo-Nazi groups burned houses of 
several Turkish and Yugoslavian immigrants in Germany as they have been the victims of ethnic 
prejudices and blamed for increasing unemployment among Germans. 
29 For example, a common objection with regard to Turkish membership is its alleged lack of 
contribution to those core aspects of European civilization throughout centuries. However, the EU’s 
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All these factors point to the fact that a primordial framing of European 
identity is simply not convincing enough to generate deep positive feelings and a 
sense of ‘natural’ brotherhood among Europeans. The contemporary idea of Europe 
is based on a deliberate political project erected as a safeguard against the European 
tragedies. European identity in its essence is centered on a goal of peaceful change of 
Europe through cooperation and understanding. Delanty talking about this point 
argues that “the discourse of citizenship and civil society is particularly important 
and could be a basis of a normative representation of Europe since Europe is not in 
itself reducible to a spatial concept: it is in fact a cultural model. The kind of 
symbolic representation Europe therefore needs is posthistorical and anti-essentialist” 
(1998, 25-26). Similarly, Schmidtke argues that “the crucial challenge for generating 
a European collective identity is whether in principle the normative political ideas 
underlying the trans-national integration process can become strong enough to stir 
individual orientation and action competing with the emotional energies inherent in 
established ethnic ties” (1998, 47). 
 European Union’s Efforts to Form a European Identity 
The original understanding of the European leaders with regard to European 
identity was based on the neofunctionalist thinking that economic integration would 
be followed gradually by political/cultural integration. Such expectations of 
automatic cultural unity downplayed the need to focus on European identity and 
polity formation at the European level for decades. Particularly, following the crisis 
experienced during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, European leaders came 
                                                                                                                                          
desire to avoid any sort of a tanglement with Middle East—the way it would with Turkey (a 
predominantly Muslim country) in the Union—and its concern over the enormous implications of 
Turkish membership for the Union budget are often the actual concerns that are essentially political in 
nature. 
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to realize that the European Union needs to be actively involved in promotion of a 
common European consciousness. They needed to design symbols and traditions that 
have practical and social appeal to their constituencies to justify the presence and 
worth of the EU. 
A quick review of this history will highlight the strategies of European elites 
and policy makers to facilitate a sense of belonging among their citizens. The 
original Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity of 1973 neglected the explicit 
explanation of the concept of European identity (Schneider 1993, 265). Furthermore 
vague references to European identity often blurred the clear difference between the 
external identity of the EU and a sense of popular European identity in the 
sociological sense (De Witte 1987, 134). During the 1965-1966 Gaullist crises, in 
addition to lack of popular support, the EU came to terms with its grim situation that 
elites did not have a consensus on how the European integration process should 
proceed. After this crisis, the EU, in an effort to reach its popular bases, initiated its 
direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. It was, however, the European 
Council Summit of 1984 that which for the first time recommended some practical 
steps to disseminate a European consciousness among ordinary citizens to increase 
identification with the EU. Based on the recommendations of the subsequently 
formed Adonnino Committee and debates, the EU developed many means to raise 
the salience of the EU for its citizens. Among these means were the introduction of 
youth exchange programs, European television initiative, voting rights for those 
living in another member state in local and European elections, initiation of the 
European lottery, increased emphasis on the teaching of European history and 
integration in school curriculums, adoption of European anthem, a common 
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European passport, a new license plate with EU symbol on it, the European flag, and 
the adoption of May 9th as Europe day.  
It was, however, not until the 1990s, that the European Commission gained 
formal competence in the cultural field.30 A major step in the efforts to construct a 
“Peoples’ Europe” was taken with the initiation of European citizenship by the 
Maastricht Treaty.  European citizenship grants some rights to Europeans ranging 
from right to move/settle in other EU states –article 8a, consular protection-article 8c 
to right to vote and run in European elections- article 8b, right to petition the EU 
ombudsman- article 8d.31 
The most compelling symbol of European identity implemented is the single 
currency-Euro initiated on 1 January 1999. Euro, in the context of the EU, serves not 
only as a practical means of exchange but also symbolizes the unity of the European 
peoples and the economic and political power of the Union that rules them in many 
realms.32 If currencies are symbols of nationhood, the presence of the euro for 
ordinary individuals provides a myth of collectivity amongst the Europeans.   
Creating a new social/cultural domain has been neglected by European elites, 
as efforts for social integration lagged far behind efforts for political and economic 
integration for decades. Although the commission and other organs of the European 
Union attempted to bridge this gap by several strategies and symbols of European 
                                                 
30 Title IX, article 128 states that “The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of 
the member states while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing 
the common cultural heritage to the fore.” 
31 Citizenship of the Union and the respective rights are cited in Part II in Provisions Amending the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
32 The meaning of a currency for the collective sense of belonging and nationhood is well established 
in sociological studies. In an empirical study, confirming this cultural meaning of currencies, Luna 
Arocas  et al. (2001) show that Spain and Portugal support euro not for economic reasons but for 
identity reasons. 
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identity in the past two decades, some major problems in the nature of their 
discourses still limit the capacity of these measures to fulfill this task.  
Although references to European identity in everyday discourse of integration 
are frequent, this broad vision of Europeanness has yet to be clearly defined. 
Although officially the EU defines Europeanness on the basis of a mixture of 
geography and some political and economic criteria, different documents and leaders 
mention other ways of defining this identity (history, religion etc.) creating confusion 
and anomaly in understanding of who exactly is a European. 
European citizenship discourse also disappoints those who believe in its 
potential to give a tangible meaning to the EU. European citizenship suffers from 
some major limitations that can compromise its capacity to act as a catalyst for 
formation of a European collective identity. Scholars as well as legal experts often 
point to the lack of citizenship duties, the predicament of the non-EU nationals and 
the dependency of European citizenship on member state citizenship as deficiencies 
in the current form of citizenship discourse in the EU (e.g., Welsh 1993; Freeman 
and Ögelman 1998). If the EU is going to be a transnational polity, revolutionizing 
the conceptions of sovereignty and loyalty, it is important that the EU constitutes a 
direct means of representation and rights for its citizens.33  
In fact, European citizenship, by promising to disassociate citizenship and 
nationality (Soysal 1995; Delanty 1995; Koslowski 1999), promises to revolutionize 
the way large-scale collective identities can be built. However, one should be aware 
                                                 
33 The best known advocate of EU’s increasing alignment with individual citizens as a source of 
collective identity is Habermas and his notion of verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism). 
Accordingly, this notion assumes that individuals’ sense of collectivity and loyalties revolve around 
the political principles and ideals of democracy as well as civic institutions that are designed to 
safeguard their preservation.  
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of a nuance: The fact that European citizens are not members of a European people 
does not necessarily create a strong divide between citizenship and nationality. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, member state nationalities are indirectly linked to the 
notion of European citizenship thereby lowering the value of impressive badges some 
scholars attach to the Union citizenship as ‘deterritorialized’. Although the EU 
identity is more defined in civic terms, ethnocentric biases of national identities finds 
their way indirectly into the EU by discriminating against the non-EU nationals who 
live in any of the European member states and are denied the universal rights that the 
EU stands for.34 
In addition to these problems with the citizenship discourse, the main 
question that remains to be answered is the relevance of such a Union citizenship to 
everyday lives of Europeans. The internalization of this citizenship through some 
emotional attachment is the main test for judging the success of this symbol in 
furthering a common sense of belonging among Europeans.  
Lastly, although European leaders recently recognized the problem with 
neglecting the nourishment of cultural integration and promotion of a collectivity 
feeling among disparate nationals as members of a new and bigger society, the 
approach they adopted seem to take this task on the surface value. Many scholars 
agree that nation-building strategies and symbols employed at the European level 
cannot guarantee the emergence of a sincere identification with the European Union. 
This is because what is being built is best understood as a multi-level polity than a 
European nation (Schild 2001; Banchoff and Smith 1999). The acceptance and 
                                                 
34 Perhaps the most pronounced deficiency of the EU citizenship with regard to non-EU nationals is 
the disenfranchisement of such residents in European elections even though they are affected by EU 
policies as much as European citizens. 
 39
internalization of a collective identity at European level can come only from 
Europeans as they recognize and appreciate this new political system as relevant and 
effective. In other words, acceptance of the European Union as a valid locus of 
identity and allegiance is to be facilitated only if Europeans see it that way. 
Suggesting otherwise would be no different than saying European identity is there 
and can be taken for granted. This argument will be discussed later in detail as the 
backbone of the forthcoming chapters where I focus on understanding European 
identity as a form of social identity. 
 Previous Research on European Identity 
  Previous literature on European identity has addressed the issue inadequately.  
For a long time, students of the European Union seem only to worry about ensuring 
popular support for the integration process. Although there have been some empirical 
studies on public attachment to the European Union (e.g., Inglehart 1970, 1977; 
Schild 2001; Kohli 2000; Medrano and Gutierrez 2001), the rigorous and systematic 
study of European identity at individual level has been insufficient (Medrano and 
Gutierrez 2001, 754).35 With these shortcomings in mind, a brief review of the 
previous research is in order. 
One of the earliest empirical analyses on European identity is carried out by 
Inglehart. Inglehart (1970, 1977) found that postmaterialism, cognitive mobilization 
and formal education imply stronger European identity. Medrano and Gutierrez 
(2001) retested the postmaterialism, cognitive mobilization and education hypotheses 
and found that postmaterialism has no relationship with European identity. However, 
                                                 
35 There have also been other lines of studies on European identity. Firstly, some research focused 
solely on policy suggestions to bring about a European identity. Secondly, normative studies dealt 
with what kind of a European identity/citizenship ought to be promoted (e.g., Kostakopoulou 2001). 
 40
the relationship between European identity, on the one hand, and education and 
cognitive mobilization on the other are confirmed. Kohli (2000) found no 
relationship between age and European identity. His analysis revealed a positive 
relationship between a sense of Europeanness on the one hand, and educational level, 
income and urban population on the other. Kritzinger (2004) investigated the link 
between expected EU efficiency and the level of EU identity in an empirical study 
conducted based on data from the Eurobarometers from 1996 and 1999.  Measuring 
expected efficiency through citizens’ willingness to allow the EU to handle policy 
issues that are handled at the time of the study by the member states of the EU; she 
showed that a supranational European identity is more likely to develop if the EU 
citizens perceive the EU as an efficient institution (Kritzinger 2004, 2). 
On the possibility of European identity, many studies argue that 
commonalities that are required for individuals’ subjective sense of collectivity are 
simply not there due to the lack of a common European culture, language and history 
(see for example, Smith 1992; Obradovic 1996). On the other hand, those who 
believe that identities are a result of sociohistorical construction are more readily 
optimistic about the formation of a European identity (see Habermas 1998, 2001). 
Accordingly, common interests and projects can very well serve as a viable basis for 
a new sense of belonging at the European level.  
One important finding is that there is a dramatic difference across European 
member states in terms of the link between various factors and European identity. 
This reinforces a tendency to focus on single case studies or comparative case studies 
in the research on European identity. However, detailed studies that focus on a single 
case or comparative case studies might, by the same token, lead to the results that are 
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not representative of the overall trend within the entire EU. One such variation 
among the member states of the EU with regard to the level of European identity is 
seen in the effect of nationality on support for the European integration (e.g., 
Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001; Inglehart 1977; Gabel and Palmer 1995) and in turn 
on European identity. Several scholars confirmed that nationality of an individual is a 
powerful predictor of the level of identification with the EU (e.g., Duchenes and 
Frognier 1995; Luna Arocas et al. 2001; Seidendorf 2003) for the broader political 
culture of a nation affects the perceptions of Europe (of the EU) as well as benefits 
and harms of the Europeanization process. The particular way a national identity is 
contemplated creates the specific context where how receptive one is to [different] 
constellations of European identity is conditioned. In other words, national identity 
constructions frame the negotiation process between the two identities. 
The influence of nationality can be seen particularly in the issue of 
compatibility of national and European identities. If national identity discourse does 
not pit national identity to a European identity, the compatibility of the two is not 
problematic. In other words, those national discourses that contemplate national self 
and European images as similar and compatible facilitate the interaction of national 
and European identities. What this finding implies is that there is more than one way 
to see Europe. Such perceptions are inevitably embedded in individuals’ distinct 
national understandings of self and Europe.  
For example, Risse (2002a, 85) argues that the notorious reluctance of British 
citizens to welcome a European identity or a European federal system has its roots in 
the particular way Britishness has been defined. The British national identity is based 
on Englishness, which is defined in the post WWII era in opposition to Europe as the 
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‘other’. National pride in itself does not contradict with European identity but might 
come into play depending on how contradictory national and European identities are 
in various national discourses (Risse 2002a, 80).  
In a similar study, Marcussen et al. (1999, 614) explains the sources of the 
variation in Europeanization of national identities by three hypotheses: citizens’ are 
willing to accept a new identity to the extent that it is  compatible with the old 
identity that they have; it is at times of ‘critical junctures’ that new identity 
constructions become viable alternatives; the longer an identity construct continues 
to be secure, the less viable it becomes to challenge that identity as it becomes 
costlier to challenge the broader system and the political culture where that identity is 
embedded. They illustrate their points through an empirical discourse analysis of 
party elites in Great Britain, France and Germany from the 1950s onwards. 
In addition to the historical compatibility of national discourses with the 
European venture, we also see deliberate efforts of policy makers at critical times to 
re-interpret national histories and identities in a way that is more favorable to 
European integration. For example, in a discursive study, Banchoff (1999) compares 
German and French controversies on European venture in the 1950s and 1990s 
respectively. He shows that during those debates, leading elites, acting strategically, 
manipulated the definition of established national identities so that participating in 
the EU is more acceptable. These revisions often depict the EU as a platform to 
promote national interests. Whichever way it is achieved, such Europeanization of 
national identities signals the changing content of national identity as a response to 
European integration and the identity it brings about. 
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Two different camps emerged in studies of European identity with regard to 
the prospects of a European sense of belonging. Those who argue for the persistent 
significance and legitimacy of nation-states see national and European identities 
mutually exclusive. Progress of European identity would have to be at the expense of 
weakening individual loyalties to nation-states (Smith 1992, 58-65). However, this is 
seen as largely impossible, for compared to national identity, European identity is 
only an instrumental identity and therefore cannot compete with affective national 
attachments. This viewpoint assesses European integration through the premises of 
nation-building approach. 
The other camp of scholars, on the other hand, sees a decline in nation-state’s 
legitimacy and capabilities.36 Delanty argues that the globalization of economic 
relations along with increasing influence of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
caused states to give concessions to postnational institutions such as the EU. This 
process in turn triggered “the decoupling of nation and state” (1998, 30).  As the state 
loses its hegemony over its sovereignty and claim over its citizens, citizens are 
gaining a new power as agents of new social movements and become addressee of a 
new identity politics where various political units are competing to gain their 
legitimation and loyalties. In addition to a weakening nation-state, individuals often 
perceive themselves as belonging to multiple groups and have the capacity to 
develop multiple identities (Wintle 2000, 13, Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Duchenes 
and Frognier 1995; Leonard 1998; Marks 1999; Schild 2001; Kostakopoulou 2001; 
Waters 1990).  
                                                 
36 For a discussion of the issue, see Jenkins and Sofos (1996) and Wallace (1994, 82-83).  
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The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed. Duchenes and Frognier (1995) 
showed that the strength of national identities imply low chances for a European 
identity. Marks (1999) through Eurobarometer data argued that regional, national and 
European identities are mutually supportive and that attachment to local and regional 
level is higher than attachment to country and European level. Through a study on 
Spain United Kingdom and Germany, Medrano (2003) showed that simultaneous 
territorial identities are common. Similarly, compatibility of national and subnational 
identities (Haesly 2001) and national and European identities (Van Kersbergen 2000) 
are shown.  On the other hand, Carey (2002) found evidence of a negative 
relationship between the type and intensity of national identity and European 
identity. Accordingly, those who perceived European identity as a threat to their 
national heritage are proven to be more likely to refuse European identity. Medrano 
and Gutierrez (2001) found a positive relationship between regional, national and 
European identities in a study on Spain.  
In a study on attitudes toward European integration, Hooghe and Marks 
(2004) defended a more complicated situation with regard to identity. They showed 
that in some cases national identity motivates Europeans to support European 
integration and in others it is the very reason why European Union is conceived as a 
threat. They argued that the direction of causality might be explained by the elite’s 
framing effects on individuals’ perceptions. Although the main focus of the research 
was attitudes towards European integration, the results are applicable to the attitudes 
towards the collective identity the aforementioned process of European unification 
entails.  
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The aforementioned Medrano and Gutierrez study of 2001 is significant for 
also investigating the identity issue with an eye on the social bases of the process. It 
is one of the rare studies that try to model European identity with the help of some 
social identity theories. Interested in the individual variability that can account for 
differences in adherence to the EU, they revise theories of Tajfel and Turner, and 
Lawler. They test one of Tajfel and Turner’s hypotheses that individuals identify 
with groups that they perceive positively. They also test the nested group identity 
hypothesis of Lawler that groups that are closer to individuals will attain stronger 
identification than groups that are farther. The study is, however, confined to local, 
national and European identities only in Spain (data are from own survey) and 
neglects other premises to be derived from social identity theories. 
Bruter (2003) tested the effects of European symbols and news on 
individual’s European identity through an experiment. Differentiating between the 
civic (identification with the EU as a relevant political system) and cultural (general 
identification with Europe) components of European identity, Bruter proved that 
there is a great deal of European identity mostly in civic sense and that national and 
European identities are compatible. Furthermore, while symbols of European 
integration affect mostly cultural identity of Europeans, news affects the civic 
component of European identity.  
Jimenez et al (2004) tested three different theories on European identity—
cultural (which sees identities based on ethno-cultural factors), instrumental (which 
sees identities as a function of self interest) and civic (which sees identities as based 
on agreement over rules for the political system). Their study reveals partial evidence 
for all three theories. Based on Eurobarometer survey (#57.2), they show that 
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national and European identities are compatible because they are “of different order”; 
national identities are defined in cultural terms while European identities are defined 
in instrumental terms. Furthermore, national pride decreases the adherence to 
European identity. Interestingly, their study showed that, although to a lower extent, 
cultural elements are also part of European identity (16).  
 Castano (2004) tested the relationship between the psychological concept of 
entitativity of the EU and the degree of identification with the European Union. 
Defined on a fourfold scale (common fate, similarity, proximity and boundedness), 
entitativity refers to the subjective perception of realness. Through an experiment 
where he manipulated the aforementioned four aspects, Castano shows that 
increasing the entitativity of the EU leads to an increase in identification with the 
Union among those who hold moderate attitudes toward the EU. Castano’s study also 
highlights the fact that cultural homogeneity is not the only way to increase the 
‘realness’ of the EU to the citizens.  
Another significant finding is that although the European Union developed 
many symbols and discourses as to the contemporary European identity, the 
internalization of this identity by individuals lags behind the respective efforts. 
Studies based on public surveys in member states conclude that nation-state is still 
the main source of identification. However, even though attachment to the EU comes 
behind the nation-state, the major dividing line in the EU is between those who 
exclusively identify with their nation-state and those who feel loyal to both the EU 
and nation-state (Risse 2003, 3). Risse argues that as the exclusive identification with 
the nation-state has been declining, more and more people identify with their nation 
state, local regions and the EU at the same time. Furthermore, there is a 
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consciousness in the public as to the distinction between Europe as a cultural and 
historical space and the EU as the dominant political space with the accompanying 
civic community in Europe, confirming Bruter’s (2003) study.  
Although many agree that establishment of a European identity is an essential 
task for the future success of European Union, different scholars pointed to different 
factors as the major difficulties the EU is facing in achieving that goal ranging from 
the geographical vagueness of Europe to lack of a consensus on where the EU is 
going. However, probably the most important obstacle has been the inability of 
European citizens to access the bureaucratic governance system, and in turn grasp 
and enjoy rights guaranteed by the respective treaties. Some of this difficulty has 
even been welcomed by national policy makers as a way of using the community 
policies as a scapegoat to blame failures or unpopular policies on the EU when they 
want to escape the punishment from their constituencies (Edwards 2000, 71). The 
ramifications of this game are more far-reaching than it seems as it delays public 
granting credit to the EU for improvements in their lives. It is this kind of 
appreciation, however, that the EU needs to be seen as an effective forum of politics. 
It is also this kind of appraisal that which would ultimately lead to a transfer of 
loyalties from the nation-states to the EU.   
Lack of a democratic public sphere as a common social space is also pointed 
out as an obstacle for creating a European identity (Obradovic 1996, 203). 
Accordingly, in the absence of such a space where European public can deliberate on 
European politics and system, the legitimacy of the European governance could not 
be ensured—a precondition for switching loyalties to the European Union. In a 
discourse analysis study based on the media reporting on Austrian elections where 
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ÖVP and Jörg Haider’s FPÖ formed a coalition government and the subsequent 
debates across EU member states, Risse and Steeg (2003) argue that unlike the 
reporting in the US newspapers, reporting in European media became an occasion 
where Europeans discussed the issue as a common European problem. Even though 
they disagreed as to how to handle it, the reference points used for detecting the 
problem were similar across different member states. Furthermore, Haider issue was 
not treated as an event internal to Austrian domestic politics, but as an event taking 
place in Europe. Thus Risse and Steeg conclude that there is an emerging European 
public space and this presupposes a certain degree of European identity and not the 
other way around. This is because acceptance of others in such debate as legitimate 
partners requires an understanding of boundaries that include both parties in the “we” 
camp (Risse and Steeg 2003, 19). 
A further problem in the articulation and dissemination of a unified Europe 
image has been cultural limitations that derive from national differences, best 
illustrated by linguistic obstacles.  Multilingualism particularly causes problems due 
to incompatibility of different linguistic and national traditions of meaning.37 In fact, 
often times, despite the commitment of the Commission to preserve multilingualism, 
English emerges as a de facto working language (Kraus 2000, 203). As a problem 
even European elite is struggling with, linguistic plurality affects ordinary Europeans 
by reducing their ability to directly experience Europe and form affective 
associations with fellow Europeans in a way to de-nationalize interest networking. 
                                                 
37 Abeles (2000, 41) cites the example of the word “liberalism” in his discussion of linguistic obstacles 
in European communicative processes. While French considered liberalism as an essentially economic 
project, many European traditions such as German, Dutch and Portuguese considered liberalism no 
different than separation of state and church. However, the latter is known as laicism in conventional 
French thinking. 
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Some scholars argue that lack of a common language, in fact, is a major barrier to the 
evolution of a genuine transnational European public sphere (Giesen 2002; 
Obradovic 1996, 203) and in turn European identity (Bruha and Seeler 1998).38  
 When considered together, it is easy to see that the majority of the theoretical 
studies on European identity are inadequate particularly because they do not address 
the issue within the framework of a cohesive theory. Partial theories such as 
Inglehart’s (1970) theory on European identity being a result of cognitive 
mobilization, education and postmaterialism is interesting and informative but, I 
believe, it is incomplete. What his theory can help us understand is only some of the 
individual qualities that increase chances of a European identity. Inglehart’s theory, 
for example, does not address the issue of instrumental and affective dimensions of 
an attachment as well as the social roots of the logic of group identities. Furthermore 
it treats European identity same as support for different dimensions of European 
integration. Feelings of European identity and support for European integration 
should not be confused as one might go without the other. Evidently, ad hoc 
hypotheses (such as urban/rural or border residence and its relationship with 
European identity) that are derived from partial theories need to be united under a 
more general and sociological framework to combine the findings of previous 
research into a cumulative collection of knowledge. 
 Furthermore, many empirical studies focus on a single case (such as Spain in 
Medrano and Gutierrez study of 2001), or comparison of two/three/four cases (e.g., 
                                                 
38 Giesen (2002) suggests ritual performances as a means of establishing a collective identity at the EU 
level in order to compensate for lack of a common history or language. Accordingly, an instance of 
such ritual performance could be the annual opening of European Parliament ceremonies. One also 
needs to note that necessity of a common language for a viable public sphere is not shared by some 
scholars. See Risse and Steeg (2003) and Kantner (2002). 
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Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, but mostly Germany and France). This leads 
to a predicament where not only many less-than-prominent member states are 
understudied, but also the findings are not cross-validated through comprehensive 
coverage of the all member states. Even though single and comparative case studies 
are valuable to lead future research into useful directions, in light of the previous 
findings that uncover the great extent of variation across EU nations in integration 
issues, their results cannot be assumed to be representative of all the member states 
of the EU. In addition to the inadequate coverage, many empirical researches rely on 
correlations, or descriptive statistics (e.g., Duchenes and Frognier 1995; Schild 2001; 
Citrin and Sides 2004). These studies are informative as preliminary evaluations, but 
they cannot claim to control robustly for the simultaneous effects of multiple factors 
that are likely to be at work in case of identity.  
 Thus, I believe there is a gap in the European identity research both in the 
conceptual and empirical terms. I think presenting a cohesive theoretical framework 
that covers majority of the aspects of the leading social identity theories is important 
in order to develop a more complete understanding of the sociological logic of 
identity formation at the European level. European identity studies will greatly 
benefit from taking the identity issue back to its basics by curbing the tendencies to 
treat the issue at face value. It will shed light on the ways the future research can go 
from these general theories into the particular implications. There is need for further 
conceptual clarity when discussing the types of European identity. For example, in 
the literature instrumental and affective identities are mostly treated as different (e.g., 
Schild 2001; Duchenes and Frognier 1995). Sometimes, affective support for the EU 
is considered to be the identification with the EU and (economic) support for the EU 
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is considered instrumental. What is lacking is the possible relationship between the 
two and an empirical evaluation of whether the instrumental and affective 
attachments are rivals or merely different components found in each identity 
category. Sociological roots of the identity phenomenon will give us more ideas as to 
the nature of this relationship. Empirically, a study that covers all of the EU member 
states and relies on a multivariate analysis is important, as it would produce 
representative results that also stem from convincing causal logic. Thus, this study 
aims to contribute to the debate on European identity by providing a comprehensive 
test of the existing social identity theories in case of the EU. Rather than suggesting 
new theories about European identity, my intention is to unite the literature by 
developing a comprehensive model based on present ideas and test their validity in a 
multivariate model across the EU. Doing so, I hope to achieve cross validation of the 
results both theoretically and empirically. 
The following chapter will present my case with regard to the prospects of a 
European identity in the framework of social psychological theories. Even though the 
symbols and other strategies used by the European policy makers can serve to 
increase the salience and recognition of the EU among ordinary citizens, it cannot 
ensure the emergence of a compelling and genuine attachment to the political system 
of Europe. The case for the role of governing elites and intellectuals in shaping a 
sense of belonging among citizens is well established in the literature (Anderson 
1991; Brubaker 1992). However, such top-down process alone cannot ensure 
flourishing of a mass attachment to a political institution. It is social and constructive 
practices that lead to construction of successful collective identities. If European 
identity is to be a compelling self-conceptualization, it is important that EU citizens 
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don’t see it as an elite-designated identity (Fremdzuschreibung), but as a subjective 
sense of self internalized by EU citizens themselves voluntarily and consciously 
(Selbstzuschreibung) (Lessar 2000, 2 as cited by Edwards 2003, 9). Constellation of a 
collective identity is essentially a sociological process that cannot be successfully 
concluded by the efforts of only elites and governing leaders. Its success requires 
popular acceptance and internalization of some common reference points (even 
though the very content of this commonality might vary over time and across 
different national histories) as basis for self-definition.  
Thus, unlike what the founding fathers thought, the mere existence of 
European integration, its institutions and policies cannot automatically lead to the 
emergence of a collective sense of Europeanness. Such approaches do not grant 
individuals the due credit for their role in identity processes as rational decision-
makers. Confirming more-than-passive-role of individuals in identity issues, Jenkins 
posits that identity is also about “to identify” and “there is something active about the 
word which cannot be ignored. Identity is not ‘just there’. It must always be 
established” (1996, 4). Hence, it is important that the citizens socially relate to the 
EU and its policies by discussing and experiencing them. 
Touching upon this point, Belot and Smith suggest, “studying collective 
identity therefore should not begin by looking for historical, geographical, and 
cultural criteria. Instead, research needs to focus on what makes sense for individuals 
as part of their daily lives” (1998, 100). This is the very reason why the state of 
collective identity formation at the EU level is best analyzed as a form of social 
identity.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY 
 If the citizens of Europe understand that this is not just an anonymous 
 bureaucratic monster that wants to limit or even deny their autonomy, but 
 simply a new type of human community that actually broadens their freedom 
 significantly, then the European Union need not fear for its future… 
 -Extract from the speech made by the President of the Czech Republic, 
 Vaclav Havel, to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on March 8th, 1994. 
 Available at  
 http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm 
 
 In this chapter, I will look into the conceptual roots of the social identity 
phenomenon through established theories and prepare the theoretical basis for the 
subsequent analyses that examine European identity as an instance of social identity. 
Doing so, I also hope to fill a gap in the literature that I pointed out earlier. The 
majority of the studies on European identity are devoid of a coherent broader 
theoretical framework that places this evolving identity in its sociological context. 
Any approach that falls short of treating European identity as an instance of social 
identity is, however, betraying the conceptual and empirical complexity of the 
phenomenon. Ad hoc hypotheses tested in these studies cannot go beyond providing 
some bits and pieces of unorganized and random findings that do not enjoy the 
theoretical validation of the concept of identity. Furthermore, empirical validation of 
the issue across the whole EU has been rare. Therefore, I believe that going back to 
basics of identity is essential in the case of European identity.  
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Social Identity and Multiple Identity Theories 
Human beings cannot be contemplated outside the many social groups of 
which they are members and in which they function as social beings. In other words, 
we do not exist and function in a vacuum. Zetterholm argues that individuals “have a 
need for transcendency, i.e. to experience themselves as something more than just 
individuals with short life-span and to partake in the cultural life of the social group” 
(1994, 71).  In other words, an individual by belonging to various social groups gains 
a sense of being more than what he is as a single being. Individuals, as a result, 
Zetterholm (1994, 71) continues, develop feelings of trust and loyalty toward those 
social groups that help them gain such sense of transcendency. As such, students of 
social and political studies have always been preoccupied with the need to 
understand the bond between human beings and the social groups that they are 
engaged in.  
The genesis of social identity has been a popular place to start. The main 
question is why individuals feel loyal to some groups and feel indifferent to some 
others. Similarly, students of identity wanted to know why some individuals are 
embraced by certain groups and refused by others. For a long time, collective identity 
is treated as flowing from “essential” features of the group members. Initial literature 
even reflected a belief in the biological bases of group (particularly racial) identities. 
Similarly, religion, cultural heritage, ethnicity, race and gender are all treated as 
naturally causing distinct collective categorizations.39 In other words, the essentialist 
approach takes identities as given and independent of and prior to identity politics. 
Such approaches also neglect integrating the power relations and status hierarchies 
                                                 
39 The long lasting marks of the early thinking on the collective identity as stemming from natural 
qualities of group members can be seen in the citizenship lingo of “naturalization”.  
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present in every society as factors shaping identity discourses and practices. 
Although essentialist understanding of identities is theoretically still possible, as an 
approach such depiction lost much of its prestige starting from the 1960s with the 
rise of empirical studies confirming the invented nature of nations and other social 
categories (Eley and Suny 1996, 7-10). Recent literature is critical of essentialist 
approaches to any category of identities. Today, it is largely agreed that identities are 
not “real” in the sense that objectifying them denies the socio-historical process of 
fabrication behind them—a subjective process that constitutes the essence of the 
constructionist school. According to the constructionist view subjective definitions 
and the accompanying social interactions affect even seemingly straightforward 
issues such as gender and race. Any identity category is socially and culturally 
defined and hence is to be viewed as not inevitable. 
Accounting for a fluid concept like identity, indeed, requires recognizing the 
deliberate role of agent and politics in construction of identity categories. Every 
collectivity is a social product based on mobilization of discourses via the interaction 
of (dominant) social forces.40 Unlike the conviction of essentialist school of thought, 
in a society, there is more room for maneuver in identity politics as the task is not 
simplified by the presence of only one—and what is more—“given” raw material on 
which the definition of a social group may be based. The question of which 
                                                 
40 At one time in a society, there may be, for example, more than one way of defining a national 
identity. However, it is the dominant social forces whose contemplation will determine the final 
product. This is why social identities are often a result of mutual bargaining as much as imposition 
between different social groups. This process of social construction of identities by the dominant 
social forces is most apparent in multinational societies. In places like Spain or Turkey, for example, 
the overarching national identity has more to do with the discourses of the most prevalent and 
majority-based forces than marginalized ethnic groups. Although internalized (felt) versions of such 
identities might be different than the one that is displayed in public sphere, any alternative identity 
constructions are deterred by way of fears of explicit or hidden social punishment and/or 
discrimination. 
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dimension in a cultural context are to be the constitutive principles of a collective 
identity is resolved by active agents. In short, constructionist school argues that all 
identities are manufactured. All groups and the respective identity categories 
(ethnicity, gender, nationality and even race) are culturally constructed, [re]visited 
through modified or novel discourses and from time to time reinterpreted with the 
influence of social movements as well as external developments.41 
Thus, identity construction is not to be taken as an endogenous given; it rather 
needs to be understood in its respective cultural setting where the fictional stories are 
fabricated through mutual bargaining and negotiations as well as power relations 
among the respective social actors.42 For example, depiction of blackness (Davis 
1991) or admission of Irish into the white category (Ignatiev 1995) in America 
cannot be grasped by way of examining the biological or physical qualities of the 
group members. Such qualities do not have a meaning that is a priori to the 
social/political process whereby identity categories are created and maintained. 
Social practices, government policies or strategic action on the part of claimants (to 
take advantage of rewards offered by such classifications) all have a role to play in 
determining what identity categories are available and acceptable to the groups 
involved.43    
                                                 
41 For a discussion of this process in detail see Anderson (1991); Ignatiev (1995); Takaki (1993, 
1999); Omi and Winand (1994); Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983).  
42 For a good account of this process in the context of the United States, see Omi and Winant (1994). 
43 A similar strategic move on the part of claimants of a collective identity is seen in the relatively 
unknown community of Melungeons in the US. Due to their darker skins of Mediterranean origin, 
during the 1800s, the Melungeons are denied the right to vote or own land. Remained largely hidden 
for centuries for fear of discrimination, there is a recent revival of Melungeon consciousness. Thus, 
formal institutions and policy agendas have a way of affecting how collective identities are formed, 
expressed and reproduced, and how social behavior is patterned with the influence of social relations 
and social/political negotiations.  
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Although construction of collective identities takes place through deliberate 
acts, one should not exaggerate the process as purely based on will. Referring to this 
process, Marcussen et al. (1999) argue that reconstruction of a collective national 
identity, for example, takes place usually during ‘critical junctures’ of national crises. 
At these times, political actors define, based on the compatibility with the existing 
identity constructs, the range of viable options for reconfiguration of a collective 
identity. In other words, it is through a “conditioned subjectivity” that agents can 
originate identities (Eley and Suny 1996, 18). 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) developed by Tajfel (1970, 1974, and 1982), and 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) is an oft cited source on identity studies. According to SIT: 
firstly, individuals desire and are naturally in need of having a positive self-image. 
Thus, they will only develop attachment to those groups that projects a positive 
social identity.44 Tajfel defines social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership” (1974, 
69).  Hermann and Brewer argue that “beyond mere recognition of membership in a 
social group or category, identification implies that the group and its defining 
characteristics have become integral to the person’s self-concept, with associated 
values, emotions and extensions of individual self-esteem” (2004, 6).  
Secondly, if social identities cannot continue to provide such a positive 
image, individuals can either abandon their association with that group or initiate a 
                                                 
44 One should, however, note that there are identity categories that are not necessarily voluntarily 
selected but are rather imposed on individuals by cultural systems of meaning and practices. The most 
compelling example of such a case is racial identities. 
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change in its image for a better way of conceptualizing themselves.45 The impact of 
frustration with the image one group provides to the individual might also be seen in 
a shift of emphasis of another group membership instead of a wholesale termination 
of the original group membership (Medrano and Guitierres 2001, 758). This is where 
SIT is supplemented by the literature on multiple identities, which will be discussed 
in detail below. 
Thirdly, this self-esteem function of identities gains meaning in a context of 
social comparison (i.e., comparison with other groups). Group-identity formation 
requires definition of a ‘we’ group of insiders with common characteristics and a 
negation of this boundary with a ‘they’ group of outsiders with different (and often 
negative)ones.46 Accordingly, to distinguish a community from other collectivities, 
every social group defines the ties that bring them together and believes that what 
they share is why they have a “wir-gefühl”.47 That which the group members are 
believed to share allows in-group members to positively relate to one another. It is 
this commonality that justifies and requires concern for one another, and defense of 
the community. Out-group members, on the other hand, are distinct from in-group 
members as they are defined by a set of different features. The out-group symbolizes 
the other of an identity in opposition to which we-hood gains meaning. Different 
                                                 
45 When social identity becomes negative (i.e., identity is perceived to be unsatisfactory), individuals, 
by acting in their self-capacity, adopt a different identity that attributes a more positive self-image 
(known as ‘social mobility’) or by acting in their group capacity improve the perceived image of the 
group itself as a whole (known as ‘social change’) (Tajfel 1974, 78). An example of social mobility 
can be seen in frequent preference for European identity among Germans instead of German national 
identity due to its problematic past connation. Civil rights movements in the US in the 1960s can be 
considered as an example of social change. However, one should, again, not exaggerate the degree of 
freedom in adopting identities. In some cases, identities are imposed on us by others (Breakwell 
1979). For example a Hispanic person may have better chances of disguising his/her ethnic/racial 
identity depending on her skin tone compared to an African-American person, which makes the latter 
case a rather compulsory group membership. 
46 Eriksen (1995) defines these two processes as “we-hood” and “us-hood” respectively. 
47 Wir-gefühl refers to the feelings of solidarity with the fellow in-group members (i.e., we-feeling). 
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contexts render different others relevant for an identity construct (Eriksen 1995, 431; 
Mayer and Palmowski 2004, 578). An American, for example, might find the 
differences between Americans and the French more relevant than the differences 
between Americans and Canadians when traveling in Europe. Similarly, in a 
domestic context, the other of Turkish identity might be the Kurds but in an 
international context where the necessity of Turkish membership in the EU is 
emphasized, the other of Turkish identity is often the non-secular Islamic (Arab) 
countries. In the audio-visual domain, the other of European identity has been 
Americans and their cultural domination. The other of an identity can change over 
time as well (Eriksen 1995, 431). Since definition of out-group or non-group 
characteristics are an essential part of any identity construction (see e.g., Neumann 
1996), in cases where such differences are nonexistent, they are often manufactured 
(Tajfel 1974, 75), and through discourses projected as eternal facts. 
This dual process of conceptualization of ‘we’ and ‘them’ is the very basis of 
what is known in psychological studies as in-group bias as well as the stereotyping 
directed typically against out-group members. Social psychology studies gathered 
evidence for a clear bias in collective identities in that members of a social group 
usually favor fellow members over non-members. Indeed, regardless of personal 
acquaintance, depiction of a person as a fellow in-group member provides for one an 
immediate reason to favor that individual over another individual who is free of any 
relations to one’s social group (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 38). The definition of in-
group is what motivates the differential treatment of outsiders. Thus, the way out-
group members are handled is informed by the common norms that characterize a 
particular social group (Klein 2003, 2). 
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However, not every group identity requires or necessarily relies on a 
corresponding negative image of another group. In some cases, group identity is 
constructed in such a way that it does not take its cues from an alleged inferior or 
adverse image of another group. Zetterholm (1994, 69-70) suggests two situations 
where cognitive discrimination with negative connotations for another group usually 
happens: in cases where the central identity creating feature of the other group is seen 
as “strange and undesirable”, and where historical hostilities and animosities 
encourage forming a threatening image of the other group due to the conflict 
inducing potential of major differences.48 In fact, many studies concluded that the 
presence of a common enemy is the most powerful cue for identity demarcation.49 
Sometimes identities can take their cues from others that are not different 
groups/countries. They can also be alternative versions of a group identity (Duara 
1996). In Muslim societies secular and non-secular versions of national identities can 
be an example of such a situation. In multicultural and especially contested societies, 
there are different claims to the constitutive principles of the dominant identity. 
Catalan version of Spanish identity or Quebec’s version of Canadian identity is 
different from the dominant version of the national identities in the respective 
countries. Similarly, Germany’s Nazi past is the clear other of its current democratic 
European identity. 
                                                 
48 A particularly illustrative example of this situation can be seen in the current discussions 
surrounding the debates on Turkish membership in the EU. Turkey presents a clear challenge for the 
EU. Turks served as the ‘other’ of the various episodes of European identity, particularly during the 
times of political and military conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and the various European 
nations. Such perceptions— combined with its unfamiliar culture and religion—lead to an image of 
Turkey for many Europeans that is threatening to the cultural persona of the European venture. 
49The initial disorientation following the end of the Cold War in the Western Europe with regard to the 
future of the NATO is a telling case. The collective images formed during the cold war were the main 
driving force for NATO as a viable collective security organization. With no enemy left in sight, many 
scholars and policy makers quickly declared that NATO was debilitated and obsolete. For, without a 
common enemy, the ties that bring the member states of NATO together became ambiguous. 
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In line with different types of other, social boundary formation is realized in 
different ways. Erickson (1995) explains implications of what he calls 
“dichotomization” vis-à-vis “complementarization”, favoring the latter. Accordingly, 
dichotomization is a conflictual way of defining the differences between two groups 
to make sense of the respective identities. The contrasts between in-group and out-
group members are put in negative terms pointing to the irreconcilability of 
differences. Complementarization, however, “refers to the creation and reproduction 
of a comparative terminology for dealing with cultural differences” (Eriksen 1995, 
434). Through complementarization, out-group members are treated as different but 
not inferior. Such an approach to difference emphasizes a culture of respect for 
difference whereby perceptions of other lead to a more benign mental demarcation.  
In a more general study, Schmidtke (1998) differentiates between three ideal 
types for constructing a collective identity. Accordingly, primordialism refers to 
those cases where the community members are believed to share a natural core that 
uniquely differentiates them from others.  Membership is practically not possible to 
attain without being born to that community. Outsiders are seen as causing 
contamination. The second type of collective identity formation relies on 
universalistic patterns of identification. Here, qualities that determine who belongs to 
a particular community are not derived from the ethnic or cultural qualities.  As long 
as outsiders adopt the cultural standards of the community they are welcome to join.   
However, the group might pursue missionary policies to assimilate late-comers.  It 
still relies on strong communal homogeneity rather than civic rights. The third form 
of collective identity formation, Schmidtke discusses, is based on traditional 
identities. It is based on a sense of community via face-to-face interaction and 
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common practices. It usually works in small-scale communities. This type of 
boundary formation does not require any cultural or primordial features but only 
civic participation based on traditions.50 
In whichever way it is done, boundary demarcation also determines who is 
expected of fulfilling duties that flows from group membership and who is entitled to 
the privileges which such membership has to offer. For example, in a nation-state 
citizens are privileged to vote and at the same time expected to defend their country. 
 Yet, existence of social boundaries between groups (that is, us-hood) is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for a group identity in that knowing the 
difference between in-group and out-group is not enough to erect a viable collective 
identity. The social identity perspective emphasizes the link between self and other.51 
Consolidation of group identity, in addition to a certain degree of differentiation from 
other social groups, requires a degree of internal cohesion and solidarity, too (Eriksen 
1995). In other words, in-group and out-group depictions are both essential for the 
viability of an identity construct. Definition of self and other is intertwined in a 
complex and mutually reinforcing way.52  
As argued by students of nationalism and discussed above there are different 
reasons why a group identity might emerge and what the group members believe they 
                                                 
50 Tempelman (1999) similarly discusses different forms of recognition of ‘other’ and the respective 
exclusionary effects of it. Among the forms he introduces are primordialism, civic multiculturalism 
and universalism. While the first one sees the other as essentially different and incompatible with the 
original group identity, the second one allows outsiders’ entrance on the condition that they adopt the 
practices and norms of the in-group. The third one sees outsiders as guilty of wrong choices and 
adopts a missionary perspective to convert them. Tempelman favors civic multiculturalism as it 
neither bars entrance option nor imposes it on the other. 
51 Collective identities, in this respect, are social identities deriving from large-scale and important 
differences (Kohli 2000, 117). Collective identities inform the cognitive roots of nonrandom 
social/political behavior and collective action. 
52 See Takaki (1999) to review the mutual interaction of self and other in the formation of collective 
national identity. Takaki argues that Asian Americans, who long were seen as strangers in the US, 
contributed to the idea of what it means to be an American today.  
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have in common. Cultural traits, economic standing, institutions, political 
mobilization among many other reasons can all lead to the formation of group 
identity. Kelman (1969, cited in Herman and Brewer 2004, 8), for example, argues 
that what the individuals believe to have in common might determine what kind of a 
group attachment comes into being (emotional or instrumental attachments). 
Similarly, as mentioned above what the group believes to have in common can also 
determine the type of exclusion that is practiced vis-à-vis other groups. 
The effects of different forms of identity formation are seen in various 
citizenship and immigration policies nation-states pursue (Croucher 2003, 4). 
Restrictive immigration and citizenship laws are common practice in countries with 
cultural membership criteria. The best example would be Germany’s insistence on 
ethnic German origin known as the ‘Volk’ principle for citizenship. Almost automatic 
admission of many non-German speaking ex-Soviet citizens into German citizenship 
following the end of the Cold War due to their German ancestry was upsetting to 
many members of immigrant groups living in Germany. For instance, younger 
generations of immigrant Turkish labor force, even though born and socialized 
throughout their life in Germany, are facing tougher obstacles in way of their 
acceptance as full-members of German society. On the other hand, civic citizenship 
laws effective in the US tie citizenship to birth or residence in the US and are 
accompanied by less rigid immigration laws. Here a warning, however, with regard 
to different degrees of flexibility seen in various countries with civic conceptions of 
membership is in order. Despite the use of principle of jus soli, France, for example, 
is known to promote an assimilationist policy to ensure a somewhat standard 
conception of French citizens. The ‘headscarf’ crisis is perhaps more about this issue 
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than French laicism. Canada, on the other hand, actively encourages the most 
pluralist multiculturalism policy known. 
Perhaps more surprising than the effects of different types of identity 
formation followed by groups on their willingness to allow entrance by outsiders are 
the effects of such societal beliefs as to the appropriateness of basis for group identity 
on perceptions of evolving new identities. Central and Eastern European countries 
are known to emphasize ethnic/cultural national identities. It would be interesting to 
see if this is why they perceive European identity also in ethnic/cultural terms.53 In 
other words, models of identity formation followed by collectivities might have long 
term impact on how they approach to new collective identities. Although the case of 
Germany would go against such a pattern, their willingness to see European identity 
in civic terms might be explained by the conditioning effect of their desire to be seen 
as Europeans rather than Germans.  
 The variables in an identity construct are formed in a historically contingent 
way and are open to reconstruction. What is at issue here is the fluid and temporary 
nature of identities. So what the members of a group have in common might change 
but the process and how identities are formed is the same. In fact, identities –whether 
individual or collective—are not fixed and free of change in time and context. Our 
group memberships and the roles we assume in different groups continuously change 
depending on many personal factors including age, social status, marital status and 
the like. However, individual qualities are not the only factors that change one’s 
understanding of self. The individual experiences that give cues to self-understanding 
                                                 
53Jimenez at al. (2004) shows that while Central and Eastern European countries refer to cultural 
commonalities, Western and Southern European countries refer to civic ideas as the basis for the 
evolving European identity. 
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is not taking place in a vacuum, but as Loth argues, “realities experienced by the 
individual are interpreted in the context of collective models of reality and stocks of 
knowledge” (2000, 20). Both the individual experiences and the collective context in 
which they are evaluated, then, change—hence the dynamic nature of identities. 
Although identities are constructed and fabricated, one should be wary of a claim that 
identities are genuinely ‘shared’ at all times or at any given time. Many students of 
identity politics criticize the reductionist tendency to disregard the fragile and 
temporary nature of consensus on the content of identities as well as individual 
variation within an identity group.  
Studies on multiple identities complement social identity theory by pointing 
to the fact that social identities are multiple (Lawler 1992; Waters 1990; Kohli 2000). 
This is because we all see ourselves belonging to more than one social group. The 
configuration of these identities is often nested contingent on the context and issue 
area (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Lawler 1992; Kohli 2000, 115).  Thus, it 
is the context that determines which one of our identities will come to the fore as the 
relevant one at a particular instance. 
For example, somebody, who does not believe that there is a great deal of 
cultural commonality among disparate European nations, can be surprised to feel 
how close s/he feels to other fellow Europeans during a stay in the United States. 
Similarly, Klein et al. (2003), through an experimental analysis, shows that Greeks 
are not as outspoken about their historically embedded biases against Turks when 
they face a European audience compared to a purely Greek audience. Wanting to 
project their self-image in line with European credentials, Greeks suppress their 
prejudices towards Turks, when their European identity is more salient and condition 
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their speeches more in line with the norms of broader European Union: tolerance and 
acceptance. Thus, as long as we can come up with rules according to which the 
salience of various identities are shaped depending on the context, we can gain a 
predictive power as to when a person can feel belonging vis-à-vis a certain group.  
The configuration of multiple identities can be in ways, nonetheless, other 
than nested (where one identity is subsumed in a broader identity). Herman and 
Brewer (2004, 8) argue that identities can also be either crosscutting or separate. The 
perception of configuration of multiple identities for those who share the same 
identities might be different, too (Herman and Brewer 2004, 9). For example, Texas, 
although a state in the US, is known for its unique and assertive identity. It is also 
home to many immigrants with or without American citizenship. Two Texans who 
feel both Texan and American might have different perceptions with regard to 
whether these two identities are nested, cross cutting or separate. 
The point made thusfar is that, in line with such room for variation in feelings 
and perceptions of identity, social identities are socially and politically constructed 
and deliberately manipulated. Even the national identities that are often seen as 
givens of political culture are constructed. Social identities are also relational, and 
contextual. They gain meaning relative to other groups and identities available. 
Context and issue area is likely to affect which identity is overarching in case of 
multiple identities and how they relate to one another. In turn, the relationship 
between various identities conditions social and political behavior. 
Social identities are also uneven, for they are both internally and externally 
challenged. It is misleading to treat identity groups as truly ‘collective’ since such an 
approach would exaggerate the internal homogeneity as well as the uniformity in 
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external recognition. For example, in the case of the EU, it is a well-known trend that 
the United Kingdom is ‘Euro-skeptical’. However, treating the UK as a 
homogeneous unit would be reductionist. While the British has considerable 
objection to accepting a self-definition in terms of a European identity, the Scottish 
segment of the society has more moderate views with regard to the issue (Ichijo 
2002). Similarly, Turkey as an outsider is challenging the way European identity is 
conceptualized in order to have its Islamic identity integrated into the current 
depiction of Europeanness. 
Social identities are also not frozen or final in the sense that group identities 
are often evaluative and individuals can leave certain groups based on that 
evaluation. For an identity to be secure, it must be competitive with alternative group 
identities in terms of its material and emotional worth to the individual. Lawler 
(1992) argues that individuals desire to maintain control over their lives. Thus, he 
continues, when social and political groups increase our sense of control in our 
choice processes (i.e., means/ends deliberation) we feel positive emotions, which in 
time generate affective attachments to those groups causing such increased self-
autonomy. This point can be seen as confirming and broadening the self-confidence 
function of identities mentioned above. In fact, positive self-image is an extension of 
self-esteem that derives from a sense of control on one’s own destiny. An individual 
who is not in control of the external environment and actors is not likely to have high 
self-esteem and in turn positive self-image.  
The value of a social identity is significant to understand, for it is what carries 
the seeds for change of identities. Social identities can change with external 
manipulation for a new identity promising an improved self-image with 
 68
accompanying opportunities. This depiction might sound too simplistic or negligent 
of the passionate element of identities. However, as it is clear from Lawler’s 
interpretation of the link between utilitarian and affective components of identities, 
emotive satisfaction one derives from an identity is an inherent part of the cost-
benefit evaluation of group identities. Kohli also argues that “much of identity 
politics is strategic behavior, dependent on incentives and mobilization efforts by 
political entrepreneurs and thus more a response to opportunity structures than an 
indication of a thickly particularistic self-definition in an essentialist sense” (2000, 
130). Therefore, identities are both formed and assumed as part of a strategic 
deliberation.  
The fact that identities are not final or static is not same as arguing they 
change overnight or every group identity is equally subject to the effects of external 
manipulation. Changeability of an identity is likely to be commensurate with how 
well it is established. Zetterholm (1994, 79) argues that the nation-state as the 
‘survival unit’ (i.e., the major unit handling important political functions related to 
the survival of the individual) over a long period of time, becomes hard to abandon 
as the central political identity of individuals. This ‘drag effect’  (Zetterholm 1994, 
79) that might be at work in various identity options is likely to condition the impact 
of external manipulation of identity constructs and how receptive individuals are to 
new identity options. Comparatively, class-based attachments are, for example, more 
vulnerable to revisions than national identities for the circumstances surrounding the 
former are likely to change more frequently.  
It is, however, reductionist to group every national identity in the same 
category and treat them as difficult to change. Every national identity is not subject to 
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the effects of an identity option to the same extent. Breakwell (2004) posits “national 
identities differ in their response to the influences exerted by the EU, such that the 
salience and stability of the national identity will limit in significant ways the type 
and rate of change in identity resulting from EU actions” (38). This, according to 
Breakwell, is due to the varying degrees of capabilities in different national identities 
to assimilate or resist the impact of the EU as a new identity category.  
Even if the age and the central nature of national traditions and identities 
might prove to slow down the Europeanization of collective-images, identities 
including national identities do evolve over time integrating new dimensions 
introduced by outside stimuli. Seidendorf (2003, 18-19), for example, through the 
discussion of discourse analysis in print media of France and Germany in 1994, 
argues that national identity constructs and the accompanying discourses do 
transform as a result of European integration.  
European Identity as Social Identity 
Many scholars inform their studies on European identity with a national 
identity perspective. The European integration process is compared to a mission of 
nation-building and prospects for European identity judged according to the extent 
that a single European nation is likely to emerge (e.g., Smith 1992). However, 
confining the analyses of the EU to the dominant political schema of political science 
might produce misleading conclusions (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 6). Llobera argues 
that social scientists failed in two important instances: in predicting “the collapse of 
communism and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, and the absence of sociological 
categories which would allow us to think in European terms—all our concepts being 
appropriate only to the nation-state” (1993, 65).  
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The best practical example of this ethnocentric thinking is seen in European 
Union citizenship that is trapped into a context that takes its cues from the nation-
states’ citizenship doctrines rather than residence within the EU borders. Despite the 
challenges nation-states are facing from both below and above through ‘micro and 
macro revolutions’ (Rosenau 1990), European leaders often fall into such traps as 
adopting strategies of nation/state building experienced in the European history and 
judge the progress gained in construction of a European identity against such criteria.  
When evaluated as a nation-building project, the success of the EU is bound 
to be less than impressive. As Bellier and William argue, imagining new Europe 
requires contemplation of “harmonization as an indefinite quest whose 
accomplishment is forever postponed, a process inextricably linked to the structural 
incompleteness of Europe” (2000, 14) rather than thinking about a bounded project. 
The philosophy of European integration itself is incompatible with the classical 
nation-building approaches, as the latter is done through bloody conflicts with one’s 
neighbors (Edwards 2000, 69). European Union is, on the other hand, based on the 
idea of peaceful change rather than use of force. 
The reductionist approach of nation-state paradigm also creates an impression 
of inevitable rivalry between national and European identities. This expectation of 
competition stems from the implicit assumption of essentialism. Best represented by 
the Maastricht ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht54 in 1993, a demos 
understanding that requires a Volk defined in organic-cultural terms and a citizenship 
understood only in conjunction with national state renders a rivalry between national 
and European polities inevitable (Weiler 1995, 243). Yet, it is misleading to treat 
                                                 
54 German Constitutional Court.  
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nation-state as the only unit of political organization as the addressee of loyalties. 
There are currently and will in the future be other ways of contemplating 
communities, particularly in civic terms rather than ethno-cultural primordial terms.55  
However, to say that nation-state is becoming perhaps an obsolete form of 
imagining politics and identity (Habermas 1998) is not same as talking about the end 
of nations. As Croucher (2003) argues even though the way nations are imagined 
might change, the imagining of nationhood will continue due to inherent human need 
to belong. What changes, then, is not the imagining per se but the time-bound 
variations in ways such constellation of communities takes place.  
The inadequacy of nation-building models to appraise the EU is recognized 
by many scholars (e.g., Schild 2001; Kohli 2000; Banchof and Smith 1999; Soysal 
1995). Banchoff and Smith, pointing to the increasing tendency to refuse statist 
perspectives on European Union politics, agree with approaches that “conceive of the 
EU neither as the mere creation of nation-states nor as a European super-state in the 
making, but as a complex web of policy and political relationships linking European, 
national and subnational institutions” (1999, 12). Indeed, the system of governance 
that is emerging can best be evaluated as a network of various ‘veto-players’ 
(Tsebelis 2002) where the political outcomes and behavior is determined through 
negotiation as well as unforeseen compromises. In Schild’s words, “none of the three 
levels clearly dominates the other two in a permanent and systematic way” (2001, 
334). The thriving practice and culture of the EU challenges our thinking as to the 
                                                 
55 One of the most popular theories in this regard came from German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas in 
the form of ‘verfassungspatriotismus’ (constitutional patriotism).  Accordingly, membership in a free 
polity is based on the voluntary adherence to democratic values and principles reflected in a 
constitutional culture (free of national differences).  
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appropriate models of polity. In sum, “Europe as an emerging form creates 
significant changes in our conceptions of politics and identity” (Abales 2000, 51). 
Furthermore, a more robust investigation of European identity begs for a 
more flexible and sophisticated perspective that places the modern individual with 
skills of rational decision-making and choice-processing in the center. Hence, instead 
of approaching it as part of a European nation-building strategy, a collective sense of 
belonging at the European level should be approached as a form of social identity. As 
such, individuals with their evaluative abilities and free will become citizens whose 
loyalty and appreciation that the EU needs to earn. After this introduction to the 
established literature on identity theories, an application of social identity theories to 
the case of European identity is in order. 
In light of the previous discussions where I visited the SIT, the first thing to 
clarify is that Europeanness is not an objectively definable concept. Although the 
core of what European identity stands for in the form of culture, history and heritage 
might seem real, the political and social construction of this consciousness has been 
going on for centuries. During this process, political figures, ordinary individuals and 
‘others’ (both in the sense of external entities in opposition to which European 
identity gained its meaning and alternative versions of European identity imagined by 
various Europeans and non-Europeans) all had a role to play in the manufacturing of 
this evitable consciousness. In fact, current efforts to differentiate a modern sense of 
Europeanness through selective employment of some historical raw materials 
constitute a good example of this ongoing construction. The official discourses and 
documents of the Union on European identity do not mention the tragic parts of 
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European history in an effort to construct a suitable and appealing basis for a positive 
imagination of European self.  
 It is important to mention that even though all identities created, some might 
need a more deliberate and obvious construction than others. For example, Tajfel 
notes that the “further an individual’s identity is removed from the networks of his 
immediate life and primordial bonds, the less certain his loyalty will be to the relative 
abstract unit, and the more likely it is that ‘reasons’ for his loyalty will have to be 
created” (1970, 127). Referring to the same issue, Risse (2002, 18) argues that the 
reason behind the gap in degree of identification with the EU among the elites and 
public has to do with how “real” the Europe of the EU is to the aforementioned 
groups. Elites as the leading actors in European integration are far more familiar with 
the institutions and functioning of the EU, which makes this new Europe all the more 
tangible and credible to them. Public, on the other hand, isolated from decision-
making process and disabled by the poor participation channels as well as limited 
knowledge still experiences the EU from a certain distance. European identity, hence, 
is perhaps more explicitly and bluntly created compared to national identities or to 
some other local identities. As discussed earlier, deliberate initiatives of policy-
makers to raise a European identity in the form of several symbols as well as 
European citizenship and currency are conscious efforts to erase the cold and abstract 
image of the Union in the minds of Europeans and replace it with a more real and 
approachable everyday construct. 
However, making construction of a new European collective identity credible 
and relevant cannot be achieved only by symbols, particularly when those symbols 
are not tied to tangible representations in individuals’ everyday lives. Making Europe 
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an integral part of individuals’ everyday lives warrants raising the significance of the 
EU by encouraging more and more people to experience the Union socially. This 
issue will be touched upon in detail below. 
As evaluated in the previous section, social identities rely on three main 
principles: firstly, a sense of group belonging requires definition of an in-group and 
an out-group. The definition of the “other” (i.e., out-group members) is an important 
aspect of social boundary formation. The historical European identity is molded 
through its opposition to various others: the Oriental/Asian, the American, and the 
East European (Strath 2002, 391). It is interesting to highlight that at certain points in 
history, today’s fellow Europeans within the EU were each others’ negative reference 
points for the respective national identities. For instance, following the German 
occupation and World War II, Germany was the main other in French national 
identity. British identity has content that is anti-continental (European) in general and 
anti-French in particular. The Scottish identity has some anti-British implications. 
Just like the content of national identity, it’s ‘others’ also change. Nordic countries 
consider their self-image pitted against Europe. As discussed above, defining the 
other is, however, not always done through comparison to an external entity. At 
different points in European history, Jews and communism also served to delineate 
Europe from what is perceived to be non-Europe. In the same way, following the end 
of the Cold War, some recent discourses utter Islam as Europe’s new other. This 
tendency has been strengthened with the terrorist events of 9/11 in the USA. Even 
though several European countries (both in the EU and outside the EU) have 
considerable number of Muslim population, Islamic identity is still seen as ‘stranger’ 
in Europe.  
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What the EU decides as its current ‘other’ has far reaching implications for 
what the EU at the end comes to be. If self and the other are two sides of the same 
coin, the current definition of the other for Europe will define not only where Europe 
ends, but also what Europeanness is incompatible with.56 This is the very reason why 
collective identities are shaped by negotiations and counter negotiations through its 
course. The other of an identity plays an important part in the end result of such 
constellations. A typical example of this is seen in the Turkish case. Although Turks 
have been active players in European theatre for centuries, they have been at 
different points in European history seen as non-Europeans and alien to European 
culture. The recent European Commission recommendation on start of negotiations 
with Turkey for full membership faced severe public resistance in some member 
states and led to a heated debate as to what Europe means after all. This soul-
searching and negotiations with one of Europe’s others with regard to whether an 
Islamic identity is or may be compatible with the European values will have far 
reaching implications on the future shape European construction will take. For 
instance, Turkey’s inclusion in the EU would force the EU to moderate or change its 
discourse on the Christian roots of Europeanness as it would impinge upon the role 
of Islam in Europe’s construction. 
In addition to the definition of what doesn’t constitute a social group identity, 
internal group cohesion is also required for the consolidation of that social identity. 
An internal group cohesion in the context of the EU would mean that Europeans 
                                                 
56 See for example Hülsse’s (2000) discussion of how the discourse on Turkey’s EU accession is a 
hidden ‘othering’ strategy for European identity construction by way of its focus on Turkey’s 
credentials for Europeanness.  
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recognize one another as members of the same broader ‘we’ group who are worthy of 
trust, affection, solidarity and mutual concern.  
Secondly, social identities are always multiple. A central issue within the 
context of our discussion is the relationship between national and European identities 
as social identity categories and their natures. Attempts to explain the nature of 
identities divide the issue into two by following the analysis of Easton (1965; 1975) 
on political support for institutions: instrumentalist identities (that derive mostly from 
cost-benefit calculations and are explicable through rational choice approach) and 
affective identities (that are generated by affective feelings deriving from elements 
that have potential primordial connotations). The prevalent view in the literature 
characterizes European identity less in affective and more in utilitarian terms (Garcia 
1993; Laffan 1996; Hedetoft 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Schild 2001; Van 
Kersbergen 2000; Jimenez et al. 2004). Thus, European identity, which is a result of 
such instrumentalist loyalty, is viewed as different from more durable and passionate 
national identities.57  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the nation-state continues to be the 
major locus of political identification, yet it is misleading to argue that European 
identity can only expand at the expense of national identity. ‘Multiple identities’ that 
are induced by different contexts and issue-areas (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; 
Marks 1999; Waters 1990). The development of multi-level identifications is also a 
reasonable outcome of EU’s multi-level governance (Schild 2001).  Similar effects of 
multilevel governance in federal states on collective identities are well established in 
local politics literature.  
                                                 
57 Habermas (1975), referring to the necessity of deeper attachments, argues that a democratic political 
system needs something more than economic support: cultural legitimacy. 
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Sociological studies yield that no identity can be treated as unconditionally 
and eternally superior to other identities (Eley and Suny 1996, 10). The quality and 
intensity of belonging to different groups is likely to be subject to change across time 
and issue areas. Particular contexts may elevate one identity to the dominant/salient 
status over others due to specific relevance or utility in that particular context. The 
hierarchy within multiple identities depends on many factors such as interest 
calculations, power structures, and social negotiations with accompanying 
motivations and disincentives.  
Rather than considering different identities in a zero-sum context, it is 
perhaps more realistic to treat identities as an interplay of both instrumentalist and 
affective components. A strictly dichotomous approach misses the point that even a 
predominantly instrumental identity –as long as it fulfills a certain positive function 
for the individual- might entail some emotional significance. Developing a strong 
affective attachment to a community requires a long period of adaptation and 
socialization process. It has a lot to do with the strength and the salience of 
discourses on identity along with the practical utility of its common myths and 
symbols. All these factors point to the possibility that an identity that is for the most 
part instrumental (i.e., with little emotional significance) might over time increase in 
affective intensity, as utility of the group membership for personal development and 
survival increases.58  Furthermore, as Tajfel (1974, 69) defines, social identity—in 
addition to recognition of the group membership—represents the affective meaning 
of that group membership to the individual. 
                                                 
58  Dogan (1994) and Howe (1995) foresee that European identity might replace national identity if it 
gains enough affective capital. 
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In sum, instrumental and affective attachments might be both at work in the 
case of European identity, and their interaction might be a function of the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the Union in providing Europeans with increased (material as 
well as nonmaterial) benefits. As discussed in previous section, Lawler (1992) argues 
that a social group that consistently gives positive emotions to an individual will 
eventually enjoy stronger identification from that individual. This is because such 
positive emotions will translate into affective attachments as one builds on the other 
in a mutually reinforcing way. This brings us to the third and the most important 
principle of social identity theory: the link between social identity and a sense of self-
worth. 
Drawing upon Lawler (1992), one can argue that even though individuals are 
inclined to develop stronger ties to locality (subgroups-here nation-state or regional 
state), the EU can attract affective attachments if it can change perceptions of the 
citizens as to the positive impact of the EU on individual choice generation. In other 
words, if the EU citizens see the EU as a source of independence and multiplicity of 
choices, they will develop a deep, emotive attachment to the EU. This proposition 
makes sense in light of some empirical examples. For example, the deficiencies in 
one’s national democracy might lead to a switch to European identity, if the EU 
provides ways of political participation and is seen as more representative of 
marginalized groups. This is the case for Spain where various groups see the EU as 
the guarantor of their rights. Similarly, in recent decades the religious as well as 
Kurdish segment of the Turkish population proved to be the staunchest supporters of 
the entry into the EU, for the political system and governance of the EU offers a 
refuge for censured rights.  
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In this context, Schmidtke (1998, 57-58) argues that European citizenship 
could serve a pivotal function by guaranteeing social and political participatory rights 
that make Europeanness a visible experience of everyday social practices. Currently, 
however, European citizenship functions as only a complementary membership to 
national citizenships and does not suggest its own rights and duties. EU citizens 
cannot reflect on the system and its functioning in a participatory way, without the 
mediation and conditioning of the nation-state. Rarity of any grass roots movements 
within the EU confirms that individuals are still far from perceiving the EU as an 
effective platform to raise their voices for their social and political demands and 
praises. Real democratic participation within post-national framework of the EU 
would make the EU a social reality. Heinen argues that “in view of its structural 
weakness in terms of symbolic power and emotional strength, however, European 
Historical Consciousness will only come to determine behavior when it includes the 
individuals’ experience and when it possesses greater methodological and 
interpretative strength. European Historical Consciousness can therefore not be 
directed centrally (from Brussels?!), but must direct itself towards [this] individual 
and meaningful level” (2000, 111).  
A similar logic is used in one study conducted by Kritzinger (2004) where she 
argues that “development of a European identity is closely connected to the EU’s 
ability to deliver policy outputs according to citizens’ expectations” (abstract). 
However, Kritzinger’s approach is different from the one employed here. While 
support for the EU is considered to derive from utilitarian expectations, identity 
(affective attachment to the EU) is considered separate from but related to utilitarian 
expectations. As explained above, in Social Identity Theories, utilitarian and 
 80
affective attachments are intertwined in a more complex and mutually reinforcing 
ways, although this relationship is not clearly spelled out.  
An interesting question to raise here might perhaps be how identities can 
change depending on issue areas. Instead of a one size fits all type collective identity, 
sensitivity to context exposes the possibility that identity processes might react 
differently to economic, cultural, political and historical contexts. This question is 
particularly relevant in the global era where economic and political processes are 
governed and manipulated by an array of institutions at different levels of 
governance. Touching upon this issue Mahant argues that in the age of globalism, 
self determination by people can be exercised through developing multiple loyalties 
to “multi-layered or segmented institutions” that have a division of labor with regard 
to the realms of services and “are not necessarily territorially defined” (1995, 488). 
Having said that, one can easily reach the conclusion that depending on issue areas 
individuals can develop multiple loyalties to different political units in Europe, be it 
nation-state or supranational organizations, as expectations with regard to those 
services shift from one institution to the other. In addition to issue areas evoking 
different identities, policy preferences of citizens in different issue areas can evoke 
different components of collective identities (Risse 1999, 155; Marcussen et al. 1999, 
616).  
Nevertheless, the content and the intensity of a social identity are uneven for 
its subscribers. The intensity of an identity for different individuals within the same 
country as well as for different individuals from different countries is bound to vary 
as several factors may condition an individual’s perception of the EU as a relevant 
and effective entity. Then, it is also essential to examine the limitations on 
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individuals’ ability to socially experience the benefits and opportunities the EU 
presents. Any obstacle, then, that delays or prevents social experience of the 
social/political culture of the European Union should be seen as relevant for the 
purposes of this investigation.  
Firstly, individuals will respond to the issue of European identity differently 
owing to different demographic/socioeconomic factors that tie them across nations. 
For example, labor mobility is largely dependent on language skills, and education of 
individuals. The same skills might be important in the individual ability to relate to 
fellow Europeans (in the form of cognitive sophistication) in order to form a broader 
community in opposition to non-Europeans. Also, employment groups can have an 
impact on the willingness to identify with the EU since different segments of the 
work force are offered different incentives for supporting market integration. It is a 
well-known fact that low skilled workers are more disadvantaged than empowered by 
the integrated market structure of the European economy. The prospects for low-
skilled workers’ identification with the EU are grim, unless they derive some genuine 
advantages in other realms from the EU that can offset the aforementioned losses. 
Socioeconomic factors will also affect the perceptions of policy relevance.  While 
one individual might think that the EU is dealing with issues that are vital to his/her 
wellbeing, another might see the EU dealing with issues that are unrelated to his 
concerns. In general, individuals who are for one reason or another among those who 
loose because of the increasing economic integration underway can still develop ties 
to the EU, if they are in different issue-areas joined to other (and winning) groups. In 
other words, cross-cutting cleavages are likely to increase the chances of the EU to 
offset some of the losses it causes by way of alternative services in different issue-
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areas, unless the individual in question is among the permanent losers of integration. 
At issue is whether a low skilled Catalonian would appreciate the EU (despite the 
economic disadvantages) because of its services in raising rights and recognition of 
the broader Catalan group within Spain.  
As it is well established in the literature, such variation in willingness to 
identify with the EU stems also from individuals’ distinct national histories, political 
cultures, and perhaps most importantly national discourses that frame their 
understandings of national-self and European images as well as condition subjective 
perceptions of the EU’s worth.  
In summary, what the above discussion in light of Social Identity and 
Multiple Identity Theories suggests in terms of European citizens’ attachments is 
that:  
• The hierarchy of national and European identities is far from being fixed. 
Much will be determined by how Europeans define their community and 
whether the internal solidarity is genuine enough to form an in-group from 
previously distinct nationalities (we vs. they boundary formation). This is 
conditioned by events such as increasing understanding among the European 
nations as a result of face-to-face interactions, and the resulting “convergence 
in the cultural realm” as Europeans form a community of common heritage 
and practices different from non-Europeans (Reif 1993).59 Furthermore, the 
role these respective structures play in everyday lives of Europeans is bound 
                                                 
59 LeVine (1965) argues that it is more likely to have accurate images of groups that one has more 
experience with. Increased communication and contact among the citizens of the EU member-states 
makes inter-national differentiation difficult to maintain inside the Union. 
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to change over time, which, in turn, would change any hierarchy pattern 
between loyalties vis-à-vis the two structures. 
• The ability of the European Union to load its narratives and symbols with real 
meaning to individuals is significant in creating and sustaining a collective 
identity in the EU. This requires an increasing appreciation by Europeans of 
the benefits of the EU (in the form of economic benefits, European-level 
networking opportunities for transnational issues and meaningful political 
participation through its political institutions as well as citizenship practices). 
European identity needs to be integrated in social experiences of individuals 
to create a strong sense of loyalty. For such a sense of loyalty to be genuine, 
the EU citizens must feel that the EU is indispensable to their material and 
nonmaterial welfare. 
• Social experiences of Europe and the EU will vary from individual to 
individual. In other words, what it is to be a European along with the affective 
meaning of it is likely to be different for different individuals depending on 
those demographic qualities that might facilitate or hinder the processes of 
Europeanization. Cross cutting identity affiliations and demographics 
qualitatively change the nature of European experience for individuals. There 
is a great deal of variation both within the EU member states and non-EU 
countries in the way citizens understand and live Europe as the active part 
they take in the course of the EU vary. For example, an overwhelming 94% 
of those who are engaged in European institutions considered their country’s 
membership in the EU a good thing in a Eurobarometer survey conducted on 
top decision-makers (Laffan 2004, 76). It is highly unlikely that such a high 
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percentage can be replicated among individuals who live Europe from a 
distance, such as unemployed and the third country nationals living in a EU 
member state. Accepting the possibility of alternative subscriptions to 
Europeanness deconstructs the given status of a homogenous or a dominant 
single version of European identity.  
• The perception of the Union as a relevant and representative structure would 
contribute to project the EU as a locus for a positive self-identification. 
Therefore, European identity, just as any social/political identity, should also 
be seen as a strategic choice that is responsive to the opportunity structures 
offered. In this sense, immigrants and subnational groups such as national 
minorities are particularly attracted to European identity (Kohli 2000; 
Breakwell 2004, 34; Carey 2002, 406). This process, however, is not 
inevitable for every individual. In fact, as noted earlier only those individuals 
who feel empowered by the EU will identify with the EU.  
• European identity need not compete with any other social identity. As social 
networks of individuals become more comprehensive, new layers of social 
spheres become relevant in terms of identity and loyalty. Particularly owing 
to ever-increasing pace of globalization, other and more encompassing forms 
of social identities are likely to become viable. For example, social networks 
of transnational interest alignment will over time emphasize social identities 
that are free of national or supranational governance structures or formal 
organizations. Green Peace and other ecology movements are compelling first 
examples of this prospect. If individuals appreciate groups/units that increase 
their bargaining power and effectiveness in their daily choice processes, we 
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can conclude that depending on the issue area (and individual interest), the 
relevance of various groups/units will change, hence the saliency of one 
group identification over others. Whether individuals feel attached to 
European, a subnational group, or some other form collectivity at one time 
hinges on the particular issue area, the corresponding level of governance and 
the social context one is operating in. Non-duplicative identities need not be 
rivals. 
Some might argue that the implications that I derived from SIT and multiple 
identity theories for European identity draws a model that is not very different than 
an instrumental understanding of European identity. It is true that I focus above 
mostly on the confidence-raising function of social identity. In the light of that 
assumption I highlight those factors that symbolize the empowering effects of the EU 
as major variables affecting the link between individuals and the European Union. 
Conceptually this might seem not very different than saying individuals identify with 
the EU if they benefit from it. However, the theoretical roots of this claim in the SIT 
are much deeper and comprehensive than the utilitarian models that were used in 
some of the previous literature.  
Firstly, rather than simply arguing self interest is what accounts for 
developing group identities, I, drawing upon Lawler’s (1992) theory, argue that 
sustained favorable opinion with regard to a group will over time result in a durable 
attachment to that group with more than temporary implications. In fact, such 
emotional attachment to the EU is what the policy makers hope to bring about to 
sustain popular support even at times of unpopular policies. The mere existence of 
the EU as a new supra-level identity is not in itself enough for individuals to 
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automatically embrace this new identity option. It is through the policies of the EU 
that this new identity category gains meaning and affective significance. Whether the 
EU policies are delivering to European citizens services that cannot be done by their 
national states or services that they are deprived of by their national governments for 
social/political reasons has far-reaching implications for whether the EU can over 
time rely on a growing political capital and, in turn, affective allegiance. This 
dynamic part of the theory is admittedly rich and data restrictions will prevent me 
from displaying the modifications EU brings about on personal understanding of self 
over years. This methodological challenge, nevertheless, should not lower the value 
of the aforementioned theoretical point, one that sets it apart from the simplistic 
utilitarian models which are negligent of identity trends that come about with the 
passage of time. 
Secondly, previously used utilitarian models are mostly concerned with only 
material advantages the EU offers to its citizenry. In this study, I also consider 
nonmaterial benefits Europeans derive from the EU. In this sense the theoretical 
boundaries of the model is more comprehensive and representative of the actual 
individual experiences with the EU. 
Thirdly, identities changing as a response to outside stimuli should come as 
no surprise. Individuals, rather than allowing their identities automatically change as 
passive objects of manipulation, should be given the due credit for their evaluative 
capabilities and rational decision-making skills. With these assumptions in mind, 
many scholars previously pointed to the purposive nature of identity processes (see 
Breakwell 2004; Risse 2002b). Breakwell touching upon this issue argues that  
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Identity is not totally determined by its social context. There are 
contradictions and conflicts within the ideological milieu, generated 
by intergroup power struggles, that permits the individual some 
freedom of choice in formulating the identity structure. Furthermore 
the limitations of the cognitive system itself impose some constraints 
on identity development. Changes in identity are therefore normally 
purposive (30)… People will differ in their awareness of the category 
characteristics and in the inclination they feel to assimilate them. The 
process of assimilation and accommodation of the new identity 
element is purposive (2004, 34).  
Fourthly, drawing on the Social Identity and Multiple Identity Theories, I 
focus on both the utilitarian value of the EU and affective meaning of it for the 
individual. Again data availability will limit my ability to fully demonstrate this 
mutual relationship between the two aspects of identity. However, the proxies I 
develop based on Eurobarometer data will certainly give us a more complete model 
along with some preliminary results that can be used by future research to build 
upon. I argue that utilitarian and affective attachments, rather than being different 
types of identities, are two elements found in every identity. 
What Kind of a European Identity?  
Before we indulge in uncovering the model that will be tested in this study, an 
important distinction is in order for the sake of conceptual clarification. I discussed 
that theoretically it is possible to differentiate between three types of European 
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identity: institutional, cultural and civic.60 As a form of social identity, individuals 
can attach a cultural or civic connotation to their sense of belonging to the EU. 
Which type of an identity is or can European identity be?  
Schmidtke (1998) evaluating the feasibility of ideal identity forms argues that 
only a universalistic identity can be credible for the EU. The EU lacks any eternal or 
ahistorical commonality in primordial or cultural terms for a primordially defined 
identity. The sheer diversity we see among the European member states as well as 
within each member state makes this option not convincing. This form of identity 
formation would also require an aggressive demarcation from outside world through 
a strong other. Not only normative implications of such a dichotomization are 
dangerous for future of the broader Europe, but also it would present an 
inconsistency with the broader ideals and the discourse of the EU.   
Arguing for an EU identity that is based on some universalistic values 
Schmidtke points to the fact that the European unification project is created “via a 
specific cultural value orientation and ideational reference points delineating a future 
project rather than glorifying a common past of primordial origin” (1998, 57). 
Looking at the same issue from a somewhat different perspective Howe (1995) 
recognizes the lack of a primordial kind of solidarity among Europeans, but argues 
that a prospective myth could well do the same task. Europeans can see each other as 
fellow in-group members if they believe in the joint destiny and common goals they 
share.  
Referring to the same question, Seidendorf mentions a typology introduced 
by Peter Graf Kielmansegg as to the three communities that can project a political 
                                                 
60 By institutional identity, I mean external identity of the European Union in the world stage. For the 
distinction between the last two types of European identity see Bruter (2003). 
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identity: “community of memory, community of communication and community of 
experience” (2003, 3). A community of communication relies on public discussion of 
politics in a public sphere and thereby a common identity being forged among the 
discussants who participate in this discursive practice.  Community of memory, on 
the other hand, relies on commonly interpreted past narratives and their symbols for 
persuasion and belonging in a community. Lastly, community of experience is based 
on public participation in decision-making and majority forming in an environment 
of plurality of memories, attitudes and orientation. The first two kinds of 
communities are difficult to succeed at the European level due to lack of a common 
European memory and common language respectively.61 Graf Kielmansegg 
concludes that what we see as a result of the European governance and political 
system is rather an emerging community of experience.  
Thus, there is a general agreement in the literature that a meaningful cultural 
or historical identity does not exist at the European level (Mayer and Palmowski 
2004, 575). There is also some evidence based on Bruter’s (2003) study that 
European identity is internalized by European public mostly as a civic rather than a 
cultural identity. Agreeing with Bruter, Risse (2002, 18) maintains that cultural and 
civic definitions of Europe refer to different constructs. Europe per se is often 
considered as a broader cultural and historical space. On the other hand, 
identification with the EU is often perceived in civic terms meaning attachment of 
the citizens to the political institutions and structures of the EU. Based on this 
distinction, Risse argues that when individuals talk about a political Europe, what 
                                                 
61 Lack of a common European memory is particularly discouraging as common European experiences 
are recalled through different national memories (Mayer and Palmowski 2004, 581). 
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they have in mind is the EU. In other words, “the EU has achieved an ‘identity 
hegemony’ in that it defines Europe in political terms” (2002, 18).  
Based on these theoretical points and empirical evidence, this study assumes 
that the emerging European identity is more civic in nature than cultural. Thus, the 
following chapter that tests an empirical model is meant to measure a European civic 
identity that is believed to be projected by the EU. Even though a broader European 
identity that highlights a regional attachment to the broader European continent and 
its history is theoretically possible (regardless of its persuasive capital), such a sense 
of belonging remains beyond this study. 
In this chapter I reviewed the established Social Identity Theory developed by 
Tajfel and Turner. I argued that if European identity is to be a compelling collective 
identity, its success should be judged as an instance of social identity. I investigated 
the implications of SIT theory in the context of the EU. I also supplemented Tajfel 
and Turner’s theory with Lawler’s theoretical clarifications on the link between 
instrumental/affective attachments. In the next chapter, I will continue to move from 
more general to particular. I will present a social identity model of European identity. 
Based on Eurobarometer data, I will test this model and discuss the results. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHOD AND ANALYSIS 
 No one wants to see a technocratic Europe. European Union must be 
 experienced by the citizen in his daily life. It must make itself felt in 
 education and culture, news and communications… It must protect the rights 
 of the  individual and strengthen democracy through a set of institutions 
 which have legitimacy conferred on them by the will of our peoples. The 
 image of Europe… must demonstrate to these within and without the 
 solidarity of our peoples and the values of our society. 
 -Tindeman’s Report to European Union [1976], as cited by Edwards (2000, 
 67). 
 
Based on the previous theoretical discussions, in this chapter, I will present a 
model of European identity as a case of social identity and test this model against the 
empirical data. Before we start this analysis one caveat is in order: It is important not 
to begin this endeavor under the illusion that I will test a complete theory that can 
control for all the possible factors that shape or adjust identities. The rich 
implications drawn from SIT and Multiple Identity Theories that proceeded 
constitute a comprehensive picture of identity processes and how identities are 
formed and sustained. The concept of identity is a thick and fluid one. Not only 
defining but also measuring the phenomenon of identity is difficult. As such, the 
model under investigation here is likely to be incomplete, leaving some of the factors 
out that impact identity. It is not realistic to expect that any one model can control for 
everything that can have an effect on social identities. 
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These conceptual challenges are exacerbated with the limited data 
availability. The most comprehensive data on issues of European politics is 
Eurobarometer public surveys conducted by the European Commission biannually. 
Yet, even Eurobarometer surveys suffer from several shortcomings. Researchers’ 
ability to test assumed relationships is limited with the survey questions that are often 
ambiguously worded and broadly defined. Furthermore, many questions are not 
consistently asked over years preventing an analysis over time. Faced with such 
drawbacks, one option would be designing one’s own survey or utilizing the limited 
national surveys. Any of these options, however, is likely to lead to case studies (due 
to funding or language barriers) rather than studies that examine issues across the 
whole EU. Cross-country coverage is perhaps the biggest advantage Eurobarometer 
surveys have to offer. The tradeoff involved is often between an in-depth analysis of 
a case study and a broader study with general patterns at work across the EU.  
Therefore, the empirical study that follows cannot claim to test the theory 
discussed in chapter III in its entirety or generate definitive relationships that hold 
across time due to such data limitation. As more multifaceted data become available, 
more and more aspects of the theory can be tested. The following analysis will 
present only a snapshot of the current state of European identity. Despite this 
reductionist attempt at partial testing of the theory, the preceding discussion of 
cognitive processes, social practices and symbolic tools by which identities are 
constructed, projected and manipulated is integral to any attempt at its empirical-
partial as it may be- understanding. The results still shed light on some of the 
contours of the relationships and their implications for future prospects of European 
integration and its identity consequences. 
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Modeling European Identity 
Under what conditions and for whom does European identity become a 
salient sense of belonging? Based on the Social Identity Theory, we can differentiate 
between cognitive, evaluative and affective meanings of an identity (Herrmann and 
Brewer 2004, 6). The individual is cognizant of which group he belongs to, the value 
of that group to his well-being and positive self-image, and the emotional 
significance that group membership has for him. Thus, I expect that individuals 
identify with a social group (here the EU) if they perceive it as a positive entity and 
the social group, in turn, helps them achieve a positive self-image. This positive self-
image is accompanied by a sense of empowerment by that group. Furthermore, 
individuals feel a certain degree of affect for the group in question.  
Integral to understanding European identity is also examining some of the 
possible reasons that are contributing to an individual’s willingness to identify with 
the EU. By the same token, any barriers to experiencing and relating socially to the 
European Union should also be explored. For such barriers will curb one’s reasons to 
identify oneself as European. It is also essential to investigate the issue not only at 
the individual level but also at the national level. The shift of loyalty between 
national and European identities is not likely to be identical for every individual or 
member state. To put it more clearly, differences in European identity across 
individuals cannot be assumed only to stem from factors about individuals 
themselves. Factors deriving from individuals being members of a particular country 
will also have an impact on the prospects of European identity. Examining the issue 
at also the national level seems appropriate for two reasons: First, as members of a 
particular society, perceptions of individuals cannot be considered prior to and 
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independent of the values, images and the broader cultural environment (Vertzberger 
1990; Hermann et.al. 1975). Secondly, previous research yields that nationality and 
national concerns still play an important role in the popular evaluations of 
‘integration’ issues (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Deflem and Pampel 1996; Carey 
2002).62 Therefore, elaboration on the national level is as essential as individual 
level. All in all, elements that qualify an individual’s context condition how s/he 
perceives the EU, and how s/he defines individual self. Individual context also 
determines how distant that definition of self is from an imagined European identity. 
I also discussed in the previous chapter that the nature of multiple identities 
requires taking issue areas into consideration. Thus, when investigating sources of 
European identity, one needs to be sensitive to placing the principles of social 
identity within the context of particular issue areas. My expectation is that depending 
on the issue areas, the meaning of European Union might be different.  In those issue 
areas where the major competences lie in the hands of nation-states, European Union 
has little relevance and meaning to citizens. Thus nation states might continue to be 
the most meaningful locus of social identity. Similarly, an EU that provides services 
in those areas that are crucial for what Europeanness stand for (welfare state, human 
rights, environmental protection etc.) can set the EU apart from the individual nation-
states (Mayer and Palmowski 2004; Weiler 2002) as a separate and effective unit of 
governance which deserves its European citizens’ allegiance. Moreover, in surveys 
the sequence of questions or the flow of conversation might increase the salience of 
one identity over the other. 
                                                 
62 In an empirical study, Deflem and Pampel (1996) show that both anti-Europeans and pro-Europeans 
derive their attitudes with regard to the EU from national concerns. 
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There can be additional factors that condition the context in which an 
individual thinks about the EU and his/her Europeanness. For example, at times of 
major developments in the course of European integration, the issues about the EU 
preoccupy media means to a greater extent. As Risse and Steeg (2003, 22) argue, this 
overload of information makes the European Union especially salient and may have 
effects on European identity. Salience of Europe and the discourses on pros and cons 
of European policies can facilitate Europeans discussing these issues as members of a 
collectivity, thereby creating a sense of awareness of both the EU and the joint social 
space Europeans are sharing. This expectation is in line with Bruter’s (2003) finding 
with regard to the effects of news on the civic European identity. Yet, whether such 
political context may help increase European identity or not is likely ultimately to 
depend on how the general national media frames the EU in news (hence national 
context) and whether a particular individual perceives the information as a cue to 
approve or resent the EU (hence individual context). Two such occasions can be 
years of treaty ratification63 and European Parliament elections64. Whether the 
distribution of identities is influenced by such events in those years would be 
interesting to see. These points, however, remain outside the scope of this study due 
to data limitations. Testing these propositions would require compiling data over 
                                                 
63 The current constitutional crisis of the EU offers a particularly relevant example. The firm rejection 
of the draft Constitution of the EU by both the French and the Dutch people has caused allegedly the 
biggest turmoil in the history of the EU. Media coverage of the EU as well as failed referenda news 
across the EU countries are likely to render issues of European identity dramatically salient motivating 
an overall public appraisal of the European project and its direction including its collectivity-forming 
consequences. Eurobarometer surveys carried out this spring and fall would offer a particularly 
compelling case to investigate and compare to earlier surveys because of the inherent link between 
such a constitution and a civic identity within the EU. 
64Perhaps the significance of European Parliament elections should not be exaggerated given the 
secondary status of these elections to the national elections. Typically, genuinely European debates 
are seldom the case in many member-states. National concerns and issues are known to monopolize 
these campaigns. 
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years. At the time being, it is not possible to combine such time series data on 
European identity along with all the variables of the theory I present here. In this 
study, deferring the issue to future research, I opted to apply the social identity theory 
to the case of European identity and test its validity without a consideration given to 
such contextual factors. 
Having mentioned all the limitations on a full test of the theory that is 
discussed in the previous chapter, a review of the model that will be tested in this 
study is in order.  Drawing upon the SIT and Multiple Identity Theory, the model 
proposed here is presented in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1 Model of European Identity as a Social Identity 
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Propositions 
Principles of Social Identity Theory 
Positive Image of the EU  
 SIT contends that individuals only identify with groups of which they have a 
favorable image so that they can contemplate their self-identity in a positive manner  
as well. Thus identifying with a group necessitates perceiving the group in a positive 
and favorable image.65 For example, Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002, 593) argue that 
during the Cold war the US regularly had favorable estimates of the strength of 
European allies due to her strong identification with Europe. Thus, I hypothesize that 
the more an individual views the EU through a positive image the more s/he is likely 
to identify with the EU.  
Empowerment by the EU 
 Lawler (1992) argues that empowerment by a group is significant in creating 
grounds and incentives for identifying with that group. If it is a voluntary 
membership of a group that is in question, one is more likely to identify with a group 
that enhances one’s control over choice processes in everyday life as such autonomy 
enhancing intervention of the relevant group creates positive emotions in the 
individual. These positive emotions, in turn, Lawler argues, over time, transform into 
affective attachments to that group. In other words, what is being considered here is 
the utilitarian (in the broader sense of the term) evaluation of the European Union 
through a subjective angle. It is plausible to expect that Europeans who have positive 
experience with the EU and receive substantial material/nonmaterial advantages from 
                                                 
65 This proposition is confirmed in an earlier study conducted by Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) in 
Spain. However, it is important to see how it fares across the EU in a complex model involving 
additional premises of the Social Identity Theory. 
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the EU should be more loyal supporters of the EU, hence subscribers of European 
identity. This is because they are likely to perceive the EU as enhancing their 
freedom in their choice-processes. On the other hand, those who are disadvantaged or 
threatened by the European Union are likely to oppose European identity as it 
decreases their sense of control in their lives. 
Affect for the EU 
 As discussed in the previous chapters, many scholars treat European identity 
as a utilitarian identity whereas national identity is considered more passionate and, 
hence, affective. This clear-cut division between instrumental and affective 
dimensions of identities might, however, be exaggerated. Drawing upon Lawler’s 
theory of nested groups, I argued that interest and affect are likely to have a more 
interwoven relationship and have some bearing on identities at the same time. In fact, 
this logic is more convincing in light of Lawler’s (1992) argument that positive 
experience with a social group is what ensures the development of affect for that 
group. This process is likely to take some time. Therefore I consider that, rather than 
assuming European identity is instrumental, both instrumental and affective 
attachments condition one’s willingness to identify with the EU. Emotive 
significance of a social group develops parallel to empowerment by that group. 
However, it is possible that while affect is a result of empowerment, it also has an 
independent influence on identity as affect can endure temporary setbacks in 
empowerment.66 In other words, if the relationship between emotion and affect is 
                                                 
66 In case of a prolonged frustration with a group’s impact on one’s sense of empowerment, the 
affective dimension is, I assume, likely to regress like the utilitarian dimension over time. Lawler 
makes a similar argument that affective attachments to a collectivity can be weakened if freedom in 
choice processes is not enhanced. 
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established over a long time, the reversing of the process is likely to take a certain 
time, too. 
Thus, even in the (temporary) absence of the positive experiences with 
the group that evoked such emotions in the first place, one is likely to identify with 
the group and project an emotive confidence into the future with regard to that 
group’s positive image. A measure of affect in the model will control for both those 
who benefit from the EU and has a certain level of affect for the EU and those who 
have affect for the EU even though their expectations are currently not fulfilled. In 
line with these expectations, I hypothesize that individuals who have affective 
attachment to the EU are more likely to feel European. 
They-hood 
 As discussed in Chapter III, establishment of a social identity requires mental 
boundary formation. In other words, for an identity to be consolidated, identity 
claimants need to reach a clear consciousness of who belongs to their group as fellow 
members and who does not.  Erickson (1995) argues that the exclusion of those who 
are considered to be different is achieved relatively easier, for difference is easier to 
detect than similarity. On the other hand, achieving internal solidarity and we-hood 
comes later than out-group consciousness.67 In other words, defining a group is more 
difficult than defining what that group is not. This subjective boundary definition 
ends in objective results in terms of entitlements and dues as well as status and 
respect. The ‘We vs. they’ consciousness, for example, is the ultimate criterion for 
determining who can be allowed to enjoy privileges of group membership and who 
cannot be allowed to benefit from membership under any circumstances or without 
                                                 
67 Similarly, Neumann argues that social boundary between an in-group and an out-group is “not a 
consequence of integration, but one of its necessary a priori ingredients” (1996, 166-167).  
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certain restrictions.68 It is necessary to understand whether Europeans have reached a 
mental demarcation line towards non-EU citizens as non-Europeans. I expect that 
those Europeans who treat non-EU citizens differently from fellow EU citizens are 
likely to feel more European compared to those who do not have such perceptions 
activated by a common sense of Europeanness.  
We-Hood 
 Another dimension of boundary formation is an acceptance of certain 
individuals (based on some commonalities) as fellow members of the social group 
that one belongs to.  This would require a certain degree of trust, perception of worth, 
and similarity in the broader norms and attitudes. Due to this vote of confidence and 
perception of commonality, in-group members are seen worthy of help, solidarity, 
cohesion and favorable treatment. An EU citizen who is unable to extend such spirit 
to other EU citizens is unlikely to have revisited his/her conceptualization of self on 
the basis of a broader European society and its constitutive principles as to 
Europeanness. Therefore, I hypothesize that those individuals who perceive fellow 
EU citizens as in-group members and treat them in a privileged way are likely to feel 
more European than those who do not feel this camaraderie with other EU citizens.  
 Individual Context 
Knowledge of the European Union  
 Willingness of Europeans to embrace the European cause even in the face of 
major losses might be determined by their level of knowledge about the EU. The 
                                                 
68 Many studies argue that group identification creates a psychological in-group bias—treating of the 
in-group members differently and favorably then out-group members. This conclusion is confirmed in 
various fields.  
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European Parliament’s Hahn Report (1984) clearly highlights this point in the 
following lines:  
European integration will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans 
will only want it if there is such a thing as European identity. A European 
identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. (as cited by 
Edwards 2000, 70). 
 A certain level of awareness is a prerequisite of developing a sense of 
attachment to any political community. Furthermore, this variable can serve as a 
proxy for the level of involvement and activism of an individual with the EU. 
Opinion on Multiculturalism 
 Being able to identify with the supranational community of the EU also 
means being able to identify with people from different racial, religious and cultural 
backgrounds.69 Although this could be the case in a single nation-state as well, the 
extent of the challenge faced within a multinational society such as the EU is beyond 
comparison. The difficulty of such solidarity within the EU is also intensified by the 
lack of any moderating effect the broader unifying element of nation-hood has to 
offer. Furthermore, some European countries are highly homogeneous and, hence, 
devoid of any significant multicultural element in their political discourse (e.g., 
Greece, Sweden, Portugal). This predicament is confirmed by the subjective 
perceptions by Europeans of cultural diversity in Europe and lack of a common 
European culture shared by all the European countries. 
 
                                                 
69 Hooge and Mark (2004) included multiculturalism as representing identity aspect in a study that 
focuses on support for the EU. They, however, did not test whether it actually affects European 
identity.  
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FIGURE 2 Perception of a European Cultural Identity Shared by All  
  Europeans 
 
 
 
Source: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 2001. “How Europeans See 
 Themselves: Looking through the Mirror with Public Opinion Surveys.” European 
 Documentation Series (ISBN 92-894-0077-3), Luxembourg, p.12.  
 
 
 As can be seen from Figure 2, 38 % of EU citizens agree that there is a shared 
European cultural identity while 49 % of EU citizens disagree with such a 
conclusion. Geert Hofstede (1984) argues that culture is “the collective programming 
of the mind, which distinguishes the members of one group or society from those of 
another” (cited in Leitner 2000, 22). Thus, prospect of European supranational 
identity is likely only among those who are tolerant to the presence of other cultures 
and value systems and can mentally see no problem in building solidarity with people 
who are markedly different from one’s own. Then, the more favorable opinion one 
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has on multiculturalism, the more likely one is to identify easily with other 
Europeans. 
National Context 
State Structure 
 There can be three possible theoretical arguments with regard to why the type 
of state structure one is coming from might partly account for one’s level of 
readiness and willingness to adopt European identity. Firstly, leading political and 
social actors in a society such as elites and political parties can invoke identities, as 
cognitive schemas, by developing discourses where carefully selected cleavages are 
activated. As target groups are acculturated into these discourses, identities are 
‘learned’ through a process of socialization. In this respect, the federal character of 
the state might endow its citizens with political learning of developing loyalties to 
different levels of governance.70 Accustomed to viewing different levels of public-
policy making as legitimate and effective locus of loyalty and identification, such 
citizens can treat the EU as a new level of governance to be added to their range of 
identities.  
 Secondly, Marks (1999, 83) argued that in federal or federalizing societies of 
Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain regional attachment is considerably stronger 
than national attachment, suggesting that national identities were weaker. This 
finding might imply that the tendency to associate with the Union as a form of 
political identity might be higher in federal societies in the absence of any serious 
rivalry from national identity.  
                                                 
70 This logic is suggested by Schild (2001) who argued that Germans with federal state experience 
might be more willing to accept European identity than French. He, however, did not test such 
possible link between the state type and European identity. 
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Thirdly, the revival of regionalist movements in Europe highlights a case for 
European integration, for it is considered to provide a forum within which to reassert 
regional identities (Laffan 1996, 90). In light of the fact that in federal societies 
regional consciousness and identities are considerably salient, the EU might be 
viewed more favorably due to its encouragement of regional policymaking. Hence, I 
hypothesize that those who are from a federal state are more likely to adopt European 
identity as a form of multiple identities than those who are from a unitary state with a 
centralized state culture.  
National pride 
 The strength of one’s national pride has a lot to do with one’s willingness to 
develop a supranational (European) identity.71 This expectation is not in conflict with 
the argument earlier made with regard to multiple identities and the (possibly) 
complementary nature of European and national identities. Even though legal 
documents of the EU deliberately make the point of compatibility of national and 
European identities, national lenses of individuals may continue to see the two as 
mutually exclusive, for such a perception is dependent upon individual/national 
framing.  
 Several scholars emphasized that those who are uneasy with their national 
past (such as Germans, Italians) (Schild 2001, 339; Jimenez et al. 2004, 18) and who 
value the Union membership as an affirmation of their acceptance in the democratic 
community of Europeans such as Spaniards, Portuguese and Greeks (Luna-Arocas 
et.al. 2001, 444) might perceive the EU as an alternative source of political 
                                                 
71 Although this variable is tested before in the previous literature, the evidence found is conflicting. 
Thus, the conclusion is not clear. Inclusion of national pride in this model is essential also for correct 
model specification purposes as national pride is a good indicator of one’s affect for one’s national 
collectivity.  
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identification. Also, some scholars argued that European identity is easier to 
incorporate in those national discourses where national identity is constructed in a 
way compatible with Europeanness (e.g., Risse et al. 1999). Those national 
discourses where national pride is low are less likely to be constructed in a way to 
drive exclusive national identities due to a lack of necessary affective confidence. 
Thus, in countries where there is low self-esteem on a large scale (such as Germany, 
Spain, Portugal), individual’s willingness to identify with the EU will be 
strengthened by their low national pride as their national discourses are likely to be 
more conducive to European identity. Thus, I hypothesize that those with strong 
national pride are less likely to adopt European identity as the leading or the sole 
form of identification.72  
Length of EU membership 
 Since this analysis is based on a cross-sectional examination of the data, it 
would be prudent to integrate a form of time parameter in European identity 
formation. Citizens of countries with long EU membership are likely to be exposed 
to some form of acculturation into the discourse of Europeanness, and to enjoy the 
respective benefits over a longer period of time. It is also possible that long years of 
country membership can translate into higher levels of knowledge about the EU for 
respective citizens. Owing to these assumptions, I believe that the development of 
European identity is partly determined by the duration of a country’s EU 
membership. Accordingly, the longer a country has been in the EU, the more its 
citizens are likely to develop European identity.  
                                                 
72 This hypothesis does not exclude the possibility that individuals with high national pride might still 
identify with Europe. However, such an identification, it assumes, most likely to rank below the 
respective national identification. 
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WWII National Death Toll 
 In addition to culture, economic interest, and political institutions, Marks 
(1999) identifies war as an important factor changing territorial identities. As a major 
tragic event, war leaves deep marks in national memories and forms images of allies 
and adversaries that are to be transferred from generation to generation. Coercive 
conflict serves to bring a group together by “deepening commitment to the national 
community in a way that squeezes out other identities” (Marks 1999, 80), making 
national identities dominant and less accommodating to other identities. Hence, war 
is a major source of boundary formation. Wars draw and redraw boundaries, 
condition images of groups that are considered similar/different and superior/inferior.  
 In this context, WWII as the main driving force for the establishment of the 
EU is the most recent and destructive war in European history that shaped mental 
maps of Europe along with the images of allies and enemies. Thus, national 
casualties in WWII can operate as a good indicator of how deep such memories 
might go affecting the reconstruction of boundaries in Europe. National memories of 
WWII experiences are, then, likely to affect how hard or easy it is to identify with 
fellow Europeans as in-group members.73 I hypothesize that individuals from those 
European countries with higher WWII casualties are less likely to identify with the 
community that the EU represents due to negative memories of other European 
countries and, in turn, their citizens.  
                                                 
73 Gabel and Palmer (1995) showed that WWII battle deaths conditioned overall levels of public 
support for the EU. The theoretical reasons for the validity of the variable in our models are, however, 
different. Gabel and Palmer argued that citizens of those countries with high battle deaths might 
appreciate the services of the EU in the realm of peace and order and hence support the European 
integration process. In this study, WWII death toll is employed as a variable that conditions one’s 
willingness to accept other European countries as fellow in-group members. Often negative memories 
and images that follow a war cause long-term prejudices and stereotypes that are likely to render a 
collective bond difficult to establish with the parties to the respective war. 
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Control Variables74 
Education 
 Being able to identify with an abstract supranational community requires a 
certain level of mental sophistication and ability to process the due evaluations of 
group memberships. Therefore, education of a person is a good indicator of his/her 
cognitive skills and ability to relate to a distant unit of organization and governance. 
Furthermore, education is one individual quality that will likely to affect an 
individual’s ability to socially experience the EU and its opportunities. It is widely 
known that individuals with high education (and income, in turn,) are in a better 
situation to relate to the EU and support European integration. Education can also be 
considered here as a proxy for ability to speak foreign languages.75 As discussed in 
the theory section, language ability is one practical obstacle that prevents Europeans 
from interacting directly with each other or experience their potential in organizing 
and participating in social movements as members of a broader European society. 
Thus, those with higher levels of education are more likely to feel European. 
Gender 
 The effects of gender on European identity were previously tested in many 
studies. However, the results are far from facilitating a consensus. It is possible that 
gender of a person does not have a clear-cut and direct influence on one’s willingness 
to identify with the EU. Gender might be forming its influence on identity in 
combination with other variables included in the model leading to different results in 
                                                 
74 In the analysis section, only variables with which I am theoretically concerned (and not control 
variables) will be reported.  
75 Language ability is occasionally included in Eurobarometer surveys preventing us from testing its 
effect over years and is not included in the particular survey used in this study. Also, inclusion of both 
education and language is likely to evoke multicollinearity.  Similarly, income is not included in the 
model, since education and income is likely to be highly correlated. 
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different studies. Rather than resolving the issue, inclusion of gender in this model is 
for control purposes. 
Age  
 Due to the socialization process at work in identity formation and the 
pervasive nature of well-established identities, it is proven that it is easier for 
younger generation to identify with the EU. Conversely, the older generation has a 
greater degree of loyalty to their nation-states and hence greater resistance to a 
supranational body. Partly this is due to the ability of the older generation to relate to 
the memories of the WWII and the accompanying enemy images. 
 Below Figure 3 presents the propositions that will be tested in this study.
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FIGURE 3 Social Identity Model of European Identity 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Social Identity Premises 
 
P1: Only those individuals who have a positive image of the EU will identify with it and 
assume the identity it proposes. 
P2: Those who feel empowered by the EU are more likely to develop an allegiance to the 
EU and in turn have some form of European identity.  
P3: The more affectively attached one is to the EU, the more European one is likely to feel. 
P4:  Those who developed an image of non-EU out-group and treat non-EU citizens 
differently from fellow EU citizens are more likely to feel European. 
P5: Those individuals who perceive fellow EU citizens as in-group members and treat them 
in a privileged way are more likely to feel European. 
 
Individual Context 
 
P6: Those with higher levels of knowledge of the EU are more likely to identify with the 
 EU. 
P7: The more favorable one’s attitude is toward multiculturalism, the more likely one is to 
identify with other Europeans. 
 
National Context 
 
P8: Those who are from a federal state are more likely to adopt European identity as a form 
of multiple identities than those who are from a unitary state.   
P9: Those with strong national pride are less likely to adopt a supranational (European) 
identity as the leading or the sole form of identification 
P10: The longer one’s country has been in the EU, the more one is likely to feel European 
(length of EU Membership). 
P11: Individuals from those European countries with higher WWII casualties are less likely   
 to identify with the EU due to negative memories of other European countries. 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Age, gender and education are control variables. 
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Measurement and Data   
Most of the variables in this dataset are constructed using European public 
surveys known as “Eurobarometer surveys” conducted each spring and autumn by the 
European Commission since 1973. Specifically I will be using Eurobarometer 53 
(fieldwork done in April-May 2000).76 The survey covers EU citizens aged 15 and over 
residing in any of the European Union Member States. Survey respondents are chosen 
on random sampling basis. The total number of individuals surveyed is 16078. During 
this survey, EU member countries were Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sweden and 
Finland. 
Since the study suggests investigating the sources of national and European 
identities in a comparative perspective, I will be using Multinomial Logit Model with the 
assumption of nonlinear relationship between explanatory variables and various options 
of the dependent variable in the light of the theoretical discussions above.77 The unit of 
analysis of this study is individuals that are citizens of 15 European Union member 
states. The measurement of the explanatory variables is explained below: 
Dependent Variable  
 Identities in the EU: (Q28): “In the near future, do you see yourself as 
Nationality only, National/European, European/National, European only, don’t know” 
                                                 
76 Eurobarometer 53 (2000) is available for download through the International Consortium of Political 
Science Research (ICPSR study # 3064) website: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu 
77 For a good account of MNL models and their advantages in comparative politics see Whitten and 
Palmer (1996). 
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Answer options are treated as categorical outcomes.78 Don’t know option—2.10% of the 
sample— is left out of the analysis.  
Explanatory variables 
Positive Image of the EU: (Q14) “In general, does the European Union conjure 
up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative 
image?” While very positive and fairly positive answers are coded 1, fairly negative and 
very negative answers are coded 0. Those who answered ‘neutral’ are excluded from the 
analysis.79  
Empowerment by the EU: (Q15) “Do you think you, yourself, have got more 
advantages or more disadvantages from (our country) being a member of the European 
Union?” Answer options are many more advantages, more advantages, as many 
advantages as disadvantages, more disadvantages, many more disadvantages, don’t 
know/no opinion.80 While the answers representing advantages are coded 1, answers 
representing disadvantages are coded 0. Responses of ‘as many advantages as 
disadvantages’ and ‘don’t know/no opinion’ are not included in the analysis. 
                                                 
78 Note that this study examines European identity in the sense of the identification with the EU, for it is 
interested in understanding the identity the EU projects rather than any other possible meanings the term 
‘European identity’ might entail. 
79 I excluded neutral answers to increase the parsimony of the model. It amounts to 31.62 % of the sample. 
However, during the analysis I run many versions of this variable to see what kind of an effect the neutral 
perceptions of the EU have on European identity. For details see footnote 93. 
80 One problem with these measurements might be that the image of the EU and the instrumental 
evaluation of the EU might be correlated. Although the difficulty of differentiating the two in empirical 
sense might be a reasonable concern, I believe that these two issues have conceptual dimensions that are 
both different and mutually reinforcing. Image of the EU, different from the empowerment aspect, has also 
a dimension that is concerned with respect and prestige. In addition to whether the respondent derives 
benefits from the EU, at issue is the achievements and reputation of the EU as a worthy and powerful 
organization with its policies, values and ideals. This point can be better validated by examining the 
images of the EU in the eyes of those individuals coming from the non-EU countries. Their chances of 
receiving direct benefits from the EU are limited. However, presence of positive image of the EU is not 
unlikely as the instrumental evaluation of the EU and positive image of the EU can be independent of one 
another. In the current sample, these two variables are highly correlated (.84). 
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Affective Attachment to the EU81: (Q24) “In five years’ time, would you like the 
European Union to play a more important, a less important or the same role in your daily 
life?”82 
They-Hood: This measure is compiled from two questions measuring attitudes 
towards Muslims and Eastern Europeans as the two major non-EU groups that are likely 
to be considered as the other of European identity at the time of this survey. Q54: “If 
people from Muslim countries wish to work here in the European Union, do you think 
that they should be accepted without restrictions, be accepted but with restrictions, not 
be accepted?” and Q55: “And what about people coming from Eastern Europe who wish 
to work in the West? [Do you think that they should] be accepted without restrictions, be 
accepted but with restrictions, not be accepted?” Any response that reflects a restrictive 
                                                 
81  Similar to the correlation between image of the EU and empowerment by the EU, the former may be 
correlated with the affect for the EU. I assume that as a more durable concept, affect is a long-term result 
of empowerment and positive image. Hence a degree of correlation is bound to be present. In this sample 
the respective correlation is .60. The correlation between empowerment and affect is .59. 
82 I believe that this question is a proxy for affect for the EU for it taps a dimension of support for the EU 
that is durable and cathectic (emotional). Firstly, this question asks respondents to evaluate the EU as an 
actor in their ‘daily lives’. The phrase ‘daily life’ has a certain quality to it that motivates respondents to 
think of the EU as close to home and whether that prospect is desirable or not. I contend that this broad 
wording discourages a narrower support for the EU in a particular realm (e.g., economics) where the EU 
might be bringing the respondent certain benefits. The wholesale delegation to the EU of competence in 
one’s everyday life transcends a narrow appraisal of the EU. An individual is likely to want a 
group/organization/collective to be part of his/her ‘daily life’ if s/he perceives it as good, legitimate, 
worthy of trust and pride and has respect and affect for it. Secondly, individuals are likely to desire the 
increase of the role of a group/organization/collective in their daily lives in five years-time if they have a 
certain degree of affective confidence in the wholesale worth of that group/organization/collective and this 
affective confidence is projected into the future even if the calculations of losses and gains cannot be 
reliably predicted in every realm of life five years from now. Lawler argues that “the repeated [everyday] 
experience of positive or negative emotions that social structures create is the basis for cognitive 
(attributional) appraisals that underlie enduring affective attachments to nested sub-groups and/or 
collectivities” (1992, 332). The far-reaching long-term support a respondent expresses in his/her answer 
for the EU in a broad spectrum of issue-areas, I believe, reflects such a reservoir of affective capital. 
Furthermore, the wording of the question encourages the respondent to think specifically of the EU rather 
than the broader meaning the word ‘European’ in other questions might entail, preventing a possible 
confusion.  
 114
attitude (accepted but with restrictions/not be accepted) toward either one of these 
groups is coded 1. 
We-Hood: (Q58) “And what about citizens of other countries of the European 
Union, who wish to settle in our country? Do you think they should be accepted without 
restrictions, be accepted but with restrictions, not be accepted?” ‘Accepted without 
restrictions’ is coded 1 and ‘accepted but with restrictions/not be accepted’ is coded 0. 
Knowledge of the European Union Politics: (Q9): “Using this scale, how much 
do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies and its institutions?” 
Answers range from 1 to10 (know nothing at all- know a great deal). 
Opinion on Multiculturalism: (Q5901): “It is a good thing for any society to be 
made up of people from different races, religions and cultures”. Answers are coded 1 for 
tend to agree, 0 for tend to disagree. Don’t know option is not included in the analysis.83 
State structure: This is a dummy variable coded 1 for Austria, Germany, Belgium 
and Spain.84 All the other states are coded 0 as unitary states.  
National Pride: (Q29)“Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not 
very proud or not at all proud to be nationality?” The first two answers are coded as 0 
and the last two answers are coded 1. 
Length of EU Membership is calculated according to the year Eurobarometer 53 
was conducted (2000). Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg 
are members of the EU since 1952, the UK, Denmark and Ireland since 1973, Greece 
                                                 
83 The correlation between this variable and perceptions of they-hood is -.21. 
84Even though Spain is officially not a federal state, it is treated here as one, for the extensive autonomous 
rights granted to the regional governments in Basque Country and Catalonia give it a de facto federal 
character. 
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since 1981, Spain and Portugal since 1986, and finally Austria, Sweden and Finland 
since 1995. Thus, this variable is coded 48, 27, 19, 14 and 5 respectively for each cluster 
of countries. 
The WWII National Death Toll: The data for this variable are compiled from 
various sources. The total death toll is standardized according to population of the EU 
member countries in 1939. Thus the coded figures are percentage of the population that 
died during the WWII. This percentage includes both civilian and military figures. For a 
list of coding see Appendix, Table A2.85 
Control Variables 
Education, Gender and Age is measured by standard Eurobarometer questions 
(Q8, Q10, and Q11 respectively).  
 Before we move into the statistical analysis, it is essential to note a possible 
criticism this study might evoke. Some readers might point to the unreliability of the 
measure I use for European identity. Whether there is a possible distinction between 
European identity as such and European identity within the EU is a complex question. 
The challenge is that even those who do not feel attached to the EU might feel European. 
However, the aim of this study is to examine the European identity that the EU projects. 
I expect that those who are exposed to European integration for more than four decades 
are aware of the difference between the two and respond accordingly in a survey 
designed specifically on the EU issues. This might seem like a big leap of faith. 
                                                 
85 The sources utilized for these figures are Snyder (1982, 126), Sivard (1985, 11) and Keegan (1989, 
205). Often sources report conflicting estimates of the death toll. I adopted the smallest figures not to 
inflate the findings. The population of the EU countries in 1939 is compiled from Correlates of War 
Project (version 3.02 that covers years 1816-2001) available at cow2.la.psu.edu as discussed in Singer et 
al. (1972).  
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However, it is also the difficulty of working with survey data where the respondents’ 
accurate understanding of the survey questions is an inherent assumption. In the absence 
of any viable other cross-country empirical data source, many studies relied on this 
Eurobarometer question.86  
 Besides, the interaction between the two identities through the course of 
European integration might have largely removed any substantial disjuncture between 
the two in peoples’ perceptions. In fact, Mayer and Palmowski (2004) contend that 
“within member states, the term ‘Europe’ has become increasingly synonymous with the 
institutions of the European Union” (590). Similarly, Laffan (2004) argues that “the 
attraction of the European Union stems from it successfully appropriating the term 
‘Europe’ for itself” (80). It is a confirmation of these conclusions that the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, after their withdrawal from Warsaw Pact, perceived their 
membership in the EU as their “return to Europe”.87 
Analysis   
An initial examination of the Eurobarometer survey data with respect to identities 
in the EU is presented in Tables 1 and 2.88 Clearly, the percentage of Europeans who 
prefer their respective nation states as the sole source of identification is slightly higher 
(45%) than the percentage of Europeans who developed multiple identities with an 
emphasis on national identity (44%). The percentage of European identity as the leading 
                                                 
86 The examples of research that use the same measure are abundant in the literature. See Duchesne and 
Frognier (1995), Schild (2000) among others. 
87 Similarly, although part of Turkey’s landmass is situated on the European continent, Turkish people see 
their EU membership as the only way to confirm their ‘Europeanness’. 
88 The descriptive statistics for explanatory variables are presented in Appendix Table A1. The tabulation 
of answers for variables across the individual EU member states are presented in Appendix, Table A3. 
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or the sole form of identification is far behind these two percentages (7% and 4% 
respectively).  
 
TABLE 1 Distribution Among the Categories of Identity 
 
Identity*   Frequency  Percent 
National only   7150   45.45 
National and European 6970   44.31 
European and National 1044   6.64 
European only   566   3.60 
 
Total               15730   100.00 
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 2000. 
 
 
 From the Table 2, which represents the distribution of different identities among 
the fifteen EU member states, it is evident that national identity is the strongest in the 
UK, followed by Sweden, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and Austria. Alternatively, Italy is 
where the preference for identification exclusively with the nation-state is the least. 
Spain and France are other countries where we see low levels of exclusive national 
identities. Countries whose citizens prefer Nationality/European form of multiple 
identities are Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, France, Netherlands, and Belgium. The highest 
percentage of Europeans who prefer calling themselves first European then National is 
found in Belgium and France. Greece is the only European Union country where only 
European form of identification is by far the largest compared to the other EU countries. 
Italy, France, and Belgium follow Greece. Together these two tables demonstrate that in 
most of the EU member states EU is a substantial source of identification for Europeans. 
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TABLE 2 Distribution Among the Outcome Categories by the EU Member 
  States, 2000 
 
Respondent’s nation-state  N NE EN E  Number  
                      Of Observations 
Belgium     40 41 11 7 1003 
Denmark    48 45 5 2 983 
Germany    47 41 8 4 1984 
Greece     53 42 4 14 1005  
Spain     27 59 9 5 982  
France     28 54 11 7 987  
Ireland     53 41 4 2 998  
Italy     24 58 10 8 1056 
Luxembourg    33 55 7 4 440  
Netherlands    40 52 7 2 988  
Portugal    46 47 4 2 1034  
UK     63 29 4 3 1304  
Austria    53 36 8 3 971  
Sweden    59 36 5 1 984  
Finland    54 43 3 1 1011  
Total number of observations      15730  
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 2000. 
Notes: Entries are percentages in each cell (N=National only; NE=National and European; EN= European 
and National; E= European only). 
 
 
 Based on the variables discussed above the following MNL models were 
estimated: 
lnΩNE/N(xi)= β0,NE/N + β1,NE/Nimage + β2,NE/Nempower + β3, NE/Neuaffect +  
 β4,NE/Nthey+ β5, NE/Nwe + β6,NE/Neuinfo+ β7,NE/Nmulti + β8,NE/Nfederal+ 
β9,NE/Nnatpride+ β10,NE/Nyears+ β11,NE/Nwar+ β12,NE/Nedu+ β13,NE/Nage+  
β14,NE/Nmale 
 
lnΩEN/N(xi)= β0,EN/N + β1,EN/Nimage + β2,EN/Nempower + β3, EN/Neuaffect +  
 β4,EN/Nthey + β5, EN/Nwe + β6,EN/N euinfo+β7,EN/Nmulti + β8,EN/Nfederal + 
β9,EN/Nnatpride + β10,EN/Nyears+ β11,EN/Nwar+ β12,EN/Nedu + β13,EN/Nage+  
β14,EN/N male 
 
lnΩE/N(xi)= β0,E/N + β1,E/Nimage + β2,E/Nempower + β3, E/Neuaffect +  
 β4,E/Nthey+ β5, E/Nwe+ β6,E/Neuinfo +β7,E/Nmulti+ β8,E/Nfederal+ 
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β9,E/Nnatpride + β10,E/Nyears + β11,E/Nwar + β12,E/Nedu+ β13,E/Nage+  
 β14,E/Nmale 
 
where NE= National-European 
   EN= European-National 
   E= European Only 
   N= National only (base category for comparison here). 
   
 Table 3 presents the MNL coefficients and standard errors for variables of 
interest.89 The coefficients reveal the estimated marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables on the log-odds ratio of the respective identity outcome and the baseline 
category (in our case, National only category). As it can be seen from this table, the 
effects of each explanatory variable on the respective log-odds ratio are different for  
each outcome of identity. All of the explanatory variables that were included in this 
model are statistically significant (at various levels of significance) and have predicting 
power to understand whether one feels attached to only or primarily to their nation-state 
or European Union alternatively.90 
 A quick review of the Table 2 allows us to conclude that positive image of the 
EU, empowerment by the EU, one’s affect for the EU, internal solidarity (i.e., we-hood) 
among Europeans, knowledge of the European Union politics, favorable opinion on 
multiculturalism, federal state structure, and length of EU membership all have a 
                                                 
89 Reader should note that coefficients for control variables (education, gender, and age) are not reported. 
90  A variable that has a statistically significant impact on ‘any’ of the categories of the dependent variable 
is considered to be significant for the analysis (Whitten and Palmer 1996:241) 
 120
positive relationship with all three identity categories.91 National Pride has consistently 
negative relationship with those identity options that have a European dimension. The 
awareness of out-group members with regard to a European collectivity and the national 
casualties during the WWII has a more contoured relationship to identity outcomes and 
will be discussed in detail below.92 
 The non-linear regression models rely on the assumption that a unit change in 
each explanatory variable does not cause identical unit change in the categories of the 
dependent variable. Thus, these models cannot be interpreted as linear models. In fact, 
the above summary is as far as we can go before we calculate predicted probabilities in 
order to evaluate the respective effect of explanatory variables on identity categories 
under investigation here. Unless presented neatly, the patterns found in such analyses 
can be obscure owing to the inherent complexity of the relationships and the sheer 
number of the combinations of parameters to be interpreted. Although the best approach 
is to use a multitude of different ways of interpretation (Long and Freese 2001, 119), 
changes in predicted probabilities in response to varying values of one independent 
variable (while others are held constant) can be utilized as a summary measure (Long 
and Freese 2001, 127). 
                                                 
91 Predicted marginal effect of a variable on identities in Europe can be shown by referring to a baseline 
European respondent. For this analysis the baseline respondent is 44 years old, has positive image of the 
EU, empowered by the EU policies, has affect for the EU, has awareness of in-group and out-group 
members with regard to the EU, is from a federal state, does not have national pride, is a multiculturalist, 
and has sample mean values for those independent variables that are not mentioned (i.e., length of EU 
membership (29.5); WWII national death toll (1.7); education (15.8)). 
92 There are several tests one can carry out in MNL to ensure that there are not problematic issues 
associated with the analysis. Based on the Wald test, there is no variable in the above model whose 
coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. The Wald test also shows that categories of the dependent 
variable— identity— are distinguishable with regard to the explanatory variables included in the model. 
The Hausman test of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) confirms that the IIA assumption is not 
violated. 
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TABLE 3 MNL Estimates of European Identity as Social Identity, 2000 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Identities    Coefficients Standard Errors 
National-European    
 Constant   -2.511*** 0.275        
 Image of the EU   0.785*** 0.166   
 Empowerment by the EU  0.818***   0.165 
 Affect for the EU   0 .658***   0.118 
 They-hood   0.095  0.123   
 We-hood   0.375***     0.096 
 Knowledge of the EU politics 0.151*** 0.021    
 Multiculturalism   0.702*** 0.095    
 Federal State   0.514***  0.118 
 National Pride   -0.647*** 0.164 
 Length of the EU Membership 0.016***       0.003 
 WWII Death Toll   -0.105*** 0.036 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
European-National 
 Constant    -5.404*** 0.483 
 Image of the EU   1.058*** 0.327 
 Empowerment by the EU  1.084*** 0.333 
 Affect for the EU   1.287*** 0.278   
 They-hood   -0.472*** 0.184 
 We-hood   0.449*** 0.163 
 Knowledge of the EU politics 0.238*** 0.035 
 Multiculturalism   1.121*** 0.202 
 Federal State   0.618*** 0.187 
 National Pride   -1.626*** 0.223 
 Length of the EU Membership 0.023*** 0.005 
 WWII Death Toll   0.036  0.036 
European only 
 Constant   -6.113*** 0.551  
 Image of the EU   0.881**  0.361 
 Empowerment by the EU  0.667**  0.346 
 Affect for the EU   0.930*** 0.297 
 They-hood   -0.145  0.223 
 We-hood   0.775*** 0.195 
 Knowledge of the EU politics 0.188*** 0.042 
 Multiculturalism   1.080*** 0.241 
 Federal State   1.029*** 0.219 
 National Pride   -1.697*** 0.247 
 Length of EU Membership 0.052*** 0.007 
 WWII Death Toll   -0.179*** 0.071 
LR chi2 (42): 1308.92 
Pseudo R-squared:  0.17 
Count R-squared:    0.63   
 N: 3587 
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 2000.  
Notes: Dependent variable is identities in the EU with four categories. Coefficients are for the effect of each 
independent variable on each category relative to the base category. Nationality only is the base category (i.e., 
comparison group). The LR test statistic is chi-squared with a 1% critical value of 76.15. 
*p< 0.10, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 (one-tailed t-tests).  
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TABLE 4 Discrete Changes in the Predicted Probabilities of the MNL Model 
  of Identities in the European Union, 2000 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Variables   Changes ∆  N NE EN E 
 
Positive Image of the EU 0?1  0.10 -0.19 0.15 0.03 0.01 
Empowerment  by the EU 0?1  0.10 -0.20 0.16 0.03 0.01 
Affect for the EU  0?1  0.09 -0.17 0.11 0.04 0.02 
They-hood   0?1  0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
We-hood   0?1  0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.01 0.02 
Knowledge of the EU  ∆ Range 0.16 -0.32 0.21 0.08 -0.03 
    ∆σ/2  0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Multiculturalism  0?1  0.09 -0.18 0.12 0.04 0.02 
Federal State   0?1  0.06 -0.12 0.08 0.02 0.03 
National Pride   0?1  0.09 0.18 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07  
Length of EU Membership ∆ Range 0.09 -0.19 0.09 0.03 0.07 
    ∆σ/2  0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.03 
WWII death toll  ∆ Range 0.07 0.11 -0.12 0.03 -0.02 
    ∆σ/2  0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 
 
Pr (y/x)      0.36 0.54 0.06 0.04 
  
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 2000. 
Notes: Identities are classified as: N=National; NE= National-European; EN=European –National; 
E=European. 0?1 is discrete change from 0 to 1; ∆σ/2 is the centered change of 1/2 standard deviation 
around the mean; ∆ Range is change from the minimum to its maximum. ∆  is the average absolute 
change. Pr(y/x) is the probability of observing each y for specified x values. 
 
 
 Table 4 presents discrete changes in predicted probabilities of the MNL model of 
European Identity. An examination of Table 4 shows that viewing the EU with a positive 
image is an important element to consider in understanding the EU citizens’ choice 
between various identity categories. For someone who has a positive image of the EU 
holding other variables at their mean, the predicted probability of exclusive 
identification with nation-state is .19 lower compared to someone who has a negative 
perception of the EU. In fact, positive image of the EU significantly increases the 
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likelihood of identifying oneself as National/European, European or 
European/National.93 
 Empowerment by the EU has a larger effect on lowering exclusive identification 
with the nation-state (.20). The fact that an EU citizen feels s/he derives more 
advantages from the EU than disadvantages significantly increases the likelihood of that 
citizen including a European dimension in his/her self-definition. Although the effect is 
not as large, empowerment by the EU raises the predicted probability of exclusive 
European identity, too. 
 Affect for the EU renders inclusion of a European dimension in one’s identity, 
holding other variables at their mean, more likely. In fact, for someone who has affective 
feelings for the EU the predicted probability of having exclusive loyalty to nation-state is 
.17 lower than average individual with no affect for the EU. Affect significantly 
increases the odds of National/European (.11) and European/National (.04) identities.  
 Predicted probabilities indicate an interesting result for the impact of mental 
boundary formation on European identity. Social Identity Theory leads me to believe 
                                                 
93 I run many versions of this variable to see what kind of an effect the neutral perceptions of the EU have 
on European identity. Treated as an ordinal variable (i.e., coded as positive=2 neutral=1 negative=0), none 
of the results or their significance changed except for in fractions. When I treated this variable as having 
three categories and run the analysis with the positive and neutral perceptions, again none of the 
coefficients or their significance dramatically changed. However, it became obvious that neutral 
perceptions of the EU also significantly increase the likelihood of European identity while reducing 
exclusive national identities. This effect is slightly smaller than the effect of positive perceptions of the EU 
on European identity. For example, average absolute change for predicted probabilities for neutral image 
of the EU is .08. The specific probability change for this variable is -.16 for exclusive national identity, .13 
for National/European identity, .02 for European/National identity and .01 for exclusive European identity. 
Based on these results, it is clear that possibility of European identity benefits from neutral image of the 
EU as well as the positive image of the EU. When collapsed back into a dichotomous variable—this time 
with both positive and neutral images coded 1 and negative images coded 0—the effects of the image 
variable on decreasing exclusive national identity and increasing National/European identity are enhanced 
(-.21 and .17). The other probabilities remained unaffected.  
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that both the internal and external boundary formation is essential for an identity to be 
consolidated and be a viable locus of loyalty.  Accordingly, I hypothesized that those EU 
citizens who already developed a sense of ‘we’ and ‘they’ should be more likely to 
define themselves as European for they are likely to recognize other EU citizens as 
fellow in-group members and non-EU citizens as out-group members. While the latter 
group would be considered as non-European and different, the former group would be 
considered as similar or even ‘identical’. As a result, other EU citizens would enjoy 
benefits of being a member in the club with no restrictions, while the non-EU citizens 
would be denied any privileges that are granted to in-group members or at best allowed 
to enjoy such privileges with restrictions, implying a difference in status.  
 Table 3 already reveals that presence of a sense of who is non-European does not 
consistently hold a significant relationship with European identity. The predicted 
probabilities in Table 4, similarly, indicate a surprising result. While they-hood does not 
cause any noticeable change in the likelihood of national identity (perhaps owing to the 
fact that the same groups that are defined as non-European are also viewed by default as 
non-national), it increases the probability of National/European identity by .04. Holding 
other variables constant, those who have a mental sense of non-Europeans, however, are 
less likely to identify themselves in social identity terms where the European dimension 
has the leading role or Europeanness is their basic sense of self. This is completely an 
unexpected result in the analysis.  
 How about the second part of the boundary formation process? Does internal 
solidarity within the EU have the expected effect on European identity? Table 4 shows 
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that the answer to this question is affirmative. The probability by those who perceive 
other EU citizens as in-group members and treat them favorably of adopting some form 
of European identity is higher compared to those who do not feel that type of solidarity 
with other EU citizens. For the same group the probability of exclusive national identity 
is .09 lower. 
 Clearly while the second part of the boundary formation hypothesis is confirmed, 
the first part did not receive empirical support from this study. In-group solidarity is a 
powerful predictor of European identity (in one form or another) but out-group 
definition and discriminatory treatment is not conducive to European identity. What 
could be the reason for this unexpected result? If treatment of outsiders is an expression 
of group norms (Klein 2003, 2), one theory could be that even though in-group and out-
group definitions are, in general, part of the identity formation process, there might be 
something at work here in the particular case of European identity that offsets this 
relationship that the social identity theories maintain should exist. Could out-group 
definition and discriminatory treatment on the basis of this social demarcation be 
incompatible with European identity itself?  In other words, is there something in the 
definition of Europeanness that contradicts with such adverse demarcation and reserving 
the benefits of the EU only for those who are privileged to be ‘European’?   
 Su (2004, 7) argues that even though there is evidence that there are several 
values prioritized and shared by the EU citizens; European values are those that can be 
called particularly and uniquely ‘European’.  European “values ‘created by a multiple 
revolution in political ideas that has occurred during the past half century in Europe, in a 
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way that has not happened in other parts of the industrialized world’ are the core of the 
EU identity distinguishing Europeans from other polities in the world” (Su 2004, 7)94.  
One of these uniquely European values is the respect for diversity and a commitment to 
plurality.95 Accordingly, Europeans place a high priority on pluralism within and without 
the EU and promote tolerance and non-discrimination. Thus, any EU citizen who has 
internalized these values as a European would feel uncomfortable with a social 
demarcation and its implications in terms of discrimination (in the sense that non-
Europeans are not allowed to enjoy certain things as benefits reserved for Europeans).96 
There might be some type of a benign mental demarcation of Europeans and non-
Europeans but such in-group/out-group images are not likely to be the basis of 
preferential treatment. As discussed in chapter III, Erickson (1995) differentiates 
between ‘dichotomization’ and ‘complementarization’ as two forms of establishing 
‘other’ of an identity. While dichotomization emphasizes the differences between in-
group and out-group members by reinforcing negative perceptions of the contrasts, 
complementarization accepts the differences between two groups in a more neutral tone. 
In fact, the latter relies on the understanding that in-group and out-group members are 
different but they are comparable and equals of each other. Eriksen argues that “instead 
of strengthening own group identity at the symbolic or social expense of the other, one 
                                                 
94 Inner quotation is from Fitzgerald (2003,1) as cited in Su (2004, 7). 
95 In addition to respect for diversity and non-discrimination, Su (2004, 8) cites the following values as 
distinctly European: social market economy, the welfare state, ecology, a sense of responsibility for world 
poverty and commitment to foreign aid, international multilateralism, and opposition to violence (war and 
death penalty inter alia). 
96 This is likely to be why they-hood does not change the probability of national identity, yet increases the 
probability of one defining oneself predominantly in National terms but with a secondary dimension of 
Europeanness.  
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strengthens it through establishing a matrix for comparison whereby one’s own identity 
is seen equal to that of the other” (1995, 435). Due to a clash of dichotomization and the 
definition of Europeanness, the formation of ‘other’ in the case of European identity is 
likely to be based on a culture of respect for difference and hence 
complementarization.97 Thus, internal solidarity and cohesion is more important in 
predicting the probability of European identity than the out-group consciousness and its 
exclusionary implications.  
 Knowledge of the EU politics helps us understand identity choices as well. In 
fact, if one’s level of knowledge on the EU politics increases, the predicted probability 
of exclusive national identity decreases (-.32). As expected the probability of multiple 
identities with some European dimension increases by .21 and .08. One’s awareness of 
the Union issues also increases the likelihood of exclusive European identity by .01.  
 Table 4 also confirms my expectations with regard to the moderating effect of 
multiculturalism on fundamentalization of national identities. In fact, the more favorable 
attitude one has for respecting and cherishing diversity in ethnic, racial, religious and 
cultural terms, the more one is open to the idea of bonding with people from different 
                                                 
97 Based on the premises of boundary formation, it is reasonable to expect discrimination on the grounds 
of that demarcation. Thus, I measured this variable with a survey question evaluating the treatment of 
European and nonEuropean citizen’s prospects of living and working in one’s country. However, the 
results of the study and the alternative theory I suggested require testing the effects of we-hood without a 
reference to preferential treatment. Although there are occasionally questions in the Eurobarometer that 
asks respondents how much trust they have for different nations, trust alone cannot ensure we are tapping 
the correct dimension in they-hood. One can lack trust for a nation that they do or do not feel any 
association with based on their foreign policy or lack of consistency in their promises and credibility. One 
could suggest using questions on enlargement as proxies. However lack of support for a certain country’s 
membership in the EU might stem from reasons other than belief in the irreducible differences in 
identities. Particularly concerns about unemployment and fiscal transfers come to mind. We need a survey 
question that asks respondents directly whether they think a certain country belongs in the ‘European’ 
collective. Currently such a question does not exist in Eurobarometer surveys.  
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backgrounds and traditions. Clearly, a multiculturalist attitude renders images softer 
making identifying with the EU and the community of fellow Europeans it projects 
easier. Accordingly, being a multiculturalist reduces the probability of exclusive national 
identity by .18 and increases the probability of National/European identity by .12.  
 The federal state structure has the expected effect on identity categories. In fact, 
the political learning experience over years of developing multiple attachments to 
various levels of government in a federal state structure is translated into the multilevel 
governance environment within the EU. Such states’ citizens are significantly less likely 
to have exclusive identification with the nation-state by .12, and more likely to identify 
with the EU. 
 National Pride, as expected, decreases one’s likelihood to identify with 
alternative units of political organization. The more proud one is of one’s nation, the less 
likely one is to internalize any post-national identity or include any identity dimension in 
their self-image that has nation-transcending implications. Holding other variables at 
their means, the predicted probability of exclusive national identity rises by .18 and the 
probability of national identity as the leading dimension of social identity rises by .09. 
Clearly, the lack of collective pride in national history and heritage substantially 
increases one’s probability of identifying with the community of Europeans as a form of 
social identity. 
 How long a country has been in the EU also offers some explanation for the 
probability of its citizens identifying with the EU. The probability of adopting exclusive 
European identity is higher for someone from one of the original founding member 
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states of the EU by .09 compared to someone from one of the three countries of the last 
enlargement at the time of this survey (Austria, Finland and Sweden). For the same 
comparison group probability of exclusive national identity is -.19 lower. Clearly, those 
Europeans whose countries have been involved with the EU and its integrative policies 
longer had more opportunities to learn about the EU and be exposed to its positive 
consequences more extensively. This positive experience and socialization process is 
reflected in a higher probability of feelings of attachment to the EU. The largest impact 
of length of the EU membership on identity is seen in willingness to identify with the 
EU in addition to one’s nation-state (National/European). 
 The effect of national death toll during the WWII is relatively more complex. I 
hypothesized that the more devastating for one’s country the WWII was, the less likely it 
is for that individual to identify with the EU as feeling enough trust and solidarity to 
form an in-group bond with other Europeans would be harder. The change in predicted 
probabilities in Table 4 shows that WWII national death toll, indeed, conditions one’s 
self definition by increasing the probability of attachment to nation-state (.11). Similarly, 
the probability of National/European and exclusive European identity decreases. 
However, the probability of an individual’s definition of sense of belonging as 
European/National identity increases (.03). One explanation for this might be that the 
negative experiences of WWII either pulls individuals even closer to their nation-state 
and fundamentalizes their national identity by discouraging them to develop any bonds 
with other Europeans as fellow society members or it encourages individuals to develop 
a European identity in addition to their national identity perhaps as a way of making sure 
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the same tragedies would not repeat. However, this effect is not strong enough to 
exclude national identity from one’s sense of self completely. No matter how we 
interpret the probabilities associated with the conditioning effect of national losses in 
WWII on individuals’ identity choices, the readers should be warned that the reliability 
of the data on battle deaths is quite debatable.  There is no consensus among various 
sources as to how many civilians and military personnel died during this war. The data 
are compiled from several sources and risks of inconsistency and inaccuracy might 
compromise the patterns underlined here. 98 
 Discrete changes in predicted probabilities for a unit change in explanatory 
variables are informative as to the magnitude of the effects but understanding the 
dynamics among the identity categories requires comparison of odds ratios (Long 1997, 
203).  I discussed that positive image of the EU increases probability of European 
identity all together (i.e., National/European, European/National and European only). 
Discrete changes cannot pinpoint the specific odds of, for example, ‘National/European’ 
outcome relative to ‘European only’ outcome for an individual who perceives the EU 
with a positive imagery. Below in Figure 4, I present these odds ratios.99 
 
 
                                                 
98 For a visual representation of broader relationships based on these discrete changes in probabilities see 
Appendix, Figure A1 where discrete changes in predicted probabilities of identity categories are plotted.  
99 The odds of outcome m vs. n can be expressed as  
Ωm\n (xi) = )\Pr(
)\Pr(
xinyi
ximyi
=
=
=
)exp(
)exp(
jxi
mxi
β
β
∑  \ )exp(
)exp(
jxi
nxi
β
β
∑ = )exp(
)exp(
nxi
mxi
β
β
. The odds equation then is  
 
Ωm\n (xi)=exp(xi[βm-βn]). MNL is linear in the logit. lnΩm\n (xi)= xi (βm-βn) (Long 1997). 
  
131
 
FIGURE 4 Odds Ratio Plots for the MNL Model of Identities in the EU100 
 *N=National only, U=National/European, A=European/National, E=European only
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100The graph represents the factor change in the odds of one outcome versus the other as one independent 
variable changes holding other variables constant. The order of the letters represents the likelihood of 
identity categories relative to each other. The line that connects some of the outcomes reflects the lack of 
statistical significance. N= National only, U= National/European, A= European/National, E= European 
only.  N is the base category. Odds ratios are the same across all values of variables. 
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FIGURE 4 Continued 
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 From Figure 4 it is clearly seen that the major pattern in the effects of positive 
image of the EU and empowerment of the EU on identities is seen in the way these two 
variables split identity options into two groups: national only and post-national identity 
categories (that is, National/European, European/National and only European). There is, 
however, no significant differentiation within the post-national identity cluster by these 
two variables. Similarly, affect for the EU increases the odds of those identity categories 
with a European dimension. Furthermore, affect, unlike positive image of and 
empowerment by the EU, does differentiate between National/European and 
European/National identity making the latter more likely.  
 The effects of the boundary demarcation on European identity are diversified. As 
discussed earlier, for those who define non-EU citizens as nonEuropeans and exclude 
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them from privileges of Europeanness, the odds of an identification where national 
identity is leading or the sole form of social identity higher compared to European only 
and European/National identity categories. Internal solidarity, conversely, increases the 
odds of all post-national identity categories and particularly increases the odds of 
National/European, European/National, and European only identities relative to 
exclusive national identifications. 
 The amount of knowledge of the EU politics as well as multiculturalist 
orientation, similar to the positive image of the EU and empowerment by the EU, splits 
identities into two: exclusive national identity and post-national identities. They 
significantly increase the odds of all identities with a European content in the order of 
National/European, European and European/National identity. However, only 
European/National identity relative to National/European identity is significantly more 
likely. Both of these identities are also more likely relative to exclusive national 
identities.  
 National context has somewhat more diversified effect on one’s identity than 
subjective evaluations of the EU itself. Federal state structure increases the odds of 
feeling European only relative to national identity. Multiple identities, even though more 
likely compared to exclusive national identity, are not differentiated from one another. 
This is not surprising, since theoretically we only expected individuals coming from 
federal states to be more willing to assume multiple identities. National pride as a 
national context-forming factor has the largest effect over identities. Being proud of 
one’s country significantly decreases the odds of European identity in general. How long 
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one’s country has been in the EU and national casualties during the WWII have 
relatively smaller effects.  The odds of European only, European/National and 
National/European identities are all higher relative to exclusive national identification if 
one’s country is an EU member for a long time. Earlier the result of the discrete changes 
in the probabilities had shown that WWII casualties either decreased the probabilities of 
European only and National/ European outcome or increased the likelihood of 
European/National outcome. The odds plots clarify this relationship further. The 
aforementioned points are validated, yet the only significant part of this relationship is 
that the odds of European only and National/European identities are lower relative to 
national only identity.  
 The above discussions of the results show that the majority of the shift in terms 
of loyalties is between exclusive national identity and the rest of the identity categories 
that can be jointly called post-national identity. Though to a smaller extent, there is a 
certain degree of the movement within the European identity options motivated by 
particularly the definition of we-hood, attitude on multiculturalism, the type of state 
structure and strength of national pride. 
 My initial intention was to see how the hypotheses I derived from SIT and 
Multiple Identity Theories affect both national and European identities and their 
combinations. This was the main reason why lumping together all the identities in 
Europe was not preferable to an MNL model where I could clarify the inner variation of 
identity categories with European dimension. After seeing these relationships and 
reaching the conclusion that some of the identity categories are not significantly 
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differentiated by the explanatory variables in this study, it would be interesting to see 
how these results change if a Binomial Logit (BNL) analysis was applied to the same 
data. Specifically, the dependent variable that previously had four categories could be 
collapsed in a way to create a dichotomous conceptualization of identities: the exclusive 
national identities and those post-national identities that incorporate European identity 
with different ordinal status (secondary, primary and exclusive). I will call the latter 
“European identity” as it signifies a willingness on the part of the EU citizens to 
mentally associate themselves with a European society and the accompanying 
governance structure that has clear nation-state transcending implications. Below are the 
Table 5 and Table 6 which present the coefficients from this BNL model and the 
associated variation in predicted probabilities (derived from these coefficients) 
respectively. 
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TABLE 5 Logit Model of European Identity as Social Identity, 2000 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
      
      Parameter estimate Standard Error 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Social identity principles 
 Positive Image of the EU  0.8209**  0.1605 
 Empowerment by the EU  0.8275**  0.1593 
 Affect for the EU   0.7348**  0.1148 
 They-hood    0.0132   0.1197 
 We-hood    0.4097**  0.0935 
Individual Context 
 Knowledge of the EU Politics 0.1626**  0.0208 
 Multiculturalism   0.7641**  0.0929 
National Context 
 Federal State    0.5567**  0.1157 
 National Pride    -0.8733**  0.1558 
 Length of the EU Membership 0.0190**  0.0028 
 WWII Death Toll   -0.9064**  0.0350 
 
 Constant    -2.376**  0.1605 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
LR Test Statistic [14]  1115.88 
Pseudo R-squared  0.23 
Correctly predicted %  75.55 
Reduction in error %  35.28 
N    3587 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 2000. 
Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent identifies with the EU in 15 member states. 
The LR test statistic is chi-squared with a 1 % critical value of 29.14. The naïve model that everyone feels 
European correctly predicts 62.22% of the cases. 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (one-tailed t-tests). 
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TABLE 6 Discrete Changes in the Predicted Probability of the Logit Model of 
   European Identity as Social Identity 
 
 
       x=minimum x=maximum Difference 
 
  
Social identity principles 
 Image of the EU   0.500  0.694  0.194 
 Empowerment by the EU  0.498  0.694  0.196 
 Affect for the EU   0.512  0.687  0.174 
 We-hood    0.598  0.692  0.093 
Individual context 
 Multiculturalism   0.511  0.692  0.181 
 EU-info    0.490  0.806  0.316  
National Context 
 Federal State    0.606  0.729  0.123 
  
 National Pride    0.801  0.627  -0.174 
 Length of the EU Membership 0.537  0.725  0.188  
 WWII Death Toll   0.675  0.569  -0.106 
 
Notes: Only statistically significant variables are reported.  
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 As can be seen from the results in Table 5, most of the variables have signs in the 
expected direction along with statistically significant parameter estimates (all at 0.01 
level). Clearly, BNL results not only confirm earlier findings of MNL model, but also 
amplify some variable’s impact on the state of sense of belonging in the Euroland. 
Except for consciousness of out-group (i.e., they-hood), all of the variables are powerful 
predictors of mass identification with the EU. Unlike the rest of the explanatory 
variables, national pride and high WWII national death toll has negative relationship 
with European identity.  
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 Some of the observations from Table 6 can be summarized as follows: If one 
attributes a positive image to the EU, his/her probability of feeling European is .19 
higher than one who does not view the EU positively. Benefits derived from the EU 
increase one’s probability of identifying with the EU by .20. Affect for the EU, 
similarly, increases one’s probability of identifying with the EU by .17. National context 
also powerfully shapes the probabilities of European identity. Federal state structure one 
is coming from increases the probability of identifying with the EU by .12 perhaps 
owing to the perception that the EU is the last chain of a multilevel governance structure 
in place in these countries. Varying the length of EU membership from its minimum of 5 
years to its maximum of 48 years (at the time of the survey) causes an increase of .19 in 
predicted probabilities. Both the national pride and the national battle deaths during the 
WWII reduce EU citizens’ sense of Europeanness. If one is proud of one’s nation, 
his/her probability of developing loyalty to the EU is .17 lower. Varying the battle 
deaths from its minimum of 0 to its maximum of 5.01 decreases the predicted probability 
of European identity from .68 to .57, a decrease of .11. 
 Knowledge of the EU politics dramatically increases the probability of European 
identity. It has, indeed, by far the biggest effect of any of the independent variables 
considered in this analysis on European identity: .32. Multiculturalist stand also increase 
one’s likelihood of identifying with the EU by .18.  
 In light of these findings, clearly, the positive image of the EU, empowering 
effects of its policies, the resulting affective attachment to the EU and the evolving 
internal solidarity among European citizens—depending on the conditioning effects of 
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the individual and national context— all determine whether one will identify oneself as 
European or not.  
The next logical question would be who the EU empowers. As I argued in the 
theory section, in this model, I treated empowerment as resulting from both economic 
and non-economic benefits. The question of who the EU economically (or materially) 
empowers is studied in the literature extensively. According to the trends established in 
these studies, those who have higher education and income as well as the younger 
generation benefit more from the EU for they are better equipped to take advantage of 
the opportunities provided by the EU.  Similarly, the work sector one is engaged in is 
bound have some effect on the influence of the EU on one’s well-being. In some ways, 
the EU is known to suppress the welfare arrangements in member states. Women in 
addition to the elderly are more prone to the effects of this trend. One could argue that 
individuals living in cohesion fund zones are clearly empowered by the EU. On the other 
hand, non-economic benefits are largely political (though in some cases cognitive) in 
nature. Previous research already found that those who have marginal ethnic identities 
feel suppressed by the hegemonic national identities and, hence, appreciate the broader 
European identity as a way of bypassing the national identities (Kohli 2000). This logic 
can be broadened to include any groups that feel marginalized due to cultural or 
religious reasons. Furthermore, dual citizens and border populations might find it easier 
to present themselves as European (Kohli 2000, 131). Similarly, evaluations of national 
and European democracies give a clue as to who might appreciate the EU as a source of 
political empowerment. Those who frequently travel and live in other EU member states 
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are likely to appreciate the opportunities of the EU. Particularly, the latter group might 
feel empowered by the EU as it grants them voting rights not only in European elections 
but also in local elections through European citizenship that otherwise would not be 
granted to them on the grounds that they are not the citizens of the host country.  The 
citizens of smaller member states might appreciate their country’s increased voice in 
world politics as they are part of a group that makes them more than what they are on 
their own.  Obradovic (1996) argues that legitimacy of a governing structure depends on 
whether the political authority meets the needs of its citizens and reflects the values of 
the governed. If a governing structure is perceived as the embodiment of those values 
that are central to the self-definition of individuals governed by those structures, it is 
likely that individuals will see the political authority as furthering their self-expression 
and self-interest. Thus, those EU citizens who define themselves and the EU in the same 
value terms are likely to feel empowered by the EU. Although these initial ideas shed 
some light on the issue of whose evaluations of the EU are likely to be favorable, the 
issue remains outside the scope of this study. There is clearly need for future research to 
pursue this issue further through rigorous analyses.  
 At the end of the day, these findings can be viewed as self-evident. But they, I 
believe, are not obvious without the consistent framework of the theoretical backing as 
well as the subsequent testing I provided. Many studies reveal unexpected results that go 
against what seemed obvious a priori. Furthermore, in light of great variation across the 
EU countries, it is prudent that one is wary of such an automatic evaluation. 
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Consciousness of out-group, for example, surprisingly did not prove to make a 
difference for European identity.  
 An interesting question to consider is whether the logic of the analysis may be 
reversed. Perhaps. But this is less of an indication that there is a mistake in the direction 
of causality than the point that once an identity is formed it becomes a driving force on 
its own for future perceptions of interests and images. Referring to this two way-
relationship between identity and subsequent social/political behavior, Lawler argues 
that “as choice-processes make collective attachments stronger, the collective 
attachments in turn transform choice processes into ritual affirmations of the collective” 
(1992, 336). In other words, when an individual identifies with a social group, the 
subsequent behavior of that individual depends on the definitions of group welfare and 
interests. Individual perceptions of welfare and interests become tied to perceptions of 
group welfare and interests. However, I believe that the direction of causality in the 
Social Identity Theories is quite clear. Identity is first formed as a rational response to 
some outside stimulus that activates the cognitive and emotive roots of an identity. 
Dormant identities (i.e., those identity options that are theoretically possible but not 
activated yet) are stimulated by a social group that proves its worth to the individual and 
in return the individual develops an attachment to the group. Only after that, identity can 
become an independent variable that can account for the subsequent preferences on 
developments with regard to the original social group.  
For example, Luna-Arocas et al (2001) show that citizens of both Spain and 
Portugal supported the adoption of euro because they perceive it as a symbol of 
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European identity rather than as a source of economic benefits. Up to here one could see 
that identity can reverse the casual logic. Yet the reason why citizens of Spain and 
Portugal want to strengthen symbols of European identity is interesting. They see 
European identity as a means of strengthening their democracy and their recognition as 
European that allows them to conceive their self-image more positively. In other words, 
yes, identity affects their attitude on euro but it is because they see euro as strengthening 
their identity which is a result of the empowering effect of the social identity offered by 
the EU rather than Euro’s own empowering effect. Similarly, if identity was something 
that could be assumed prior to socialization with a group, we could not imagine why 
anyone who claims to feel European would not feel empowered by the EU. Yet, a 
manual worker will have many compelling reasons and objective criteria as to why s/he 
feels (or does not feel thereof) empowered by the EU. This brings us to the beginning of 
the theory I employ in the dissertation. Individuals identify only with those social groups 
by which they feel empowered. It is no new theory that identities affect political 
preferences and behavior. My focus is, however, on the sources of an identity rather than 
what that identity means for the subsequent political choices. 
Through the model I developed based on the SIT by Tajfel and Turner and 
Nested Identity Theory by Lawler, I aimed at contributing to the literature in several 
ways. As it can be seen from Table 7 where these contributions are summarized, firstly, 
the majority of the studies in the literature rely on single case or comparative case 
studies neglecting the examination of patterns that are at work across the EU rather than 
one or few member states. This is crucial for there is a great cross-country variation 
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within the EU with regard to mass attitudes on the EU-related issues. By carrying out a 
cross-sectional study based on data from 15 member states, I cross-validated the 
findings, reaching more robust and representative results. Secondly, many studies reach 
conclusions only through correlations or descriptive statistics. This study performed a 
complex series of analyses where the simultaneous effects of several variables were 
possible to examine. Thirdly, there is a lack of unifying conceptual framework in the 
literature. Many studies test ad hoc hypothesis where the broader theoretical 
understanding of European identity could benefit from a more consistent and cohesive 
construction.  By going to basics and starting from the original questions posed in Social 
Identity Theories, I believe, I was able to unify this disparate research under more 
general headings that can subsume many patterns within its sociological logic.  
 Lastly, I supplemented SIT of Tajfel and Turner with Nested Identity Theory of 
Lawler to address the instrumental-affective discussions. Many studies treat support for 
European integration as instrumental attachment to the EU and identification with the 
EU as affective attachment. Drawing on Easton’s works, others treat national identity as 
an affective form of attachment and European identity as an instrumental form of 
attachment, hence the two different forms of identification. I disagree with these 
reductionist approaches that exaggerate the clear-cut division between instrumental and 
affective identities. Rather than treating them as different types of identities, I see them 
as different components present in each identity that reinforce each other instead of 
functioning separately. Tajfel and Turner’s theory does briefly address the affect issue 
(by implying that the emotive significance of an identity is important), but is not 
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concerned with how affective and instrumental components of an identity might be 
related. Lawler argues that the long-term affective attachments to a social group grow 
along with the positive experiences with that social group. Supplementing Tajfel and 
Turner’s theory with Lawler’s logic, I argued that instrumental and affective evaluations 
of the EU should both affect European identity at the same time and if this theory is right 
such evaluations would have significant independent effects on European identity 
simultaneously. As—even in the presence of deficiencies of the present dataset used in 
this analysis— results yield strong independent effects of both components on the 
individual identification with the EU, the robustness of the theory is all the more telling. 
The model I presented addressed all aspects of the social identity theory of Tajfel 
(positive image, consciousness of in-group and out-group members, and affective 
significance of group membership), Lawler’s nested identity theory (empowerment and 
affect component), and individual qualities and national qualities both of which prepare 
the context for individual understanding of self and Europeanness. I also addressed the 
issue of context-bound nature of salience of identities that is integrated in both theories 
but did not test it due to data unavailability. I, however, discussed possible ways of 
testing them if I had the data. There is no single model in the literature that I am aware 
of where all these dimensions are integrated and tested together.  In sum, this 
dissertation aimed at contributing to the debate not by advancing new ideas or theories, 
but rather by uniting existing theories in a single model and testing them across the EU 
with a complex analysis to ensure robustness and cross-validation of the patterns.  
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TABLE 7 Contributions of the European Identity as Social Identity  
  Model 
 
Hypothesis Status Contribution 
Positive image of the 
EU 
confirmed  
Empowerment by the 
EU 
confirmed Not tested before in broad terms and together with 
affective concerns in the same model 
Affect for the EU confirmed Not tested before 
We-hood confirmed Not tested before 
They-hood disconfirmed Not tested before—unexpected finding 
Education confirmed  
Multiculturalism confirmed Not tested before in identity context 
Federalism confirmed Not tested before 
National Pride confirmed  
Length of EU 
Membership 
confirmed  
WWII Death Toll confirmed Not tested before in identity context 
Notes: 
****A cohesive theoretical framework that brings leading theories together in a single model  
****Cross-national coverage rather than single or comparative case studies where only two or 
few countries are considered. 
****Complex MNL analysis reaches conclusions by controlling for the simultaneous effects of 
many variables rather than correlations or descriptive statistics. 
**** It integrates instrumental and affective components of identity in the same model arguing 
that both play an independent effect on identity. Instrumental component is theoretically more 
than mere economic implications of the EU on individual well-being. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 What we now need to build is a union of hearts and minds, underpinned  
 by a strong shared sentiment of a common destiny – a sense of common  
 European citizenship. We come from different countries. We speak  
 different languages. We have different historical and cultural traditions.  
 And we must preserve them. But we are seeking a shared identity – a  
 new European soul. 
 -Romano Prodi’s address to the European Parliament, September 1999, as cited 
 by Leitner (2000, 21). 
 
Created as a result of the catastrophes of the 20th century in Europe, the European 
Union was designed to transcend the nation-state and its destructive ideologies of ethnic 
nationalism. Half a century after its foundation, the EU stands as the most compelling 
example of regional integration that has helped many warring countries in Europe to 
reconcile and peacefully transform the way they think about each other and European 
politics. The EU constitutes the identity, interests and the culture of not only its member 
states. It has also become a forceful determinant of identity and interests of those outside 
the EU. As Laffan (2004, 79-80) argues, it is clear that the majority of the countries in 
the broader Europe cannot escape the significance of the EU cognizant of the fact that 
their inclusion or exclusion from the EU carries great implications for their economic 
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prosperity, foreign policy and their overall weight in world politics; hence the EU 
“successfully appropriated the term Europe for itself” (80).  
Considering the extent of integration within the EU, any account of European 
integration that sees this process only in economic and political terms would be 
incompetent to present a complete picture of the reality. Particularly starting with the 
Maastricht Treaty, every treaty (Amsterdam, Nice and the current draft Treaty 
establishing a constitution for Europe) has taken the integration process further into 
realms that were previously outside its jurisdiction. In the process, the EU has perhaps 
not reached yet its goal of ‘Political Union’, but it is clearly more than what is 
considered an international organization.  The EU is becoming a cultural actor creating a 
social sphere for different European nationalities to interact with and understand each 
other. One implication of this is that European leaders need to make sure that they win 
the hearts and minds of Europeans for the EU and the collective it is in the process of 
forming. The broader legitimacy of the EU hinges on the popular identification with the 
Union and fellow EU citizens regardless of nationality, language, religion or ethnicity 
differences. For the extending EU jurisdiction and decisions taken by qualified majority 
to be perceived as legitimate, Europeans need to come to think of other EU citizens as 
fellow members of a European collective and the EU as ‘our’ government both of which 
has the legitimate power to take decisions on behalf of all Europeans. Thus, identity 
issues have become very costly for European leaders to neglect. Unlike the early decades 
of European unification, a sense of ‘Europeanness’ cannot be expected to simply and 
naturally flow from the institutional development and economic benefits alone provided 
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by the EU. The significance of public approval of and loyalty to the EU is illustrated by 
the controversial referenda of European Treaties, the latest of which led to the current 
constitutional crisis of the EU. Clearly the European public has to be considered as an 
important ‘veto player’ (Tsebelis 2002) in the integration process.  
With these considerations in mind, this dissertation focused on the question of a 
collective identity that is evolving within the EU. The main puzzle was concerned with 
understanding what determines the various adherence levels of Europeans to their 
nation-states and the EU alternatively. Before dealing with this question directly, in 
chapter II, I focused on clarifying some points about European identity in order to place 
its theoretical and empirical evaluation in the due context. First, I reviewed the reasons 
for the popularity of the identity issues in European politics in detail. In addition to the 
extent of deepening, I discussed the impact of the end of Cold War on images and social 
boundaries in Europe. The end of the Cold War, indeed, rendered the old assumptions of 
European identity obsolete warranting a revision of who ‘we’ and ‘they’ are in the new 
Europe. Secondly, I discussed what kind of a European identity is credible for the EU. 
Reviewing its historical, cultural and civic components, I repeated the well-known fact 
that European countries do not have enough cultural/historical/ethnic commonality for a 
European identity with primordial connotations. Not withstanding its fundamentalist 
implications on identities that the EU is established to avoid in the first place, such an 
organic definition of European identity would be hard to promote as it would increase 
the perception of the EU threat for national cultures and identities, but perhaps more 
importantly it would be ill-equipped to represent the extent of heterogeneity both 
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between and within the comprising nation-states. The only viable option for the EU is to 
promote a civic form of identity that values common norms and values as joint reference 
points instead of alleged ethnic or cultural similarities. 
In chapter II, I also reviewed the previous literature on European identity noting 
the leading findings. I pointed out some of the shortcomings of this literature. The need 
to differentiate between European identity and support for the EU is particularly noted. 
Furthermore, the lack of systematic and empirical studies on European identity across 
the EU stands out as a major gap in the literature. 
In chapter III, I focused on the main question this dissertation sets out to 
investigate: sources of European identity. To answer this question, I developed a 
theoretical framework that heavily draws upon the literature of social psychology. I 
argued that alone institutional presence of the EU or the reductionist efforts of European 
leaders to increase the salience of the EU in everyday lives of European citizens through 
several symbols of European integration cannot guarantee a genuine sense of belonging 
at the European level. The mere existence of an identity option will not lead to the 
adoption of that identity if human beings are sophisticated and rational decision-makers. 
In fact, for an identity to be genuine, it should be felt and internalized by the individual 
as an indispensable part of self and its representation. Therefore I argued that we should 
approach European identity as an instance of ‘social identity’.  
Based on Social Identity Theory developed by Tajfel (1970, 1974, and 1982) and 
Tajfel and Turner (1979), and Multiple Identity literature (mostly Lawler 1992), I 
formed several hypotheses about the possibility of European identity. According to the 
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SIT, every social identity entails cognitive, evaluative and affective dimensions.  
Individuals should be cognizant of their group membership that is valued for its positive 
contribution to their self-definition and has an emotional significance. The first set of 
hypotheses I derived from the SIT focused on the cognitive and evaluative aspect of 
European identity. Accordingly, I expected that those individuals who ascribed the EU a 
positive image and feel empowered by the EU are more likely to feel European. Based 
on the affective component of social identities, I expected those individuals who have 
affect for the EU to feel more European. Furthermore, I formed hypotheses about the 
social boundary formation that is essential to any identity formation process. An 
understanding of out-groups and a sense of solidarity with fellow in-groups are essential 
to establish a ‘wir-gefühl’. Although this social delineation of boundaries is subjectively 
drawn, it results in objective conditions that represent status of different individuals. 
Thus I expected that the presence of these two components of boundary demarcation in 
mental maps to be conducive to the likelihood of European identity. Drawing upon the 
previous literature and SIT, I also formed hypotheses about individual and national 
qualities that condition the first few hypotheses as individuals perceive and experience 
the EU differently not only due to personal differences but also due to reasons that stem 
from them being members of different nations with specific histories and traditions. In 
this context, knowledge of the EU, personal stand on multiculturalism, state structure 
one is coming from, national pride, years of EU membership and national death toll in 
the WWII are considered. The analysis is controlled for education, age and gender. 
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The testing of these propositions is done through a Multinomial Logit Model and 
the data are compiled mostly from Eurobarometer survey data (Eurobarometer 53) from 
2000. The results confirmed all of my hypotheses except for out-group consciousness. 
Positive image of the EU, empowerment by the EU, one’s affect for the EU, knowledge 
of the EU politics, favorable opinion on multiculturalism, federal state structure, length 
of EU membership, and internal solidarity (i.e., we-hood) among Europeans all have 
positive relationship with all three identity categories with a European dimension 
(National/European, European/National and European) and reduce the probability of 
exclusive National identification dramatically. National pride has consistently negative 
relationship with all categories of post-national identity (i.e., National/European, 
European/National and only European) and increase the exclusive National identity. The 
national casualties during the WWII increase the probability of National identity and 
European/National identity while reducing the probability of National/European and 
European identities. Delineation of the EU from nonEU citizens decreases the 
probability of European identity as the predominant or the sole identity. I argued that this 
unexpected result can be explained by the argument that even though Europeans might 
have a benign sense of who is a European and who is a nonEuropean, such a 
demarcation might fall short of producing the usual objective exclusionary effects 
toward out-groups that can easily be observed in another case of social identity. This is 
because in the case of European identity adverse demarcation and discrimination on the 
aforementioned grounds are incompatible with the true spirit of European identity.  One 
of the values that constitute the core of European identity is respect for pluralism and 
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commitment to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, ethnicity and culture. 
Thus, based on Erickson’s (1995) differentiation, I argued that in the case of European 
identity the definition of Other might be done through a culture of 
‘complementarization’ rather than ‘dichotomization’. 
The largest shift of identities is seen between exclusive national identity and 
post-national identities. The analysis, however, yielded that some of the variables do not 
significantly differentiate within the postnational identity cluster.  For example, although 
positive image of and empowerment by the EU makes European identity in the form of 
multiple identities or ‘European only’ identity more likely, none of the categories are 
differentiated by these variables. Affect, on the other hand, significantly increases the 
odds of European/National identity relative to National/European identity by allowing 
EU citizens a leap in the primacy of identities. Similarly, one’s experience with federal 
state increases the odds of ‘European only’ identity relative to the multiple identities, 
while one’s national pride renders European identity in its manifestation as sole or 
leading form of identity less likely. Another variable that differentiates within the group 
of postnational identities is the length of EU membership. In those states that have been 
in the EU longer, the complete shift of loyalties from the nation-state to the EU is more 
likely relative to multiple and exclusive national identities. Lastly, while 
multiculturalism increases the odds of European/National identity relative to 
National/European identity, internal cohesion and spirit of we-hood increases the 
likelihood of ‘European only’ identity relative to multiple identities with a European 
dimension. In light of these findings, I also tested an alternative model based on a BNL 
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analysis. If most of the shift between identity outcomes is taking place between 
exclusive National identity and post-national (European identities in multiple or 
exclusive form) identities, BNL would sharpen this relationship and allow me to 
demonstrate the patterns more clearly. The results confirmed the findings of MNL 
model. 
 What are the implications of this study for the future of the EU and its identity 
consequences? EU citizens will identify with the EU if they continue to attribute a 
positive image to it and see it as a source of major economic, political and social benefits 
that give them a sense of increased control in their everyday lives. One might think that 
positive image is a result of empowering effects of the EU. This logic is partly true but 
viewing an entity positively has also a dimension that stems purely from the qualities of 
the entity in its own right. In this sense, political events where the EU seems disabled or 
incompetent to act as a strong union hurts the overall image of the EU rendering a 
negative perception more likely. For example, the inaction of the EU during the ethnic 
cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia despite the public support as well as the disconcerted 
reactions from the EU member states during the initial phases of the controversial Iraq 
war in 2003 are bound to project an image on behalf of the EU that is not likely to 
encourage the EU citizens to shift their loyalties and expectations from their respective 
nation-states to the EU with confidence.  
The complex relationship between affect and the value of a social group is 
discussed in chapter III. If affect flows from the social value of the group, clearly 
increasing the value of the EU in everyday lives of Europeans will contribute to an 
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increasing degree of emotional significance of the EU over time. However, European 
elites, based on the social identity theory, cannot intervene to reinforce the affect 
component of European identity directly. The parts of European identity that they can 
influence are the cognitive and evaluative aspects. Affect is a natural result of the 
genuine internalization of a social identity based on its social value over time. 
Nevertheless, whether this theoretical expectation receives empirical support is 
something to be investigated in future research when time series data on the issue are 
available.  
 Although federal state structure, national pride and national death toll in the 
WWII impact an individual’s context to perceive the EU and its effects in a certain way, 
these variables hold relatively smaller potential for policy makers to manipulate in order 
to help foster a European identity. For example, one is either from a federal state or not. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that for upcoming generations, those variables that 
condition the national context for the perception of the EU are likely to hold less of a 
determining force. How much a nation is proud of its history and heritage in itself does 
not constitute a threat to identification with the EU. However, the way this pride is 
integrated into the national discourses in relation to a European identity is determining. 
This study proved earlier research that those individuals with less national pride are 
more willing to adopt a European identity. However, particular national discourses and 
how national pride is embedded in these discourses in conjunction with the identity the 
EU projects would help us understand the extent of cross-country variation in the effect 
of such discourses among those individuals with national pride. In other words, it would 
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be interesting to see what conditions an individual’s willingness to identify with the EU 
despite his/her national pride. This is left for future research. Based on the previous 
literature, I discussed in chapter III that European integration has changed the tone and 
configuration of some national discourses. The relationship between the passage of time 
and the softening of such discourses (particularly those discourses where national pride 
is prevalent) is also an interesting issue for future research to investigate. 
 Similarly, the battle deaths during the WWII of the EU member states are fixed. 
However, the intensity of these memories is likely to decrease with the passage of time. 
Thus, the upcoming generations of the EU member countries are likely to be influenced 
less and less by this variable, even if these experiences continue to figure in national 
discourses. This prospect is all the more likely due to the socialization effects of 
inclusion of European history and integration in school curriculums written from a more 
favorable and joint perspective. A content analysis of national discourses on these two 
points and evaluation of change in their course over time would be an interesting project 
for future research.  
 An area where European policy makers could actively engage in advancing 
European identity is promotion of a sense of internal cohesion and solidarity. Clearly, 
many of the symbols that the EU introduces (Euro and the European citizenship being 
the most prominent of these symbols) aim at increasing this perception of commonality 
among Europeans. Other than introduction of symbols, there are some EU policies that 
more actively spread a sense of ‘identity’ and internal solidarity. Cohesion fund and the 
related fiscal transfers are the best examples of such policies. However, the success of 
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these policies in promoting a ‘wir-gefühl’ hinges on whether the public ascribes the due 
credit to the EU. In some cases where national governments do a poor job of public 
relations in making the EU’s cohesion fund contributions known, such policies of 
helping out the poorer regions will not foster a feeling of internal solidarity. An 
improved system of information dissemination is likely to help the broader process of 
European integration as well as increasing public consciousness of contributions made 
from other EU countries in a spirit of internal solidarity. 
The biggest symbol suggested to date of such a sense of we-hood at the European 
level is the draft Constitution of the EU. The link between a constitution and collective 
identity is well established in the literature. Of particular importance is the debate on 
‘verfassungspatriotismus’, a concept developed by Jürgen Habermas (2001) referring to 
a form of civic identity based on an allegiance to common norms and values crystallized 
in a constitution. Paradoxically, the overwhelming ‘no’ that came out of the recent 
French and Dutch referenda (on May 29 and June 1, 2005 respectively) on the European 
Constitution has given the first signs of reluctance of Europeans to associate themselves 
with the polity such a constitution was to define.  
Some of the issues that appeared to cause referenda failure have clear identity 
implications. One of the biggest issues handled in the constitution was institutional 
reform that would have increased the efficiency of the EU with 25 member states. 
Increased applicability of qualified majority voting was particularly a powerful means of 
resolving the decision-making predicament in an enlarged Union. Qualified majority 
voting warrants the EU citizens to accept other Europeans’ decisions as valid and 
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legitimate. A majority of the voters who are skeptical of a Turkish membership in the 
EU associated the European constitution in their minds with Turkish entry in the EU, 
seeing the referenda as a plebiscite on Turkish membership. This, too, has identity 
implications. As mentioned earlier, there is more than one way of imagining Europe. 
While to those who perceive the EU as a civic Union Turkish membership is acceptable, 
to those who imagine European unity in historical or cultural terms, Turkey continues to 
serve as the other of European identity as it did for centuries during the reign of the 
Ottoman Empire.  
Initial reports, however, also showed that many voters had increasing 
unemployment and job transfer to the new member states (including possibly Turkey, a 
country of 67 million populations) in mind as they voted for the European Constitution. 
Loss of social benefits is, indeed, a major concern for majority of Europeans. This is all 
the more telling particularly if one accepts the fact that identity attachments are not 
likely to change overnight in response to temporal events. In other words, the negative 
reaction to the European Constitution during French and Dutch referenda might be more 
of an indication that EU citizens are questioning the validity and effectiveness of the 
structural blueprint (along with the associated welfare concerns) the constitution is 
suggesting rather than a refusal of European identity. However, in light of Lawler’s 
argument, if affective and evaluative components of identity draw on each other (which 
this study showed that they both do impact on identities simultaneously), pervasive 
dissatisfaction with the EU structures due to a sense of loss of control in one’s life can 
over the long term have an impact on identity by reducing both evaluative and affective 
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attachments to the EU. Earned social benefits might prove difficult for the EU to take 
away without any negative backlash on the identity front. 
What these concerns together suggest is that winning the hearts and minds of the 
EU citizens for further deepening is critical. Identity concerns are everywhere; they 
affect the perceptions of Europeans of their interests, self-definition, and range of 
acceptable actions in their everyday lives towards in-group and out-group members, and 
ultimately what kind of a ‘European collective’ they imagine. In light of these realities, 
identity politics is likely to be the most critical ingredient of the efforts on European 
integration motivating or curtailing the developments toward a genuine Political Union 
among European peoples. European identity can hardly be called a marginal field of 
study for the students of the European Union.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A1 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables in the Identities in 
   the EU Analysis 
 
Variables    Mean S.D. Min. Max. % N  
Image    0.7 0.5 0 1 68.7 9925  
  
Empowerment   0.7 0.5 0 1 67.5 7444  
EU affect   0.7 0.5 0 1 72.8 9353  
Federal   0.3 0.5 0 1 31.8 16078  
National pride   0.9 0.3 0 1 89.3 15495  
Length of EU Membership 29.5 17.1 5 48  16078  
WWII Death Toll  1.7 1.7 0 5.013  16078 
Education   15.8 7.1 0 39  16066  
  
Multiculturalism  0.7 0.5 0 1 71.6 14217  
They-hood   0.8 0.4 0 1 77.8 16078  
We-hood   0.4 0.5 0 1 42.6 14980  
EU Info   4.3 2.1 1 10  15757 
Male    0.5 0.5 0 1 47.6 16078  
Age    43.8 17.8 15 99  16078 
_______________________________________________________________________  
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 2000.    
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TABLE A2 Per Capita Death Toll of EU Member States during WWII 
 
 
 
 
Country 
WWII national causalities
(percentage of population 
as of 1939) 
Belgium 1.787 
Denmark 0.079 
Greece 0.886 
Italy 0.5 
Spain 0.086 
Franc 1.611 
Ireland 0 
Luxembourg 1.678 
Netherlands 2.346 
Portugal 0 
Finland 2.703 
Sweden 0 
Austria 4.146 
Germany 5.013 
UK 0.942 
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FIGURE A1 Discrete Change in Predicted Probabilities for European identity as 
   Social  Identity* 
 
 
 *N=National only, U=National/European, A=European/National, E=European only
 Change in Predicted Probability for socid
 -.2  -.15  -.1  -.06  -.01  .04  .09  .13  .18
 U A E N
 U A E N
 U A E N
 U A  E N
 U A E N
 U A E N
 Positive Image of the EU-0/1
 Empowerment by the EU-0/1
 Affect for the EU-0/1
 They-hood-0/1
 We-hood-0/1
 Knowledge of the EU-std
 
 Change in Predicted Probability for socid
 -.2  -.15  -.1  -.06  -.01  .04  .09  .13  .18
 U A E N
 U A E N
 U A  E  N
 U A E N
 U  A E  N
 Multiculturalism-0/1
 Federal State Structure-0/1
 National Pride-0/1
 Length of EU Membership-std
National Death Toll in WWII-std
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TABLE A3 Tabulation of Individual EU Member States and the Binary Explanatory Variables 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 2000, European Commission. 
       Image      
 
  0           1 
Empowerment 
 
  0           1 
    Affect 
 
   0            1 
    Federal 
 
  0           1 
   National Pride 
 
   0        1 
    Multilateral 
 
    0       1 
They-hood 
 
0           1 
We-hood 
 
0            1 
Belgium 138 544 131 268 128 491   0 1063 211 825 362 607 127 936 599 421 
Denmark 312 298 128 300 306 281 1000 0 75 907 260 659 296 704 373 601 
Greece 87 510 91 368 71 646 1004 0 21 979 514 369 108 896 597 378 
Italy  94 655 118 282 42 717 1000 0 100 870 222 653 315 685 405 547 
Spain  61 560  58 556 62 531  0 1000 74 881 126 753  368 632 364 561 
France 167 496 158 210 123 485 1002 0 121 813 208 714 178 824 573 389 
Ireland 47 667 47 587 109 389 1000 0 10 979 241 628 249 751 550 356 
Luxembourg 82 298 68 206   83 242 600 0 60 508 134 419  66 534 341 236 
Netherlands 198 370 161 280 125 369 975 0 107 858 190 724 137 838 683 248 
Portugal 63 612 55 445 56 684 1000 0 47 938 207 631 291 709 500 407 
Finland 266 338 165 287 202 264 1010 0 56 944 249 672 217 793 489 485 
Sweden 426 268 258 193 309 350 1000 0 78 895 162 784 396 604 352 605 
Austria 361 231 229 248 202 264 0 1005 84 852 284 522 259 746 581 231 
Germany 402 666 465 493 437 734 0 2049 536 1338 636 1084 190 1859       1373 537 
UK 403 308 289 300 288 341 1370 0 76 1252 234 969 358 1012 821 377 
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